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CHAPTER I  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Where democracies have no middle class,  
and the poor are greatly superior in number,  
trouble ensues and they are speedily ruined” 
 
Aristotle, Politics IV1 
 
Why do unequal economies produce fragile democracies? At least since Aristotle, 
philosophers and theorists have believed that countries characterized by high economic 
inequality are not likely to be able sustain democracy. In particular, the literature suggests that in 
economically divided societies, where a large proportion of the population is economically 
deprived and few are exceptionally prosperous, social and political conflict is inevitable, and 
may ultimately result in revolution (Gurr 1970; Midlarsky 1986; Muller and Seligson 1987). 
Thus, just as the well-known contention that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the 
chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1961) has received great attention in the literature 
so too has the assertion that “no middle class, no democracy” (Moore 1966) been a popular 
mantra in the field. Surprisingly, however, despite extensive research, the underlying 
mechanisms through which economic inequality might erode democratic stability and the role 
that ordinary citizens may play in this process have not been elucidated.  By placing ordinary 
                                                 
1 In Aristotle, Barker and Stalley (1998). 
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citizens at the center of the causal chain, my dissertation seeks to explore in an empirical 
manner the “black box” of how economic inequality may prevent the sustainability of robust 
democracy. 
The bulk of the empirical literature indicates that once democracy has been established, 
economic underdevelopment and inequality work against the consolidation of democratic 
regimes. Indeed, the finding that strong democracies are more likely to be found in economically 
developed countries constitutes one of the few empirical regularities in political science; 
additionally, it is also well established that in countries characterized by high economic 
inequality, democracy is more likely to breakdown (Geddes 1999; Geddes 2007). However, 
interestingly enough, although at the country level the economic factors associated with 
democratic stability are well-known, the micro-foundations or individual level dynamics that 
explain such correlations remain largely unexplored. This limitation in the empirical literature 
has led some observers to conclude that “given the quality and amount of effort expended on 
understanding democratization, it is frustrating to understand so little” (Geddes 2007 319).  
Since most empirical studies that address the topic consist of macro analyses that rely 
exclusively on aggregate data at the country level, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to 
empirically test the channels through which economic underdevelopment and inequality are 
likely to affect democratic stability. Most empirical studies do not specify the process through 
which citizens internalize the information provided by the features of the economic environment 
in which they reside, and how it shapes their political attitudes and in turn favors or mitigates 
political conflict. A missing piece in the democratization literature is citizens’ role in preventing 
or fomenting democratic stability under particular economic contexts.  
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Thus, ordinary citizens, the very actors behind aggregate indicators, have been for the most 
part overlooked in the empirical literature that examines the impact of economic structural 
factors on democratization. Differing from previous works, by adopting a multilevel strategy, this 
study simultaneously takes into account the characteristics of both the economic structure and 
citizens for understanding the economic basis of democratic stability. 
Generally, most qualitative and statistical works on the topic emphasize one point: economic 
inequality generates envy and discontent. As a consequence, it has been suggested that in 
unequal economies these negative feelings prevent the emergence of a widespread democratic 
political culture among the citizenry, resulting in weak democracies. Nevertheless, what 
democratic attitudes are likely to be eroded, who are more likely to adopt undemocratic attitudes 
among the citizenry under these circumstances, and how this translates into political conflict 
remain underspecified. My dissertation aims at exploring each of these questions.  
The remaining pages of this introductory chapter summarize the theory that serves as the 
basis to build the main argument of my dissertation. It then presents the research design of this 
study and the methods and data to be employed. 
 
Theory 
As in Aristotle’s philosophy, the contemporary literature points out the “evils” of economic 
inequality for democratization. For instance,  in Polyarchy, one of the most influential works in 
the democratization literature, Dahl (1971) suggests that inequalities, including economic ones, 
work to endanger democracy because they result in a skewed distribution of “political resources 
and skills,” leading to “the creation of resentments and frustrations” among the citizenry. Thus, 
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for Dahl inequality is a primary source of discontent among the population, suggesting that it has 
a negative effect on citizens’ political attitudes.  
Similarly, Lipset (1961) stresses the importance of transforming the class structure of 
democratic societies from an “elongated pyramid” to a “diamond” shape, pointing out that “a 
large middle class tempers conflict by rewarding moderate and democratic parties and penalizing 
extremist groups” (Lipset 1961 51). Lipset goes further, suggesting that in underdeveloped and 
unequal societies, negative feelings such as envy and resentment grow especially among 
individuals at the bottom of the economic ladder, making them more vulnerable to the appeals of 
authoritarian political groups. Thus, according to Lipset, in societies with a weak middle class, 
the poor rather than the rich are more likely to show an undemocratic political culture. In fact, 
until recently Lipset’s view on the distinct political attitudes of the poor constituted the 
conventional wisdom in the field of comparative politics.  
Yet, recent empirical evidence for developing countries based on individual level data rejects 
the notion that the poor are unambiguously undemocratic (Krishna 2008). The works contained 
in Krishna’s (2008) edited volume, however, do not explore whether the features of economic 
environment where individuals reside, such as the extent of economic development and 
inequality, make the poor more likely to hold undemocratic attitudes. In order to answer the 
“who” question stated above, one of the objectives of this dissertation is to examine the political 
attitudes of individuals across economic groups taking into account the characteristics of the 
economic context. 
In contrast, other authors argue that, rather than the erosion of democratic attitudes among 
the citizenry, the main source of political instability in economically unequal democracies is the 
heightened conflict between the rich and poor over public policy choices (Boix 2003; Boix and 
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Stokes 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). It has been suggested that high levels of inequality 
and poverty lead to fervent disputes over public policies between the rich and poor, explaining 
why democracy is more likely to breakdown under these conditions. For instance, Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s (2006 20) formal model departs from the supposition that “most policy choices 
create distributional conflict,” adding that in nature “the rich and the poor have conflicting 
preferences over policies, and every policy choice creates winners and losers…with high taxes, 
the rich are the losers and the poor are the winners, whereas when low taxes are adopted, the 
roles are reversed.” Accordingly, they conclude that under conditions of high economic 
inequality democracy is less likely to consolidate because of more intense redistributive conflicts 
between the rich and poor. In sum, this approach draws attention to disagreements over public 
policies across economic classes as the main destabilizing force in economically unequal 
democracies. However, empirical evidence at the individual level corroborating these theories is 
almost nonexistent in the literature. 
Alternatively, my dissertation proposes an integrative approach for understanding the 
underpinnings of democratic instability under conditions of high economic inequality in 
developing countries. It considers both undemocratic attitudes and distributional conflicts as 
important sources of political turmoil in economically unequal democracies. The main argument 
of my dissertation is that through the erosion of a key democratic attitude, generalized 
interpersonal trust, the high levels of economic inequality that characterize most democracies in 
the developing world make political conflict over redistributive policies between the rich and 
poor  more likely, putting democratic stability at risk.  
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Therefore, this study identifies one of the components of social capital,2 generalized 
interpersonal trust,3 as an important wellspring of democratic stability, since it is likely to 
attenuate conflict over redistributive policies in unequal democracies. The reason for this is 
explained in turn. 
Since Almond and Verba’s (1963) seminal work, The Civic Culture, it has been well-
established that stable democracies show higher levels of interpersonal trust and consequently a 
widespread democratic political culture. Almond and Verba (1963 357-58) underscore the 
importance of interpersonal trust for democratic stability, stating that, 
“Social trust facilitates political cooperation among the citizens…and without it democratic 
politics is impossible…general social attitudes temper the extent to which emotional 
commitment to a particular political subgroup leads to political fragmentation. This general set of 
social attitudes, this sense of community over and above political differences, keeps the affective 
attachments to political groups from challenging the stability of the system. Furthermore, it acts 
as a buffer between the individual and the political system…these norms…place a limit on 
politics…this management of cleavage is accomplished by subordinating conflicts on the 
political level to some higher, overarching attitudes of solidarity” 
 
Thus, Almond and Verba suggest that interpersonal trust is a key democratic attitude for 
citizens to hold given that it neutralizes conflict across individuals even if they have antagonistic 
interests. Subsequently, based on this argument, it can be inferred that sharp conflict over the 
                                                 
2 “Social capital” defined as the “connections among individuals, social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam 2000 19), commonly operationalized in terms of participation in 
voluntary organizations and interpersonal trust, has been considered key for building robust and efficient 
democracies. 
3 Defining interpersonal trust is not an easy task. Many definitions of “interpersonal trust” can be found in the 
literature (Newton 2001 ; Hardin 2002 ; Uslaner 2002 ; Cook,Hardin and Levi 2005 ; Hardin 2006). For example, 
Newton (2001 202) defines interpersonal trust as “the actor’s belief that, at worst, others will not knowingly or 
willingly do him [her] harm, and at best, that they will act in his [her] interests.”  According to this definition, 
interpersonal trust is a rational response to the characteristics of those around us, contrasting with the view that 
interpersonal trust is the byproduct of norms or moral values learned through  a socialization process that have its 
roots in child rearing practices (Banfield 1958 ; Uslaner 2002). Thus, according to the rational approach, for 
interpersonal trust to grow, it first requires considering others trustworthy, and therefore the extent of interpersonal 
trust in a society is considered conditioned on the characteristics of the environment where individuals interact with 
each other (Nannestad 2008). By exploring how contextual economic characteristics and individual experiences 
shape citizens’ level of interpersonal trust, this study considers interpersonal trust largely the product of a rational 
process. 
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implementation of redistributive policies between the rich and poor in highly unequal 
democracies is likely to be less intense between trusting individuals even if they belong to 
different economic classes.  
Although social capital in the form of interpersonal trust is likely to play an important role in 
neutralizing conflict over redistributive policies between rich and poor particularly in unequal 
democracies, at the same time the literature indicates that interpersonal trust is less likely to 
flourish in places characterized by high economic inequality. Hence, interpersonal trust seems to 
be generally absent where it is most needed. Consequently, this research identifies a possible 
vicious circle in economically underdeveloped democracies between high economic inequality, 
low interpersonal trust, and low support for redistributive policies within certain segments of the 
population, especially among the wealthy.   
In sum, in developing countries, economic inequality is expected to foment negative attitudes 
for democracy among the citizenry, in particular interpersonal mistrust, that are likely to result in 
intense political conflict over redistributive policies and therefore in low support for such 
policies, and consequently in low probability that democratic governments will implement 
serious policies to redress economic disparities, perpetuating a state of poverty and economic 
inequality, mistrust, and political conflict between haves and have nots. 
 
The Latin American Context as a Case Study 
This study tests the aforementioned propositions in the Latin American context. As a region, 
Latin America and the Caribbean constitute a perfect setting for exploring how contextual factors 
such as poverty and inequality mold political attitudes of citizens, ultimately contributing to 
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political conflict or instability. High poverty and economic inequality and political conflict are 
some of the prototypical features of most countries in the region.  
In the past twenty years, Latin America has made significant progress in raising the standards 
of living of its population. According to the most recent data, the Latin American region as a 
whole shows a trend toward convergence with the developed world in quality of life indicators 
such as life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy rates, and access to basic services (ECLAC 
2007). Although these achievements have been praised by policy makers and seen as signs of 
modernization and economic development, these positive outcomes depict only partially the 
region’s socio-economic trends of recent years. These positive outcomes contrast sharply with 
the slow progress in poverty reduction and the lack of improvement in the distribution of 
economic resources in spite of the region’s  moderate economic growth.  
Meeting the goal of halving poverty rates by 2015, set at the 2000 United Nations 
Millennium Summit is now virtually impossible (IADB 2005; UN Millennium Project. 2005), 
and even more discouraging is the scenario for economic inequality. Latin America remains the 
most unequal region in the world, and even countries with the lowest economic inequality in the 
region, show higher inequality rates than any developed country in the world (De Ferranti 
2004).  Moreover, the absence of serious policies to redress inequality makes it very unlikely to 
significantly shrink the gap between haves and have nots in the near future (Sáinz 2007). 
“Unequal” economic development (i.e., high poverty and economic inequality) rather than 
economic development per se seems to best describe Latin America’s economic record over the 
past twenty years.  
Contrary to the expectations, after more than two decades of stunning economic and political 
transformations in Latin America, high poverty and inequality have endured. Transitions from 
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government led economic development to free market oriented strategies and from 
authoritarianism to democracy did not set the basis for the improvement of the already highly 
skewed distribution of economic resources. In fact, many suggest that economic liberalization 
(Portes and Hoffman 2003) and the exclusion of important sectors of the population in the 
negotiation of political pacts that facilitated the installment of elected governments (Bermeo 
1990; Karl 1990) have contributed to the perpetuation of poverty and economic disparity. In 
economic terms, these important reforms are said to have disproportionately favored economic 
elites. Thus, rather than lack of entrepreneurial ambition, enduring poverty and inequality in 
Latin America has been considered products of political processes (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2008) and consequently of the unbalanced influence of powerful economic minorities on state 
reforms and policies.4  
Discouraging is the fact that deep-seated economic inequality and high poverty in Latin 
America have been found detrimental for achieving high and sustained economic growth in the 
long-run (Birdsall,Ross and Sabot 1995; Londoño and Székely 2000), and it has also been 
suggested, although not proven empirically, that high poverty and inequality are jeopardizing 
democratic stability in the region as they erode social capital, particularly interpersonal trust, and 
produce disenchantment among the bulk of the population toward the political system (Márquez, 
et al. 2008), predicting a bleak future for Latin American democracies.  
Moreover, recent qualitative studies suggests that as a product of Latin America’s high 
inequality and poverty conflict over distributive policies across economic classes are keen in the 
region. Teichman (2008 446,56), for example, states that “while electoral democracy has 
propelled redistributive issues onto the policy agenda, redistributive struggles are intense and 
                                                 
4 According to a recent study from The World Bank, between a quarter and half of the income inequality among 
adults in Latin America is due to “inequality of opportunities” they faced early in life and “through no fault of their 
own” (Barros, et al. 2008). 
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progress in policy to address inequality is slow to emerge,” and concludes that “without at least 
the attempt at a new societal compromise distributional struggles will fester and less than optimal 
policy solutions will continue to be the norm,” suggesting that Latin American countries may be 
trapped in a vicious circle of underdevelopment and political instability. An important question 
that emerges is, of course, how societal compromises can be reached. In my dissertation, I claim 
that high levels of interpersonal trust among the citizenry are largely part of the answer. 
In sum, despite Latin America’s high poverty and economic inequality and the political 
turmoil that characterizes the region, the mechanisms through which these factors may be linked 
remained unexplored in the empirical literature.5 This study examines empirically the channels 
through which Latin America’s economic inequality may be fostering political conflict among 
the citizenry and the identity of the actors involved in this process.  
 
Research Outline 
In order to test the main argument of this research, I will proceed as follows. In the first 
stage (Chapter II), I will examine the sources of interpersonal trust across countries in the 
Americas, including Canada and the United States, and also test specific hypotheses about the 
contribution of the poor and rich to the generation of trust or mistrust in Latin American 
societies. In a second stage (Chapter III), by considering smaller units of analysis, municipalities, 
I will further explore the causal mechanisms that link economic inequality and interpersonal 
trust, in this case at the sub-national level.  
Methodologically, taking municipalities as units of analysis makes it possible to increase 
the number of cases and also hold constant other intervening factors (Snyder 2001) that may 
                                                 
5 The almost non-existent literature about  the political impact of economic inequality on democratization has been 
recently pointed out in a study by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 2007 
62) 
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confound the relationship between economic inequality and interpersonal trust, such as national 
cultural traits and the national history of and degree of democracy. Thus, a sub-national strategy 
allows testing additional hypotheses such as the role that culture vis-à-vis economic structure 
may play in the creation of interpersonal trust. In this sense, looking at municipal level data helps 
to empirically test the well-known proposition that “all politics are local politics” (Cited in 
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995),  and therefore explore how the characteristics of the immediate 
context where individuals live, in this case the extent of economic inequality at the local level, 
determine their degree of trust in others.  
While in the first stage of this research I will take into account most countries in the 
Americas, in the second stage my analysis will be limited to Costa Rica. Focusing on this 
country offers important advantages. First, difficult to obtain fine-grained data at the municipal 
level is for the most part available for this country and, as it will be explained in Chapter III, the 
structure of the individual level data for this country used in this study facilitates engaging in 
sub-national multilevel analysis; that is, it allows taking into account simultaneously the features 
of the economic structure of municipalities and individual characteristics for explaining levels of 
interpersonal trust.  
Secondly, in this research Costa Rica constitutes what in political methodology is termed 
a “critical case” (Eckstein 1975) or a case where at first glance the probability to falsify 
established hypotheses is likely to be high. Critical cases are useful for confirming or 
disconfirming a theory, making the Costa Rican case ideal for this task. Costa Rica has often 
been cited as a role model for other Latin American countries as it has been praised by its 
superior economic development, lower economic inequality, long-standing democratic stability, 
and higher levels of interpersonal trust, suggesting that economic inequality is less likely to lead 
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to high levels of mistrust within this country. Thus, it is often assumed in the literature for Costa 
Rica that aggregate level characteristics are also likely to be found at the sub-national level, 
implying that the economic structure of municipalities may be irrelevant for the formation of 
interpersonal trust (and other democratic attitudes) since little variation in levels of interpersonal 
trust across municipalities is expected. Indeed, some have forcefully argued that Costa Rica’s 
homogenous and superior culture, rather than economic structural factors, is the main 
determinant of this country’s highly democratic political culture (Harrison 1985).  
Thus, examining the impact of economic structure on the creation of interpersonal trust in 
the Costa Rican context constitutes a high test to one of the main arguments of this research: 
economic inequality erodes interpersonal trust.  If the empirical results for Costa Rica support 
the country level findings of this research, a country where low variation in levels of 
interpersonal trust and other democratic attitudes across municipalities is usually predicted, this 
would constitute strong evidence in favor of the proposition that economically divided 
environments erode interpersonal trust and on the hypothesized mechanisms that explain this 
outcome.  
Finally, in the third stage of the research (Chapter IV), I asses the importance of 
interpersonal trust for reducing conflict over the role of the state in the improvement of the 
distribution of economic resources among Latin American citizens. Specifically, in this chapter 
the hypothesis that high levels of interpersonal trust work as a “buffer” between individualistic 
interests and desirable social outcomes is tested. Specifically, it tests the proposition that even if 
redistributive policies work against the economic interests of the wealthy, affluent individuals 
who show high levels of interpersonal trust toward unlike others are more likely to strongly 
support the implementation of public policies aimed to shrink the gap between rich and poor. 
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Methods  
Methodologically, the approach is to carry out a multilevel statistical analysis 
(Hierarchical Non-Lineal Modeling) in the first and second stages of this research (Raudenbush, 
et al. 2000; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Thus, multilevel models at the country and individual 
levels are estimated in Chapter II, and multilevel models at the municipal and individual levels 
are estimated in Chapter III. Finally, in Chapter IV of this dissertation, an individual level 
analysis of the determinants of citizens’ support for redistributive policies is performed. 
Specifically, in Chapter IV, because of the nature of the dependent variable (i.e. ordinal 
variable), ordered logit models are estimated. Given the novelty of the methodological approach 
used, particularly, in Chapters II and III, some additional comments are appropriate on this 
respect. 
By making use of multilevel modeling, this research hopes to shed new light on the study 
of the determinants of citizens’ political attitudes. Despite that the importance of contextual 
factors for understanding political attitudes and behaviors has been emphasized in comparative 
public opinion research (Putnam 1966; Huckfeldt 1979; MacKuen and Brown 1987; Knack and 
Kropf 1998; Gibson 2006; Franseze 2007), traditionally research in this field has been restricted 
to either an individual or country level analysis.  
While studies that consider individuals as units of analysis do not take into account how 
the outside world shapes people’s political attitudes, those that rely on average data at the 
country level cannot explain within-country variations and therefore conclusions reached using 
aggregated data might not hold at the individual level. In other words, aggregate studies are 
likely to fall prey to the “ecological fallacy” (Robinson 1950; King 1997; Seligson 2002b). In 
contrast, with the estimation of multilevel models, it is possible to take into account how both 
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contextual and individual factors shape individual level variables. This study will look at how 
contextual characteristics (at the municipal and country levels) and individual traits and 
experiences affect the formation of interpersonal trust in Latin American countries. 
As will be demonstrated, the dual strategy implemented in this study, taking into account 
countries as well as municipalities as the highest level of aggregated units in Chapter II and III 
respectively, allows overcoming one of the most prominent problems of previous works that 
have implemented multilevel modeling using data for countries in a geographical region or for a 
subset of nations (i.e. industrialized countries), namely the small-N problem. 
Indeed, multilevel analysis in comparative public opinion research has been precluded by 
the well-known “too many variables, only few cases” problem (Lijphart 1971). In statistical 
terms, this is also called the “over-determination of the dependent variable” (Przeworski and 
Tenue 1970; Landman 2000) or simply the too few “degrees of freedom” problem. Thus, 
comparativists who work with survey data for a relatively small number of countries face the 
following challenge: while plenty of cases are available at the individual level or level-1, 
relatively few cases are available at the country level or level-2, resulting in two major 
methodological constraints for employing multilevel modeling. 
First, given the small number of countries included in the analysis, regional or small-N 
works that do implement a multilevel strategy are often criticized for omitting key country level 
independent variables that are also likely to be linked with both the country level independent 
variable of interest and the individual level dependent variable, raising the question whether an 
observed relationship between a contextual and individual level variable is spurious or not.  
For example, in the case of this research given the relatively high correlation between 
many important country level determinants of interpersonal trust in the Latin American context, 
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such as the extent of and experience with democracy, cultural background, crime rates, economic 
development, economic inequality and so on, each variable might turn out to be statistically 
significant when entered separately in a multilevel model. However, given the small number of 
cases at the country level or level-2, it is not possible to simultaneously take into account all 
these factors in a single model and therefore to parcel out the effect of each variable and 
determine which of them is the most important determinant of interpersonal trust. 
A further related problem in regional or small-N multilevel modeling at the country and 
individual levels is that robust standard errors for the regression coefficients might not be 
appropriately estimated. This increases uncertainty about whether the null hypothesis of no 
relationship between the dependent variable and a country or individual level independent 
variable should or should not be rejected. The following explanation by Raudenbush and Bryk 
(2002 276), the pioneers in the development of multilevel statistical tools and the creators of the 
widely used HLM software, make clear the importance of obtaining appropriate robust standard 
errors in multilevel analysis: 
“In many applications, the primary interest is in the fixed coefficients, denoted by γ. In 
standard applications of hierarchical models, inferences about these depend to some degree on 
assumptions about the distribution of the random effects at each level. It would be unfortunate if 
false assumptions about the random effects seriously distorted inferences about the fixed effects. 
To check the sensitivity of inferences about the fixed effects to these assumptions about the 
random effects, it is often useful to compute robust or “Huber-corrected” standard errors…Use 
of these robust standard errors is most appropriate when the number of highest-level units is 
large.” 
 
As will be demonstrated in this research, computations of multilevel models based on a 
sample as large as twenty two cases at the country level or level-2 does not yield appropriate 
robust standard errors and they often differ substantially from the estimated model-based 
standard errors, making it impossible to determine the statistical significance of the estimated 
parameters and therefore the ability to draw meaningful conclusions. 
16 
 
This study presents a novel methodological strategy to deal with these two related 
problems. It encourages complementing multilevel modeling based on a relatively small sample 
of countries with multilevel analysis at the sub-national level. As this research will demonstrate, 
by increasing the number of cases at level-2, a sub-national multilevel strategy can create the 
possibility to estimate appropriate robust standard errors, increasing our confidence in the 
statistical significance of the results, while holding constant other intervening variables, resulting 
in a net gain of degrees of freedom and therefore allowing for the inclusion of more level-2 
variables in a single model. 
 
The Data 
For the statistical analysis, I make use of survey data collected by the Latin American 
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University.6 The LAPOP surveys for Latin 
American and Caribbean countries consist of face to face interviews based on probabilistic, 
stratified, and multistage samples representative of the voting age population at the national and 
strata levels. In Chapter II of this dissertation, data from the AmericasBarometer 2006 by 
LAPOP for twenty Latin American and Caribbean countries plus Canada and the United States 
are used. Phone interviews were carried out in Canada and the United States with a sample size 
of 609 and 601 interviews, respectively. The dataset includes over 34,000 individual cases.  
In Chapter III, the 2004, 2006, and 2008 LAPOP datasets for Costa Rica were merged in 
order to increase the number of observations available for each municipality included in the 
sample. Although the LAPOP data is not representative at the municipal level, as will be shown 
in Chapter III, by following this strategy it becomes possible to increase the sample size for each 
municipality for this country and obtain robust statistical results. Additionally, in Chapters II and 
                                                 
6 For more information on the LAPOP’s surveys see www.lapopsurveys.org 
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III, the LAPOP data is combined with aggregated data at the country and municipal levels from 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Centro Centroamericano de Población at the 
Universidad de Costa Rica, and census data for Costa Rica. 
In Chapter IV, data from the 2008 round of surveys from the AmericasBarometer by 
LAPOP for twenty Latin American and Caribbean countries and Canada and the United States 
were employed. In 2008, computer based or web surveys were carryout in Canada and the 
United States with a sample size of 2,032 and 1,500 individual cases, respectively. The 2008 
dataset includes over 36,000 individual cases. In the 2008 round of surveys, a series of questions 
asking citizens about their views on the role of the state in different policy issues were included 
for the first time in the questionnaire, including an item on support for income redistribution. 
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CHAPTER II  
 
 
THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF INTERPERSONAL TRUST IN THE AMERICAS 
 
 
Introduction 
Lack of trust in others has often been cited as a primary cause of Latin America’s most 
prominent troubles. According to Harrison (1985 7), the region’s socio-economic 
underdevelopment has been attributed to the narrow “radius of identification and trust” among its 
population. Similarly, Latin America’s long history of political instability and government 
inefficiency has also been credited to the prevalence of “distrust and hatred for other groups in 
society” (Huntington 1968 28). Recent empirical evidence continues to confirm Latin America’s 
low levels of interpersonal trust when compared to the developed world (Klesner 2007; Córdova 
2008). Moreover, other empirical studies show that the very ingredient that is in short supply in 
Latin America, namely interpersonal trust, is at the same time the most important component of 
social capital for strengthening democracy around the world as opposed, for example, to 
participation in voluntary organizations alone (Uslaner 2002; Armony 2004; Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005).  
Evidence from Latin America supports these global findings. At the individual level, higher 
levels of interpersonal trust within the region as a whole have been associated with increased 
willingness to tolerate the political participation of opposition and minority groups and a higher 
support for democracy as the best form of government (Córdova 2008). In contrast, the evidence 
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also shows that participation in civic organizations produces mixed results (Armony 2004; 
Córdova 2008). Thus, interpersonal trust has also been found to have a significant political 
payoff in the Latin American context as it fosters core democratic values among citizens, 
presumably promoting democratic stability.  
Although the third wave of democratization in Latin America opened up channels for citizen 
involvement in civic and political activities at the national and local levels, it is puzzling that 
interpersonal trust levels are stagnant, if not declining, and remain exceptionally low even after 
several years and in some cases even decades of experience with procedural democracy in most 
Latin American countries.7 This fact challenges the notion that interpersonal trust and civic and 
political participation go hand in hand (Putnam 1993), and also the finding that as time goes by 
democracies are more likely to build interpersonal trust (Muller and Seligson 1994).  
Mexico and Argentina are good examples of the failure of democracy to bring about 
interpersonal trust in Latin America. Almond and Verba (1963) in their seminal work The Civic 
Culture noted the extremely low levels of interpersonal trust in Mexico relative to other 
developed nations, one of them its neighbor the United States. Data from the last two decades 
reveal that interpersonal trust in Mexico is still very low when compared to the United States, in 
spite of the sharp decline in interpersonal trust experienced in the U.S. in recent years (Putnam 
1995; Putnam 2000). Moreover, the data show that in Mexico interpersonal trust is now at an 
even lower point than during the years of one party rule. Data for Argentina show a similar 
                                                 
7 Data from the World Values Surveys, the longest overtime data series available, show that interpersonal trust in 
those Latin American countries included in the sample remains low relative to Canada and the United States, in 
some cases showing a declining trend. The LAPOP data for the last three rounds of surveys (2004, 2006, and 2008), 
using different question wording, show that there have not been statistically significant changes in interpersonal trust 
in most countries overtime. 
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pattern. Since the end of the military regime in 1983, interpersonal trust shows a declining trend. 
8  
In effect, despite the implementation of drastic political and economic reforms in recent 
decades, the so-called “dual transition” (Bermeo 1994; Encarnación 1996; Weyland 2002), social 
life in Latin America is still very similar to that described by Huntington forty years ago, even 
before the Third Wave of democratization began (Huntington 1991). Distrust and hatred have 
prevailed in Latin America. In light of this evidence, this research asks, what has gone wrong? 
Why, in spite of national and international efforts to fortify civil society, have Latin American 
democracies failed to strengthen social capital and therefore build more harmonious and trusting 
societies? What explains Latin America’s low levels of interpersonal trust compared to its 
neighboring developed countries, namely Canada and the United States? Who are more likely to 
distrust others? Can interpersonal trust be promoted in order to deepen the democratization 
process undergone by most Latin American countries and make their governments work more 
efficiently?  
This research argues that the major obstacles in the building of a strong civil society in Latin 
America are the endurance of high poverty levels and extreme economic inequality in the region. 
Democratic governments in Latin America have not been able to outperform authoritarian 
regimes in these two areas (Smith 2005), and this has had important implications for democratic 
stability. Just as citizens’ disenchantment with democratic governments’ overall economic 
performance seems to have translated into lower levels of political trust or trust in the political 
system and its institutions (Carlin 2006), this disenchantment is also likely to be preventing the 
rise of social trust in the region.  
                                                 
8 These observations are based on the World Values Survey data. 
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Latin Americas’ economic underdevelopment and highly unequal distribution of economic 
resources, I argue in this dissertation, are placing at risk the social fabric on which democracy 
rests. Unequal economic development is a conflict-ridden force that breeds mistrust, resulting in 
an overall negative effect on democracy. The general argument this chapter lays out is that, by 
inhibiting the formation of interpersonal trust, economic underdevelopment along with economic 
inequality are hindering democratic stability in Latin America.  
Relatively high civic participation in an environment characterized by low interpersonal trust, 
as is the case in Latin America (Córdova 2008), is likely to be less helpful for democracy and 
may even translate into negative social capital (Armony 2004). Membership in civic 
organizations may well be associated with “particularized” rather than “generalized” trust, 
suggesting that trust materializes within but not across civic groups (Stolle 1998; Putnam 2000; 
Uslaner 2000; Uslaner 2002). Moreover, in economically polarized societies, this type of 
“particularized” trust is likely to take place among individuals with similar socio-economic 
status, resulting in societies organized along ever more insular and self-protecting economic 
class lines. As a result, participation in voluntary groups in Latin America is likely to be 
“bonding” the less well off strata of society within a network of civic organizations quite distinct 
from the groups in which the rich participate.  The result is that the key form of social capital, 
what Putnam calls “bridging” social capital, does not arise. (Putnam 2000). As Putnam (2000 22) 
explains, “bonding social capital, by creating strong in-group loyalty, may also create strong out-
group antagonism,” putting at risk the stability of democracy. 
Recent empirical evidence from Mexico shows that in urban areas members of voluntary 
organizations, whether religious or secular, are likely to share similar socio-economic 
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characteristics. The results of the Mexico’s 2006 National Social Capital Survey for Urban Areas 
indicates that about 65 per cent of the individuals who participate in civic groups reported that 
the members in the main civic group in which they participate have a level of income or wealth 
similar to their own.9 The survey also finds differences in socioeconomic status to be the most 
frequently reported cause of divisions among individuals in their communities; more than 45 per 
cent of respondents identified socio-economic status as a dividing force in their place of 
residence.  These results point to economic contextual factors, particularly class divisions at the 
local level, as salient for citizens; moreover, they suggest that economic inequality is likely to 
erode social trust in the Latin American context and therefore make civic participation less 
effective for the establishment of stable democracy. 
One of the newest and most controversial topics in the current social capital literature is the 
effect of “the composition of people’s social networks and society overall” on civic engagement 
and interpersonal trust (Stolle and Howard 2008 4). Most research in this area begins with 
assumption that “the more homogeneous a society, the more trust a (randomly selected) principal 
will place in a (randomly selected) agent”(Knack 2001 177).  In other terms,  “trust seems easier 
to develop when we are familiar with the people around us, and particularly when they appear 
similar to ourselves”(Stolle, Soroka and Johnston 2008 59).  Thus, the composition of a society 
and where a person stands in society (i.e., whether one is part of a majority or minority or 
advantaged or disadvantaged group) becomes crucial for understanding his or her views toward 
others and, in turn, for shaping one’s political identity, interests, and attitudes, especially trust. 
Contextual and individual characteristics have recently become critical in explaining people’s 
reservoirs of interpersonal trust. Given Latin America’s extreme economic heterogeneity in 
                                                 
9 For more information about this survey and access to the dataset visit the United Nations Development Program 
website for Mexico: http://www.undp.org.mx/desarrollohumano/competividad/index.html 
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comparison to the United States and Canada and its marked economic disparities across Latin 
American countries, the Americas, as a region, constitutes a perfect laboratory for investigating 
the underpinnings of interpersonal trust formation and consequently for theorizing about the 
mechanisms through which contextual factors such as poverty and economic inequality may 
affect democratic attitudes and the role that one’s socio-economic status may play in this 
process. This chapter asserts that the relatively low levels of interpersonal trust in Latin America 
vis-à-vis the most politically and economically developed countries in the Americas, namely 
Canada and the United States, have at their core an economic explanation. 
In addition to its theoretical relevance, the focus of this research has important policy 
implications. Although the strengthening of civil society has been at the core of democratization 
programs for the region (Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Campbell 2003; Seligson 2006), this 
research claims that civic participation by itself is unlikely to foster democracy unless it forms 
part of a broader agenda that includes policies that foment the building of generalized 
interpersonal trust, such as economic policies designed to ameliorate both poverty and inequality.  
This dissertation argues that by dismantling economic exclusion, social capital can be made 
to work in Latin America in a fashion consistent with the predictions of the bulk of the social 
capital literature, namely that generalized interpersonal trust and civic participation go together 
and reinforce each other (Putnam 1993), resulting in a more democratic political culture. 
Therefore, in attempting to identify the determinants of interpersonal trust in order to strengthen 
social capital and democracy in Latin America, this study departs from previous works that have 
considered interpersonal trust to be an enduring characteristic, above all a cultural trait passed 
from generation to generation rather than a social phenomenon that can be shaped through public 
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policy.  Instead, this dissertation rests on the assumption that levels of interpersonal trust are a 
reaction to context, and when context changes, so will interpersonal trust. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, it briefly reviews the literature 
that directly or indirectly has treated economic structural factors as an important determinant of 
interpersonal trust. Secondly, it presents the hypotheses and the specification of the multilevel 
models considered in this research. Third, it presents the empirical results of a multilevel 
statistical analysis. Then, the underlying mechanisms that explain the results obtained are 
explored. The last section discusses the implications of this chapter’s findings for the 
achievement of stable democracies in Latin America. 
 
The Economic Origins of Interpersonal Trust Exposed: A Review of the Literature 
Some societies seem more prone to creating interpersonal trust than others, and economic 
conditions, in particular, appear to play an important role. The literature suggests that both 
absolute economic wellbeing and relative economic wellbeing are important determinants of 
interpersonal trust. The following discussion draws primarily from two main theoretical 
approaches in political science that suggest that economic structural factors shape individuals’ 
political attitudes, the modernization and relative deprivation theories. 
Those who see absolute economic well-being or economic development as an antecedent 
factor for the formation of interpersonal trust are largely inspired by the modernization theory. In 
a nutshell, proponents of the modernization theory argue that as nations prosper economically, 
key values for the stability of democracy, such as interpersonal trust and political tolerance, are 
also likely to emerge (Lipset 1959; Lipset 1961). According to the modernization theory, 
environments characterized by economic security are likely to show higher levels of 
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interpersonal trust given that economic development reduces competition for scarce resources, 
and in turn minimizes the chances of social conflict. In contrast, economic underdevelopment, 
according to this account, sets the basis for a perfect zero-sum game in society, in which the 
economic gains of some are correctly perceived as the losses of others, creating a world of 
mistrust and constant conflict, and in turn an atmosphere not appropriate for the sustainability of 
democracy. This thesis was best articulated by Foster (1965). Herein, this explanation will be 
termed the “scarcity hypothesis.” 
Following this logic, Inglehart and Welzel (2005), for example, explain the world’s 
distribution of fundamental  values among the citizenry for the stability of democracy, or what 
they call “self-expression values,” including interpersonal trust, as an immediate consequence of 
cross-country differences in levels of economic development. They find that countries with 
robust democracies exhibit high levels of interpersonal trust and economic development. Largely 
inspired by the modernization theory, Welzel and Inglehart (2007 307) state that self-expression 
values are “rooted in social configurations that lower existential pressures and bring more 
permissive living conditions, giving people a stronger sense of security and autonomy.” 
Similarly, Przeworksi (2000; 2008), citing Lipset, argues that economic development makes 
compliance with democratic rules and consequently the maintenance of social and political order 
more likely as (on average) individuals in developed nations already have relatively comfortable 
lives (i.e., their survival is not at stake), and demonstrate a greater willingness to trust and 
tolerate those who do not share their economic interests. This explains why for citizens in well-
off nations democracy becomes “the only game in town” (Przeworski 1991 26). 
Just as at the macro-level economic development has been regarded as an important 
determinant of interpersonal trust and democratic stability, at the micro or individual level one’s 
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economic position in society has also been found to be important for the formation of 
interpersonal trust. Generally speaking, the literature finds that the higher an individuals’ socio-
economic status, the higher her level of interpersonal trust, ceteris paribus. The reason why 
individuals of lower socio-economic status show lower levels of interpersonal trust has been 
attributed by some to the poor’s greater exposure to negative life experiences, particularly 
experiences with marginalization and discrimination (Newton 1999; Whiteley 1999; Putnam 
2000; Paxton 2007). As Putnam (2000, 138) notes, “in virtually all societies “have nots” are less 
trusting than “haves”, probably because haves are treated by others with more honesty and 
respect…it is reasonable to assume that in each case these patterns reflect actual experience 
rather than different psychic predisposition to distrust.” 
In contrast, the scarcity hypothesis suggests that, given their smaller share of the pie, “have 
nots” are more likely to distrust others because of the higher opportunity cost they are likely to 
incur if they mistakenly believe that others are trustworthy; this is especially true in contexts of 
limited economic resources. In other words, according to the scarcity hypothesis low socio-
economic status individuals have more to lose in relative terms if they are betrayed by others, 
particularly in poor countries because resources are more limited. Subsequently, the poor are 
likely to almost always be “on guard” and suspicious of others, regardless of whether they have 
been treated with “honesty and respect” or not. This account suggests that the poor’s low level of 
interpersonal trust is just one of the many manifestations of a more general pattern among 
uneducated and lower class individuals, namely an authoritarian predisposition developed early 
in life (Adorno 1950; Lipset 1961). For example, Lipset (1961 106) states,  
“No less important factor predisposing the lower classes toward authoritarianism is a relative 
lack of economic and psychological security. The lower one goes on the socioeconomic ladder, 
the greater economic uncertainty one finds…such insecurity will of course affect the individual’s 
politics and attitudes. High states of tension require immediate alleviation, and this is frequently 
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found in the venting of hostility against a scapegoat and the search for a short-term solution by 
support of extremist groups.” 
 
Lipset’s views were largely inspired by Adorno’s (1950) seminal work, “The Authoritarian 
Personality,” in which Adorno (1950 411) discusses “distrust and suspicion of others” as one of 
the many authoritarian predispositions. Even though the F-scale developed by Adorno has been 
subject to much criticism on methodological grounds, his view that the authoritarians see the 
“world as a jungle,” or “a world in which one has to destroy others to prevent them from 
destroying oneself” is often widely accepted today as an accurate portrayal of authoritarian 
individuals. In Lipset’s view, these authoritarian traits are more likely to be held by low socio-
economic status individuals. 
The literature also suggests that besides a country’s macroeconomic development and one’s 
personal socio-economic status, relative economic well-being or economic inequality is also an 
important determinant of interpersonal trust, notwithstanding national or individual absolute 
economic well-being. Thus, according to this view, even in contexts where individuals’ basic 
needs are satisfied and economic resources abound, economic conditions can still play a role in 
the formation of interpersonal trust. In short, economic inequality in and of itself is said to have 
an independent negative effect on interpersonal trust.  
This observation is not new in philosophy or the social sciences. The notion that economic 
inequality erodes interpersonal trust can be traced back at least to Aristotle, who wrote that 
where economic inequality is keen, “arises a city, not of freemen, but of masters and slaves, the 
one despising, the other envying; and nothing can be more fatal to friendship and good 
fellowship in states than this...the rich and the poor will never consent to rule in turn, because 
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they mistrust one another.”10 Aristotle saw economic inequality as a powerful destabilizing 
factor that would ultimately bring down democratic governments. 
Nevertheless, as with macroeconomic development, the underlying mechanisms that link 
economic inequality and the individual’s level of interpersonal trust are far from clear in the 
literature. Along with Aristotle, some scholars have suggested that economic inequality is likely 
to instill conflict and consequently erode interpersonal trust with the same intensity across both 
rich and poor. For example, Boix and Posner (1998 688) state that, 
“Co-operation among unequals is problematic because there will always be incentives for the 
poor, who will naturally be dissatisfied with the existing distribution of assets, to defect 
from co-operative arrangements that perpetuate the status quo. Moreover, to maintain their 
political and economic privileges, the rich will maneuver to undermine any collective efforts that 
the poor may undertake to better their lot.” 
 
This account suggests that economic inequality is likely to lower the overall level of 
interpersonal trust in a society given that individuals, no matter whether rich or poor, are likely to 
equally distrust those belonging to a different economic class; that is, in places characterized by 
high economic inequality rich and poor contribute to the overall decline of interpersonal trust in 
a similar magnitude. Consequently, the rich and poor in this case both become latent sources of 
mistrust and in turn discontent and political conflict.  
A slightly different mechanism is suggested by the relative deprivation (RD) theory (Gurr 
1970), in which “relative deprivation” is defined as “a perceived discrepancy between men’s 
value expectations and their value capabilities” (Gurr 1970 13). In other words, relative 
deprivation refers to the gap between the ideal and the real, what individuals would like to 
achieve and what they can actually achieve. Thus, the concept of RD alludes to feelings of 
dissatisfaction with the status quo among the economically disadvantaged, regardless of their 
actual absolute level of socio-economic well-being. Although the focus of this theory is not 
                                                 
10 Politics, IV, 11  
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interpersonal trust per se, but to explain the occurrence of revolutions, the concept of relative 
deprivation does suggest that by promoting social conflict economic inequality is likely to 
produce distrust toward dissimilar others especially among economically unprivileged 
individuals.  
Consequently, according to the RD theory, low socio-economic status individuals’ perceived 
disadvantaged position in society triggers discontent and resentment toward those perceived to 
be better off, to the point of activating the relatively poor’s potential for political action and even 
revolution. The RD hypothesis, then, suggests that economic inequality is likely to erode the 
average level of interpersonal trust through a “bottom-up” mechanism, with those at the bottom 
of the economic ladder suffering the mistrust syndrome the most. In this case, the relatively poor 
are more likely to disproportionally contribute to the overall decline of interpersonal trust in a 
society.  
In general, the limited number of studies that have assessed empirically the effect of 
economic inequality on interpersonal trust reveal that economic inequality indeed lowers the 
average level of interpersonal trust in a given society, but are silent about the underlying 
mechanisms that explain this result. For example, in a recent article, Krishna (2007), based on an 
analysis of 61 villages in India, concludes that towns divided by differences in wealth have a 
more difficult time building social capital, including interpersonal trust, than those towns with 
more similar wealth distributions. Preliminary evidence from the Philippines, based on survey 
data of poor villages, also suggests that economic inequality diminishes interpersonal trust 
(Labonne,Biller and Chase 2007). Furthermore, state level evidence for the United States also 
corroborates these results (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Uslaner and Brown 2005). Moreover, 
cross-country research supports this conclusion. Countries with high economic inequality show 
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lower levels of interpersonal trust (Knack and Keefer 1997; Uslaner 2002; You 2006; Bjornskov 
2007).  
Despite the fact that empirical work evidences the negative effect of economic inequality on 
building harmonious and trusting societies, as was mentioned before, the mechanisms through 
which this takes place, however, remain largely unexplored. The relevance of examining the 
mechanisms through which economic inequality and economic development influence how 
much individuals trust each other goes beyond simple intellectual curiosity; it has important 
theoretical and policy implications.  
Low socio-economic status individuals have typically been blamed for the misfortunes of 
democratic systems as they have been said to lack the kind of political attitudes and practices 
necessary to achieve stable democracies,11 including the attitudes needed to build a strong civil 
society. Lipset (1959 489,96), for example, states that the characteristics of the poor, including 
“low education, low participation in political organizations or in voluntary organizations of any 
type, little reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity, and authoritarian family patterns” 
contribute to the development of authoritarian predispositions among them, which translate into  
“a tendency to view politics, as well as personal relationships, in black-and-white terms.” Thus, 
by examining the mechanisms through which inequality and underdevelopment erode 
interpersonal trust, this research seeks to answer the question whether the poor are 
unambiguously blame for the weak social foundations on which Latin American democracies 
rests, as both the scarcity and RD hypotheses suggest. Indeed, ever since the work of Lipset, the 
characterization of the poor as being a threat to democracy has been widespread. It was Lipset 
who popularized the notion of “working class authoritarianism” and linked it closely to the rise 
of the Nazis in Germany.  
                                                 
11 For a review of the literature that touches on this topic see Krishna (2008). 
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Additionally, the answer to the question of whom are most distrustful in a given economic 
context can have important implications for the present and future performance of Latin 
American democracies. As interpersonal trust works as a “lubricant of the social system” (Arrow 
1974), it encourages core democratic principles such as political and social tolerance and also 
solidarity. Thus, the level of interpersonal trust in a society is a likely determinant of the kind of 
public policies implemented or to be implemented in practice. In particular, generalized 
interpersonal trust among economically better-off individuals is likely to encourage them to 
support redistributive policies even though the relatively rich would be more likely to oppose 
such policies as they are more likely to suffer the fiscal burden.12  
Widespread support for public policies obviously decreases the probability of political 
deadlocks in society, in the case of Latin America increasing the likelihood that governments 
will implement serious policies to improve the lives of the poor and reduce economic inequality 
through fiscal reform. Sympathy and trust toward the poor and compromise among the relatively 
rich is crucial for minimizing redistributive conflicts that characterize poor and unequal societies 
and, in turn, for making governments more efficient and responsive to the interests of the 
majority of their citizens. 
Conversely, if economically better-off individuals in poor countries show low levels of 
interpersonal trust and tolerance toward the poor, they will also likely show low support for the 
implementation of redistributive public policies or for policies from which their economic class 
does not benefit directly. If this is the case, this would suggest that poor Latin American 
countries are trapped in a vicious circle, where poverty and inequality are likely to wear away 
interpersonal trust and at the same time low interpersonal trust, especially among the relatively 
                                                 
12 The impact of interpersonal trust on citizens’ support for redistributive policies in the Latin American context is 
examined in chapter IV of this dissertation. 
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well-off, leads to low support for redistribution, creating a situation in which a substantial 
decline in poverty and improvement in the distribution of economic resources are less likely in 
the near future.  
The existing empirical literature about the determinants of interpersonal trust is indeed 
limited because it does not examine the causal mechanisms that lead to the conclusions that are 
reached. A major factor in explaining this shortcoming is the almost non-existent multilevel 
research in the social capital literature. Most studies consist of statistical analyses at either the 
aggregate or individual level, and therefore do not take into account how both contextual and 
individual characteristics affect interpersonal trust and the likely interplay between levels of 
analysis, constraining our knowledge about the processes through which interpersonal trust is 
formed. In other words, given that most studies do not evaluate simultaneously the likely 
independent impact of country or community characteristics and individual level traits on 
interpersonal trust, they cannot account for the likely interaction between contextual 
characteristics and individual level factors. This constraint is in fact a prevalent characteristic of 
comparative public opinion research and empirical accounts of the attitudinal and behavioral 
basis of democracy in general. 
For example, to empirically test the scarcity and relative deprivation hypotheses outlined 
above clearly requires the use of multilevel analysis. Economic development and inequality are 
both contextual variables that are likely to influence the extent of an individual’s interpersonal 
trust. Moreover, both hypotheses suggest a likely interaction between levels of analysis. The RD 
hypothesis implies that economic inequality has a greater negative impact on interpersonal trust 
among disadvantaged individuals. Similarly, the scarcity hypothesis suggests that economic 
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underdevelopment is likely to produce mistrust particularly among the relatively poor, since 
underdevelopment is obviously more costly for them.  
Evidently, a multilevel analysis is critical in investigating the mechanism through which 
economic contextual factors impact individual levels of interpersonal trust. Taken together, the 
scarcity and RD hypotheses suggest that poor individuals living in poor and unequal countries, 
two characteristics shared by most Latin American countries, are less likely to trust their fellow 
citizens and hold the requisite values for democracy than poor individuals living in relatively rich 
and egalitarian countries. However, this literature also suggests that in both scenarios, the poor 
are less likely to demonstrate appropriate attitudes and behaviors for deepening democracy than 
the rich (Lipset 1959).13 These propositions can only be tested using multilevel modeling.  
Another related limitation of the current literature is that most works focus on the effect of 
either economic development or inequality on the formation of interpersonal trust and other 
democratic attitudes. The few works that do take into account both variables in a single model 
fail to recognize the likely reinforcing impact that economic underdevelopment and inequality 
might have. Given that most works base their analysis on averaged or aggregate figures and 
ignore the nested nature of the data and the likely interaction between individual and contextual 
factors, they are only able to examine the likely independent negative impact of economic 
underdevelopment and/or inequality on averaged interpersonal trust or other democratic 
attitudes. They do not take into account the mechanisms through which economic 
underdevelopment and inequality might reinforce each other, shape individuals’ attitudes, and 
jointly create a state of generalized mistrust.  
                                                 
13 Lipset (1959, 484) makes a similar point when he states that “the lower class in any given country may be more 
authoritarian than the upper class, but on an “absolute” scale, all the classes in that country may be less authoritarian 
than any class in another country.” 
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Figure II.1 helps explain the mechanisms through which absolute and relative economic 
well-being are hypothesized to jointly affect the level of interpersonal trust in a society. It depicts 
four possible scenarios: places characterized by high poverty and high inequality, high poverty 
and low inequality, low poverty and high inequality, and low poverty and low inequality. The 
horizontal line in each graph represents the poverty line, the y-axes show individuals’ share of 
total wealth, and the x-axes depict the proportion of the population ordered from poor (first 
quintile) to rich (fifth quintile). Hence, the steeper the tail of the curve at the fifth quintile, the 
higher the level of economic inequality. 
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Figure II-1. Hypothetical Cases: Absolute and Relative Well-Being as Reinforcing Factors  
 
 Cases 1 and 2 show two hypothetical environments (i.e. countries or towns) that have the 
same level of poverty; however, in both scenarios, high proportions of the population live in 
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poverty.14 Moreover, it can be observed that the rich have a greater share of total wealth in case 
1, as depicted by the steep tail of the curve at the fifth quintile; therefore, case 1 shows greater 
economic inequality relative to case 2. Given its higher level of inequality, based on the findings 
of previous works, we would predict the average level of interpersonal trust to be lower in case 
1. At the same time, because of the substantial differences in standards of living and personal 
traits between the majority (the poor) and rest of the population (the rich), it is also likely that the 
high level of poverty in both cases works to further reduce the level of trust toward unlike others 
among the rich minority. Indeed, considering that it is more difficult to trust others who are 
different from ourselves (Stolle, et al. 2008), in places where poverty reigns, the relatively rich 
may demonstrate lower levels of interpersonal trust even to the point that the poor and not the 
rich show higher levels of interpersonal trust. 
These two hypothetical cases suggest that in sharp contrast to what the scarcity hypothesis 
predicts, my priors are that in places where poverty is high, better-off individuals are likely to 
show little trust toward others, as their neighbors are likely to be poor and have a very different 
set of individual traits, such as lower levels of education and poor health. Research in sociology 
points toward this situation as the cause of spatial segregation in the United States (Harris 1999); 
the well-off often opt to move away from places where there is a high proportion of poor people 
and therefore do not share their interests and characteristics.15  
Furthermore, when poverty is accompanied by high economic inequality, as in case 1, the 
economic and social gap between relatively rich and poor widens, sharpening the differences 
                                                 
14 Specifically, cases 1 and 2 depict two hypothetical extreme situations, where exactly 80 per cent of the population 
is below the poverty line. The curves in each case cross the horizontal line, the poverty line, at exactly the fourth 
quintile represented by the fourth vertical dashed line.  
15 Most research in sociology on segregation patterns has focused on the United States; in this context, neighborhood 
preferences seem to be a function of both the racial and socio-economic composition of neighborhoods, two factors 
that are often difficult to disentangle.   
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between them and further decreasing the level of generalized interpersonal trust. In sum, it is the 
thesis of this study that economic inequality works to reinforce distrust between relatively rich 
and poor in high poverty areas.  
In contrast, in places characterized by low poverty, as in hypothetical cases 3 and 4, better off 
individuals are likely to show higher levels of generalized interpersonal trust vis-à-vis better off 
individuals living in places similar to cases 1 and 2, because the differences between those at the 
bottom of the economic ladder and those at the top are not as great. Nevertheless, even though 
the entire population resides above the poverty line in cases 3 and 4, the level of interpersonal 
trust is expected to be lower in case 3 because of its higher level of economic inequality. If the 
empirical evidence supports this conclusion, it would confirm the importance of relative 
economic well-being even when poverty is low.  
Clearly, case 1 constitutes the worse-case scenario and case 4 the best environment for the 
formation of generalized interpersonal trust. The four cases exemplify the importance of context 
and the likely interaction between contextual and individual level variables in the formation of 
interpersonal trust as well as the likely reinforcing effect of economic development and 
inequality. Considering that our level of interpersonal trust is likely to be conditioned on 
contextual characteristics, it is easy to see that one’s level of interpersonal trust is contingent 
upon who we are and who others around us are.  
Indeed, the levels of cooperation and generalized interpersonal trust in a society have been 
regarded as products of both contextual and individual characteristics, and not so much as 
products of isolated individual feelings or preferences, as most political psychologists contend.16 
As Rothstein (2005 13) asserts,  
                                                 
16 For an overview of psychological approaches to the study of social capital, including interpersonal trust, see the 
special issue on this topic in Political Psychology, specially the introduction by Mondak (1998). 
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“For the individual, whether or not an action is rational cannot…be determined solely by 
reference to one’s individual preferences, but is rather determined by the social context. It may 
certainly be rational to choose non-cooperation if one has reason to believe that the others are not 
going to participate. But if one has reason to trust that others are going to contribute (i.e. that 
they are actually trustworthy), it may be rational to cooperate.”  
 
Therefore, the characteristics of “others” become important when deciding who and how 
much we trust. The greater the disparities between oneself and those around us, the lower the 
propensity to trust and cooperate, especially when conflicting economic interests are at stake. 
When high poverty and inequality converge, as they do in Latin America, the end result is a 
society composed of a majority of poor and economically dissatisfied individuals and a minority 
of very rich citizens. In a scenario like this, how much we trust others is likely to depend on who 
we are and where we are on the economic ladder. If we are part of the rich minority, then we 
might be less inclined to trust those dissimilar to us, the relatively economically dissatisfied and 
poor majority, especially when the differences between haves and have nots are sharp. Therefore, 
as the most recent social capital literature suggests, the composition of society matters for the 
formation of interpersonal trust. 
In sum, this chapter tests the scarcity and relative deprivation hypotheses using multilevel 
modeling as well as the alternative hypothesis that in low socio-economic development 
environments better off individuals are likely to show lower levels of interpersonal trust relative 
to the rich living in places with higher socio-economic development. This chapter also explores 
the possibility that economic inequality might work to further deepen social mistrust between 
haves and have nots.  
I expect that when inequality and poverty are high, as is the case in most Latin American 
countries, the rich will be less likely to trust others as they are part of a social environment where 
the relatively poor have large presence and the economic distance between poor and rich is 
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substantial. Under these circumstances, conflicts between rich and poor are likely to be deeper, 
the overall level of interpersonal trust lower, and the rich may even show lower levels of 
interpersonal trust than the poor.  
Besides its general theoretical relevance, this research is particularly important for 
understanding the constraints that Latin American democracies face and their prospects of 
deepening democracy. Despite Latin America’s high poverty rates and economic inequality, we 
still know little about their effects on democratization. Cross-country studies include only a 
handful of Latin American countries in their samples, and little research has been carried out 
about the effects of economic development and inequality on interpersonal trust in the Latin 
American context. This study hopes to shed light on how the social foundations of democracy 
can be built in Latin America. 
This chapter builds upon Cordova’s (2008) multilevel cross-country analysis of the 
determinants of interpersonal trust, offering an in-depth analysis of the economic origins of 
interpersonal trust formation at the country and individual levels, and an examination of the 
interplay between contextual economic characteristics and individual socioeconomic status for 
the creation of interpersonal trust. Moreover, taking advantage of the richness of the Latin 
American Public Opinion (LAPOP) data, I further explore the sources of mistrust among the 
relatively rich and poor in Latin American countries. 
 
Modeling Interpersonal Trust: Hypotheses and Model Specification 
In this section, I present the hypotheses of this research and the general specification of the 
multilevel model estimated in this chapter. The main independent variables consist of economic 
development and inequality. As discussed before, one can find in the literature two prominent 
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approaches to the study of the impact of economic factors on interpersonal trust, and political 
culture in general. On one hand, the role of absolute economic well-being for the formation of 
interpersonal trust is emphasized (the scarcity hypothesis), and on the other, the role of relative 
economic well-being is prioritized (the relative deprivation hypothesis). Conversely, I argue that 
it is also likely that each of these two variables have a distinct but reinforcing impact on social 
trust in a rather different way than the hypothesized mechanisms suggested by these two major 
approaches. This chapter tests the following hypotheses at each level of analysis: 
 
 
H1: Individual level : Low socio-economic status individuals are less likely to trust others 
 
Scarcity Hypothesis:  
 
H2: Aggregate level:  All other things being equal, on average individuals residing in places 
with low socio-economic development are more likely to show lower levels of interpersonal 
trust 
 
H3: Interaction between levels of analysis:  All other things being equal, low socio-economic 
status individuals residing in places with low socio-economic development are more likely to 
show lower levels of interpersonal trust 
 
Relative Deprivation Hypothesis: 
 
H4: Aggregate level: All other things being equal, on average, individuals residing in places 
characterized by high economic inequality are more likely to show lower levels of 
interpersonal trust. 
 
H5: Interaction between levels of analysis: All other things being equal, low socio-economic 
status individuals residing in places characterized by high economic inequality are more likely 
to show lower levels of interpersonal trust 
 
Alternative Hypothesis (absolute and relative well-being as reinforcing factors) 
 
H6: While economic inequality works to decrease the overall level of interpersonal trust (as 
suggested by H4), economic underdevelopment decreases the likelihood that better off 
individuals will show high levels of interpersonal trust so that in highly economically unequal 
and underdeveloped places the relatively rich may not show higher levels of interpersonal trust 
in comparison to the poor.  
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I argue that although, on average, at the individual level low socio-economic status 
individuals are likely to show lower levels of interpersonal trust, as H1 states, the strength of this 
individual level relationship is contingent upon the environment where individuals reside such 
that in places characterized by high poverty and economic inequality, the rich rather than the 
poor are more likely to show low levels of interpersonal trust. In sum, I expect to find empirical 
support for the individual level (H1) and alternative hypothesis (H6) hypotheses, and 
consequently reject the scarcity and relative deprivation propositions. 
The conceptual multilevel model of the determinants of interpersonal trust considered 
here is displayed in Figure II.2. The diagram depicts the hierarchical structure of the model as it 
takes into account the fact that individuals are nested within groups (i.e. countries or 
municipalities) with certain characteristics. As can be observed, the economic determinants of 
interpersonal trust are examined at the individual and aggregate levels of analysis while other 
factors are simultaneously controlled for. The solid arrows correspond to the expected direct 
links between contextual and individual level factors and interpersonal trust. The solid arrows 
that go from the personal “level of income/wealth” variable and from socio-economic 
development and economic inequality to interpersonal trust correspond to the individual and 
aggregate level hypotheses, accordingly. Examining the aggregate level determinants of 
interpersonal trust is equivalent to modeling the intercepts of the multilevel equation and 
therefore to allow the intercepts of the equations for each group to flow randomly.  
The dashed arrows depict the indirect impact of contextual factors on interpersonal trust. 
Thus, the dashed arrows represent the hypotheses related to the interaction between levels of 
analysis, specifically the possibility that the strength of the relationship between socio-economic 
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status and interpersonal trust at the individual level is conditional on the economic characteristics 
of the environment where individuals live. Formally, this is equivalent to allowing the slope of 
this relationship to vary randomly across economic groups and then exploring the determinants 
of this variation. 
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Figure II-2. Modeling Interpersonal Trust: Conceptual Multilevel Model 
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The decision of what control variables to include in the model, especially at level-2 or 
aggregate level, was made based following the widely cited works in multilevel analysis 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) and political methodology (King,Keohane and Verba 1994). The 
advice they provide is to control only for those factors that are related to both the independent 
variable(s) of interest and the dependent variable, since the main objective of “control” is to rule 
out the possibility that the observed relationship between two variables is spurious. This is an 
important point since as discussed in the previous chapter in small-N multilevel analysis the 
number of variables one can include at the aggregate level is limited and therefore only relevant 
controls should be accounted for.  
At the aggregate level, I have identified seven control variables that satisfy this 
recommendation: the extent of and experience with democracy, cultural heritage, the level of 
violence and crime, ethnic diversity, the importance of international migration, and population 
density. All these variables have been identified in the literature as likely confounding factors 
between economic development and/or inequality and interpersonal trust.  
However, given the small sample size at level-2, twenty-two countries in total, and the 
corresponding lack of degrees of freedom, it is not possible to deploy all these factors at once in 
the cross-country multilevel analysis estimated here. Consequently, as discussed in chapter I, to 
test the robustness of the cross-country multilevel results, multilevel analysis at the local level 
within a single country is undertaken. Such a strategy allows increasing the number of cases at 
level-2 while at the same time having the singular advantage of holding constant other 
confounding factors, such as cultural heritage and the extent of and years of experience with 
democracy. The next section presents the results of the cross-country multilevel model taking 
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into account three variables at the country level, economic development, inequality, and the level 
of democracy. The individual level determinants of interpersonal trust are also discussed. 
 
The Determinants of Interpersonal Trust in the Americas: A Multi-level Analysis 
The data used in the multilevel analysis presented in this section come from face-to-face 
interviews in twenty Latin American and Caribbean countries, drawn from the 
AmericasBarometer surveys of 2006-2007 and 2008 carried out by LAPOP, and phone survey 
data gathered also by AmericasBarometer in 2006 in Canada and the United States.17 In total, the 
database includes over 34,000 individual interviews. The 2006-07 round of surveys facilitated 
comparisons between two clusters of nations with dissimilar levels of social trust and political 
and economic development. Specifically, these data make it possible to examine why Latin 
American and Caribbean countries have lower levels of social trust than Canada and the United 
States. Thus, at the aggregate level or level-2, “countries” constitute the units of analysis.  
The aggregate data on economic inequality and socio-economic development come from 
the Human Development Report 2007, published by the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP). Using the most recent figures available, the Gini coefficient and the income share of 
the richest 20 percent of the population were used as measures of economic inequality. 18 The 
socioeconomic development variable corresponds to the UNDP Human Development Index for 
                                                 
17 Except for Argentina and Brazil, all the data correspond to the 2006 round of the AmericasBarometer survey by 
LAPOP. For these two countries the data correspond to the 2008 round. Argentina was included for the first time in 
2008. In the case of Brazil, the wording of the interpersonal trust variable in the 2006 survey was not equivalent to 
the rest of countries; however, the wording of the interpersonal trust item in the questionnaire for Brazil was 
compatible with the rest of countries in the 2008 survey. 
18 The Gini coefficient can have a value between zero and one; it measures the extent of income inequality in a 
country. A larger Gini indicates a greater degree of income inequality.   
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2005, also the most recent estimate available.19 The level of democracy variable is the inverted 
total score for political rights and civil liberties by Freedom House in 2006.20  
The following item in the AmericasBarometer survey measures individuals’ level of 
interpersonal trust, the dependent variable explored in this and the next chapter of this 
dissertation: 
 
Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community 
are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or 
untrustworthy?   
 
Interpersonal trust, in this study, then, refers to how confident individuals feel about 
people outside their immediate family circle. As mentioned before, the type of trust that is likely 
to enhance democracy is the one that makes individuals sympathetic to people who may have 
different beliefs, ideologies, or backgrounds than one’s own, and consequently this type of trust 
ought to contribute to the establishment of more harmonious and, ultimately more stable 
democracies, namely generalized interpersonal trust. 
Figure II.3 shows that as expected, based on this measure of interpersonal trust, in the 
Americas there are significant differences in the level of interpersonal trust across countries.21 
The average value of interpersonal trust ranges from 42.1 to 82.8. The most economically and 
politically developed countries in the Americas, Canada and the United States, as the literature 
predicts show much higher levels of interpersonal trust than other countries in the hemisphere. In 
sharp contrast, countries like Bolivia, Peru, and Haiti show the lowest levels of interpersonal 
                                                 
19 The Human Development Indicator (HDI) is a composite measure of the level of socioeconomic development in a 
country. It encompasses three measures of socioeconomic well-being: economic resources (GDP per capita at 
purchasing power parity), an index of education, and a health indicator, as measured by life expectancy at birth. The 
HDI ranges between zero and one, with a higher value denoting a higher level of development. 
20 The formula used was the following: level of democracy=[14-(score for political rights+ score for civil liberties)] 
21 The interpersonal trust item from the LAPOP survey was recoded into a 0-100 scale. A value of 0 corresponds to 
the category “very untrustworthy,” 33 “somewhat untrustworthy,” 66 “somewhat trustworthy,” and 100 “very 
trustworthy.” 
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trust. Within Latin America, the countries with the highest average levels of interpersonal trust 
area Honduras, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Colombia, and Uruguay.  
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Figure II-3. Average Interpersonal Trust in the Americas 
 
The first model examines the factors that explain such varying average levels of 
interpersonal trust across countries once individual level factors are accounted for. The 
multilevel model that tests the individual and aggregate level hypotheses of this chapter taking 
“countries” as level-2 units of analysis examines the effect of economic development and 
inequality on interpersonal trust while holding constant the level of democracy in each country.  
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The first model is formally specified as follows: 
Model 1: Intercept as an outcome model (Random intercept): 
 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (Economic inequality)j + γ02 (Economic Development)j + γ03 (Level of 
Democracy)j + u0j 
 
Where, 
 j stands for country j; and i for person i  
 
Model in Combined Form (Contextual and Individual level variables): 
 
Interpersonal Trustij = γ00 + γ01 (Economic inequality)j + γ02 (Economic Development)j + γ03 
(Level of Democracy)j + β1 (Income Level)i + β2 (Corruption Victimization)i +β3 (Crime 
Victimization)i + β4(Participation in Civic Groups)i +β5 (Education)i + β6 (Age)i + β7 (Age 
Squared)i+ β8 (Sex)i +  u0j+ rji 
 
For all the interpersonal trust models estimated in this chapter and the next, I use a 
hierarchical non-linear procedure, also called hierarchical generalized models (HGLM), which 
takes into account the nested nature of the data (i.e. individuals within countries) and the non-
linear nature of the dependent variable.22 Given that the dependent variable, interpersonal trust, is 
an ordinal variable, the most appropriate method of estimation is a non-linear model or an 
ordered logit multilevel model,23 although similar results are obtained if a linear function is 
assumed. 
The properties of multilevel models make it possible to assess how both individual traits 
and contextual factors affect the dependent variable. For example, multilevel models allow us to 
explore why, once individual characteristics are controlled for, an individual living in a Latin 
American country shows on average a lower level of interpersonal trust than an individual with 
similar characteristics living in Canada or the United States; that is how contextual 
                                                 
22 All multilevel models in this research were estimated using the software HLM version 6.06. 
23 Ordered categorical models, in general, are appropriate when the dependent variable “can be ranked from low to 
high, but the distances between adjacent categories are unknown” (Long 1997 114), that is when the dependent 
variable is an ordinal variable. For further explanation concerning the estimation of hierarchical models using 
ordinal dependent variables see Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), chapter 10, pages 371-325. 
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characteristics determine the average level of interpersonal trust in a country. As the aggregate 
level hypotheses indicate, this chapter claims that economic structural factors explain, at least in 
part, the lower average levels of interpersonal trust in Latin American countries.  
At the individual level, eight variables are included in the model: income level, 
corruption victimization, crime victimization, participation in civic groups, years of schooling, 
age, age squared, and gender. The exact wording and description of these variables in the 
LAPOP surveys are shown in the appendix at the end of this chapter. All these variables have 
been found to be correlated with interpersonal trust in the literature.  
Among the factors that have been found to foster interpersonal trust is participation in 
civic groups. According to the literature, civic participation and interpersonal trust form a 
“virtuous circle” and consequently those who participate in voluntary groups are expected to 
show higher trust in others (Putnam 1993).  
On the other hand, large scale studies suggest that countries characterized by high 
corruption show lower levels of interpersonal trust (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; You 2006). 
Given the high levels of corruption in the region, a similar relationship is expected to hold at the 
individual level in Latin America (Seligson 2002a ; Seligson and Zephyr 2008). Individuals who 
have been asked for a bribe by a public official are expected to show lower interpersonal trust as 
they are likely to perceive that others are often looking for ways to take advantage of them, and 
also because corruption itself becomes as a sign of the fragility of the rule of law and 
consequently of the vulnerability that individuals face in their daily interactions in a given social 
context (Rothstein 2000). High crime rates have also been found to be negatively related with 
interpersonal trust in cross-country studies (Lederman,Norman and Menendez 2002), and 
personal experience with crime to erode interpersonal trust in the Latin American context 
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(Córdova 2008; Cruz 2008). In sum, experience with corruption and/or crime is expected to 
lessen interpersonal trust at the individual level. 
As mentioned above, the bulk of the empirical literature shows that at the individual level 
higher socioeconomic status, either measured by income/wealth or education, is linked with 
higher levels of interpersonal trust. There is also evidence that men and middle aged persons tend 
to be more trusting (Newton 2001). Besides these individual level factors, other characteristics 
have also been found to be correlated with interpersonal trust, such as life satisfaction, size of 
place, and religion. These variables were not considered in the cross-country analysis as they 
were not included in the surveys for Canada and the United States. However, these factors are 
taken into account in the sub-national multilevel analysis in the next chapter. 
Table II.1 presents the results for the first model. The results of the one way ANOVA 
model with random effects confirmed that there is statistically significant variation in average 
interpersonal trust across countries, as depicted by p-value of the variance component for the 
intercept in Table II.1. The decomposition of the total variance revealed that 10 per cent of the 
variation in interpersonal trust can be attributed to country or contextual characteristics while the 
remaining 90 per cent is due to individual level differences. Although the country level effects 
are seemingly low, as Anderson and Singer (2008) note in their comparative study for European 
countries, this is not surprising in regional multilevel or small-N level 2 analyses as most 
countries share a similar set of characteristics and the bulk of the data are measured at the 
individual level.24  In addition, the reliability indexes, shown in Table II.1, indicate that on 
                                                 
24 In this study, Anderson and Singer (2008) investigate the individual and country level determinants of political 
legitimacy. Using survey data from a sample of 20 European countries, Anderson and Singer find that the proportion 
of the total variance in this variable explained by country level characteristics is 12 per cent, whereas the proportion 
of the total variance due to individual characteristics is 88 per cent.  
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average the estimates for the random intercepts in each country have a high degree of precision 
(λ>0.90).25  
Also from Table II.1, it can be observed that all individual level variables are statistically 
significant and have the expected sign, except for the age variables. As suggested by previous 
studies, personal experience with crime and corruption erodes interpersonal trust, while higher 
socio-economic status, measured by income and years of schooling, is linked with greater levels 
of interpersonal trust. Thus, the results lend support to the individual level hypothesis (H1) of 
this research. However, as depicted by the size of standardized coefficients for the income and 
education variables, individual income is a more powerful determinant of interpersonal trust than 
education. Economically disadvantaged individuals in the Americas suffer the most from the 
mistrust syndrome. In terms of the demographic variables, males do show a higher propensity to 
trust others, as the literature suggest. On the other hand, on average no age effects are observed.  
It is also noteworthy that the estimated “thresholds” or the difference in the log odds of 
category two (somewhat trustworthy) versus one (very trustworthy) and category three (not very 
trustworthy) versus two (somewhat trustworthy) of the dependent variable are statistically 
significant, holding constant individual and country level explanatory variables. This last point 
suggests that individuals in higher categories of the dependent variable show unambiguously 
higher levels of interpersonal trust, confirming the “ordinal” or incremental nature of the 
interpersonal trust variable.  
Additionally, as Table II.1 shows, the total number of observations at the individual level 
used for the estimation of the multilevel models is approximately 29,500 cases; about 14 per cent 
                                                 
25 Reliability estimates for the intercept greater than 0.70 are generally considered good (Raudenbush, et al. 2000). 
Reliability indexes answer the question of how confident we can be about the accuracy of each  level-2 unit intercept 
and slope estimates. As Raudenbush and Bryk (2002, 79) explain, “these indices depend on two factors: the degree 
to which the true underlying parameters vary from [level-2 unit to level-2 unit] and the precision with which each 
[level-2 unit]’s regression equation is estimated.” 
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of this total in the original dataset was dropped due to missing data. This relatively large number 
of missing cases is explained by the high none-response rate (about 12%) associated with the 
personal income variable. This problem is overcome in this study, discussed further on, by using 
an alternative measure of personal economic status in the analysis that follows, restricted to Latin 
American countries. Specifically, an index of wealth based on household assets and access to 
basic services indicators included in the LAPOP surveys is estimated using Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA). Given that information on household assets and services is not available for 
Canada and the United States, the multilevel models presented in this chapter use personal 
income instead. However, given the large overall sample size at the individual level for the 
cross-country analysis presented here, it is unlikely that the relatively high proportion of missing 
data is biasing the results. 
The country-level results of the multilevel model in Table II.1 produce important 
conclusions. First, contrary to common expectations, socio-economic development or absolute 
economic well-being is not a strong predictor of observed differences in the average level of 
interpersonal trust across countries in the Americas. When entered by itself, the socio-economic 
variable (HDI) is statistically significant, but once economic inequality and democracy are taken 
into account its effect vanishes. Similarly, the statistically significant positive impact of 
democracy disappears once economic inequality is included in the model.26 Second, and most 
important for the thesis of this dissertation, is that in contrast, economic inequality, either 
measured using the Gini coefficient (see equation 1 in Table II.1) or the income share of the 
highest 20 per cent (see equation 2), was unambiguously found to be a statistically significant 
and negative predictor of interpersonal trust.  
                                                 
26 Appendix 2 shows the effect of each level-2 variable when entered alone in the model.  
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Yet, because of the small sample size at the country level, the statistical significance of 
this relationship is somewhat uncertain. Table II.1 compares the model-based standard errors to 
the estimated robust standard errors, showing that depending on whether one picks one or the 
other, the statistical significance of the economic inequality coefficient varies substantially. For 
example, in the case of the Gini coefficient(see equation 1 in Table II.1), if the model based 
standard errors are chosen, the statistical significance for this variable is about 7 per cent. In 
contrast, if one picks robust standard errors, the statistical significance for this variable is less 
than 2 per cent. Furthermore, given the small sample size, twenty two countries, the output from 
HLM v.6 yields the following warning “the robust standard errors are appropriate for datasets 
having a moderate to large number of level 2 units. These data do not meet this criterion.”  Thus, 
between the two, robust or model based standard errors, there is no way to determine what 
reported statistical significance level is more accurate.  
However, it is worth mentioning that both reported p-values are within the standard 
accepted levels, signifying that economic inequality is the most important explanatory factor of 
the observed variations in average interpersonal trust once individual level factors and countries’ 
economic development and level of democracy are taken into account. Moreover, the results 
show that the country level variables included in the model explain a relatively high proportion 
of the total variance in average interpersonal trust across countries, above 42 percent. 
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Table II-1. Results Multilevel Model: Intercept as an outcome model  
(Standardized coefficients) 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 
Fixed Effects: Coef. Model S. Err. 
P-
Value 
Robust 
S. Err. 
P-
Value* Coef. 
Model 
S. Err. 
P-
Value 
Robust 
S. Err. 
P-
Value* 
Contextual Variables (Random Intercept)           
 
Intercept, γ00 
 
-1.181 
 
 
0.101 
 
0.000 0.118 0.000 -1.180 0.100 0.000 0.117 0.000 
 
Economic Inequality [GINI], γ01 -0.253 0.129 0.065 0.094 
 
0.015 
 
     
Economic Inequality [Share Highest 20%],  γ01      -0.262 0.131 0.057 0.095 0.013 
 
Economic Development, γ02 
 
0.118 
 
 
0.202 
 
 
0.566 
 
 
0.171 
 
0.500 0.112 0.202 0.601 0.175 0.547 
 
Level of Democracy,  γ03 
 
0.068 
 
0.182 
 
0.713 
 
 
0.153 
 
0.662 0.071 0.181 0.700 0.163 0.668 
 Individual Level Variables           
Income Level, β1 0.101 0.014 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.101 0.014 0.000 0.026 0.000 
Corruption victim, β2  -0.083 0.011 0.000 0.015 0.000 -0.083 0.011 0.000 0.015 0.000 
Crime victim,  β3    -0.138 0.011 0.000 0.009 0.000 -0.138 0.012 0.000 0.009 0.000 
Participation in Civic Groups, β4 0.065 0.011 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.065 0.011 0.000 0.014 0.000 
Education,  β5 0.043 0.013 0.001 0.023 0.056 0.043 0.013 0.001 0.023 0.056 
Age,  β6 0.059 0.058 0.312 0.070 0.412 0.059 0.058 0.311 0.071 0.411 
Age squared,  β7 0.103 0.058 0.077   0.070 0.143 0.103 0.058 0.077 0.070 0.143 
Sex (Male=1; Female=0), β8 0.099 0.011 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.099 0.011 0.000 0.012 0.000 
Threshold 2,  1.759 0.015 0.000 0.079 0.000 1.759 0.015 0.000 0.080 0.000 
Threshold 3 
 3.587 0.023 0.000 0.104 0.000 3.589 0.023 0.000 0.104 0.000 
Random Effects: 
           
Intercept, u0 (Variance Component) 0.219  0.000   0.216  0.000   
Percent Explained, Intercept, u0 42.23%     42.90%     
Reliability Intercept 0.987     0.987     
N. Obs Country Level 
N. Obs Individual Level 
22 
29563 
22 
29563 
*P-value based on robust standard error 
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Figure II.4 graphically presents the fitted values of the intercepts derived from a HLM 
model that simultaneously accounts for the effect of economic inequality and the individual level 
characteristics discussed above.27 Specifically, Figure II.4 shows the average predicted values of 
interpersonal trust at different levels of economic inequality across countries while holding 
constant individual level characteristics at their mean value; that is, it shows graphically the 
estimated level of interpersonal trust that an average individual in the Americas would have if he 
or she were to move from a country with a relatively low level of economic inequality to another 
with a higher level, or vice versa. From Figure II.4, two points are noteworthy. First, there is a 
strong negative relationship between economic inequality and interpersonal trust levels across 
countries. Depending on the level of economic inequality in the country where one lives, an 
average citizen in the Americas can show a level of interpersonal trust ranging between 52 and 
74 points, ceteris paribus.  
Secondly, when comparing Figure II.3 and Figure II.4, it can be observed that the Latin 
American countries that were at the top in terms of interpersonal trust in Figure II.3, such as 
Honduras, Costa Rica, and Paraguay, are located in a much lower position in Figure II.4, 
suggesting that while individual characteristics favor the creation of interpersonal trust in these 
countries vis-à-vis other countries in Latin America, once individual level factors and their 
relatively high levels of economic inequality are taken into account, they are situated in a much 
lower position. This finding reflects the importance of taking into account contextual factors 
simultaneously with individual characteristics when comparing aggregate data across countries. 
In this case, the results suggest that the extent of economic inequality in a country matters for the 
                                                 
27 The fitted values for the intercepts were estimated assuming a linear function, and therefore a normally distributed 
dependent variable, rather than using a nonlinear function or ordered logit regression, in order to facilitate the 
interpretation of the estimated intercepts. An ordered logit multilevel procedure should be considered more 
appropriate in this case because of the nature of the dependent variable, but a linear multilevel model yielded similar 
results. 
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formation of interpersonal trust, implying that if an average Latin America citizen, all other 
things being equal, migrates from his or her country of origin to Canada or the United States, he 
or she would become far more trusting of others, given these two countries relatively lower 
levels of inequality. On the other hand, the extreme economic inequality in Haiti and Bolivia 
would make the same individual more distrusting of the others. 
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Figure II-4. Predicted Average Interpersonal Trust by Economic Inequality and Country 
 
The second model, formally presented in the equations below, tests for the possibility that 
the effect of contextual economic factors on interpersonal trust are conditional on one’s socio-
economic status; that is that contextual economic factors, either economic inequality or 
development, does not exert an equal effect across individuals belonging to different economic 
groups. Specifically, the second model tests the hypotheses that the characteristics of the 
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economic context where individuals live determine the strength of the relationship between one’s 
socio-economic status (i.e., household income) and interpersonal trust. For example, although on 
average higher socio-economic status individuals show higher levels of interpersonal trust, the 
“alternative” hypothesis (H6) suggests that this relationship may not hold in countries 
characterized by high levels of underdevelopment. Therefore, in this second model, the factors 
that explain possible variation in the slopes of the individual income variable across countries are 
also examined.  
Formally, the second model is specified as follows: 
Model 2:  Intercept and slope as outcomes model (Random intercepts and slopes) 
Modeling the intercept: 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (Economic inequality)j + γ02 (Economic Development)j + γ03 (Level of 
Democracy)j+ u0j 
 
Modeling the slope of the income variable: 
β1j = γ10 + γ11 (Economic inequality)j + γ12 (Economic Development)j + u1j 
 
Where, 
 j stands for country j; and i for person i 
 
Model in Combined Form (Contextual and Individual level variables): 
 
Interpersonal Trustij = γ00 + γ01 (Economic inequality)j +γ02 (Economic Development)j +γ03 
(Level of Democracy)j + γ10 (Income)ij +γ11(Economic Inequality)j*(Income)ij+ γ12(Economic 
Development)j*(Income)ij +  β2 (Corruption Victimization)i +β3 (Crime Victimization)i + β4 
(Participation in Civic Groups) + β5 (Education)i + β6 (Age)i +  β7 (Age Squared)i+  β8 (Sex)i + 
(u0j+ u1j (Income)ij + rji) 
 
  
The results are presented in Table II.2. Economic inequality continues to be the main 
predictor of the differences across countries in interpersonal trust, indicating that this result is 
stable. Once again this result holds whether the Gini coefficient or the income share of the 
highest 20 percent is employed as a measured of economic inequality and controlling for 
countries’ economic development and level of democracy. However, Table II.2 further illustrates 
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the methodological perils of working with small samples in multilevel modeling given that it is 
not possible to obtain appropriate robust standard errors. In this case, if model-based standard 
errors are used, the associated error or statistical significance is about 8 or 10 per cent, depending 
whether economic inequality is measured using the Gini or the 20 per cent share, accordingly. In 
contrast, if robust standard errors are used, although inappropriate for this sample size, then the 
associated error is about 2 or 3 per cent.  
The results of the second model also show that the variance component for the slopes of 
the income variable is statistically significant (p<0.001), indicating that there are significant 
variations in the strength of the relationship between individual income and interpersonal trust 
across countries.28 The results of the model suggest that the strength of this relationship is 
conditioned on countries’ level of socio-economic development, with richer individuals showing 
lower levels of interpersonal trust in countries with relatively low socio-economic development, 
even after controlling for economic inequality. This result is statistically significant at five 
percent (p<0.05), irrespective of the use of model-based or robust standard errors. The 
percentage of the total variance in the slopes explained by the model is about 22 per cent. 
 
                                                 
28 While statistically significant variation in the slope of the individual income variable was found across countries, 
the slope of the education variable, another indicator of socio-economic status, was found to be constant. This 
suggests that, unlike income, the effect of education on interpersonal trust is not conditional on the characteristics of 
the place of residence. The level of interpersonal trust across income groups, on the other hand, varies from country 
to country. 
61 
 
 
 
Table II-2. Results Multilevel Model: Intercept and slope as outcomes model 
(Standardized Coefficients) 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 
Fixed Effects: Coef. Model S. Err. 
P-
Value 
Robust 
S.Err. 
P-
Value* Coef. 
Model 
S. Err. 
P-
Value 
Robust 
S.Err. 
P-
Value* 
  Contextual Variables   (Random Intercept)           
 Intercept, γ00 -1.184 0.107 0.000 0.124 0.000 -1.184 0.106 0.000 0.122 0.000 
 Economic Inequality [GINI], γ01 -0.245 0.136 0.088 0.099 0.023           
 Economic Inequality [Share Highest 20%], γ01            -0.261 0.137 0.072 0.100 0.018 
 Economic Development, γ02 0.150 0.211 0.486 0.186 0.429 0.134 0.210 0.532 0.188 0.486 
 Level of Democracy,  γ03 0.109 0.188 0569 0.144 0.458 0.115 0.186 0.545 0.152 0.461 
 Contextual Variables (Random Slope)                     
Income Level, β1                     
     Intercept, γ10 0.117 0.036 0.009 0.025 0.000 0.117 0.036 0.004 0.025 0.000 
     Economic Inequality [GINI], γ11 0.021 0.047 0.649 0.047 0.655           
     Economic Inequality [Share Highest   20%], γ11           0.013 0.047 0.783 0.043 0.765 
      Economic Development, γ12 0.122 0.045 0.014 0.039 0.007 0.118 0.036 0.004 0.039 0.009 
Individual Level Variables                     
Corruption victim, β2  -0.081 0.011 0.000 0.015 0.000 -0.081 0.011 0.000 0.015 0.000 
Crime victim,  β3     -0.138 0.011 0.000 0.008 0.000 -0.138 0.011 0.000 0.008 0.000 
Participation in Civic Groups, β4 0.067 0.011 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.067 0.011 0.000 0.013 0.000 
Education,  β5 0.035 0.013 0.009 0.018 0.056 0.035 0.013 0.009 0.018 0.056 
Age,  β6 0.050 0.058 0.443 0.044 0.544 0.044 0.058 0.445 0.073 0.546 
Age squared,  β7 0.120 0.058 0.039 0.073 0.097 0.121 0.058 0.039 0.073 0.096 
Sex (Male=1; Female=0), β8 0.098 0.011 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.098 0.011 0.000 0.012 0.000 
Threshold 2,  1.764 0.015 0.000 0.080 0.000 1.764 0.015 0.000 0.079 0.000 
Threshold 3 
 3.560 
0.023 0.000 
0.104 
0.000 3.598 0.023 0.000 0.104 0.000 
Random Effects: 
  
  
 
    
  
Intercept, u0 (Variance Component) 0.244  0.000   0.241  0.000   
Quintiles, slope u1 (Variance Component) 0.022  0.000   0.022  0.000   
Percent Explained, Intercept, u0 36.0%     36.82%     
Percent Explained, slope u1 22.0%     22.07%     
Reliability Intercept 0.981     0.981     
Reliability Slope 0.825     0.826     
N. Obs Country Level  
N. Obs Individual Level 
22 
29,561 
22 
29,561 
*P-value base on robust standard errors 
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Figure II.5 shows the fitted values of the coefficients or slopes associated with the 
individual income variable across countries (γ12j). Specifically, it depicts the strength of the 
relationship between interpersonal trust and individual income (the slope or estimated 
coefficient) across countries according to their level of socio-economic development. As shown, 
the higher the socio-economic development of a country, the stronger the relationship between 
individual income and interpersonal trust. Interestingly, the strength of this relationship varies 
substantially across countries in the Americas. The slopes or estimated coefficients range from    
-2.20 to 4.31 standardized units. At the very top, one finds, not surprisingly, Canada and the 
United States, suggesting that given these countries high level of socio-economic development, 
high income individuals show on average higher levels of interpersonal trust than those at those 
at the bottom of the income distribution, ceteris paribus.  
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Figure II-5. Predicted Value Slope of Income Variable by HDI and Country 
 
In sharp contrast, in Haiti, the poorest country in the Americas, the relationship between 
income and interpersonal trust shows a reverse pattern. Contrary to what the bulk of the literature 
predicts, the overall low level of interpersonal trust in this country is mainly explained by the 
higher levels of mistrust among better off individuals. In other words, the higher an individual’s 
income in Haiti, the lower his or her levels of interpersonal trust, all things being equal. In fact, 
Hatians who are better off show lower levels of interpersonal trust in comparison to the poor. On 
the other hand, in poor countries like Guatemala and Bolivia, the theorized positive relationship 
between income and interpersonal trust is almost nonexistent as the coefficient is positive but 
very close to zero, suggesting that the rich and poor have similar low levels of interpersonal trust 
in those countries. In other words, context sharply alters the impact of income on interpersonal 
trust, moving from positive, to neutral to negative.  
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Returning to the hypotheses of this chapter, the results lend support to the individual level 
hypothesis; on average, higher socio-economic status individuals show higher levels of 
interpersonal trust. However, taken together the results do not support either the scarcity or 
relative deprivation hypotheses. Moreover, the level of socio-economic development in a country 
does not uniformly predict its level of interpersonal trust. Rather, the findings demonstrate that a 
low level socio-economic environment does not nurture mistrust among the relatively poor but 
among the rich. Thus, a country’s socio-economic development appears to mediate the 
relationship between individual socio-economic status and interpersonal trust, but the opposite of 
what the scarcity hypothesis predicts, since the coefficient of the HDI variable shows a positive 
rather than a negative sign. By the same token, although economic inequality lowers the average 
level of interpersonal trust in a country, contrary to what the relative deprivation hypothesis 
suggests, it produces a similar effect across economic groups. Economic inequality appears to 
erode the level of interpersonal trust of both rich and poor.  
In sum, the results of the cross-country multilevel analysis give support to the alternative 
hypothesis presented in chapter. Economic inequality and underdevelopment show a reinforcing 
effect that works to decrease interpersonal trust. While low socio-economic environments reduce 
the effectiveness of individual income or socio-economic status to boost interpersonal trust, 
economically unequal environments further decreases the overall level of interpersonal trust 
between the rich and poor. While those at the bottom of the economic ladder are more prone to 
distrust as the distance between them and those at the top widens, the rich are also more likely to 
distrust unlike others in unequal environments but especially when underdevelopment and 
poverty are stark. 
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Explaining the Findings 
The previous analysis raises two questions: why on average at the individual level do the 
poor show lower levels of interpersonal trust, regardless of the characteristics of the environment 
in which they live? And why do the relatively rich show lower levels of interpersonal trust in 
environments characterized by low levels of socio-economic development?  
Prejudice against the Poor? 
With regard to the first question, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, research on 
this question is divided. Some authors attribute the poor’s lower interpersonal trust to a general 
pattern of authoritarian predispositions that have their roots in child rearing practices; others,  
suggest that the poor are less likely to trust others because of their negative experiences in life, 
especially social discrimination. Until now, there have been few tests of these alternative 
conceptualizations, but the LAPOP data make it possible to test the hypothesis that experiences 
with discrimination lowers individuals’ trust toward others, especially among the poor.  
In order to test this hypothesis a “discrimination index” was computed based on the 
following two items in the LAPOP surveys using data for eighteen Latin American countries:29 
 
Have you ever felt discriminated against or treated in an unjust manner because of your 
physical appearance or the way you talk in any of the following places? 
In meetings or social events? (yes or no) 
In public places? (yes or no) 
 
The index takes the value of 1 if a respondent said “yes” to at least one of these two 
questions, or zero otherwise. Based on this index, on average in the Americas, more than 15 per 
cent of the total population stated that they felt that they had been victims of an act of 
                                                 
29 These items were only available in the eighteen countries included here.  
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discrimination. However, there are substantial differences across countries. Discrimination in 
Haiti is particularly alarming, with 52.5 percent of the population reporting having been 
victimized, followed by Bolivia with 25.1 per cent. In contrast, in Nicaragua and Panama this 
figure is less than six per cent.  
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Figure II-6. Per cent of Population Victims of Discrimination by Country 
 
In this and the next sections of this chapter, individual socio-economic status is measured 
using an index of relative wealth rather than income level in order to minimize the number of 
missing values. As shown in the previous analysis in this chapter, the proportion of missing 
values due to non-response associated with the income variable is relatively high. As is fully 
explained in the appendix at the end of this chapter, a “quintiles of wealth” variable was 
computed using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based on household assets and access to 
basic services indicators available in the LAPOP surveys for all countries except Canada and the 
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United States. In the previous section “income level” rather than quintiles of wealth was used as 
a measure of economic status because Canada and the United States were included in the 
analysis.  The PCA allows computing a measure of individual wealth in the absence of income or 
consumption data taking into account the distribution of wealth in a country or town.  
The results of an ordered logit model including the discrimination index as a predictor of 
interpersonal trust are shown in Figure II.7. The model was estimated for seventeen Latin 
American countries. Given Haiti’s extremely high discrimination rates, it was excluded from the 
analysis in order to avoid having this outlier country driving the results. The standardized 
coefficients associated with each variable entered in the model and their respective confidence 
intervals are displayed graphically. If the confidence intervals of the standardized coefficients 
cross the vertical line at the zero value, this is interpreted as a non-significant result; on the 
contrary, a confidence interval to the left or right of the vertical line indicates a negative or 
positive effect at a 5 per cent statistical significance level, respectively. 
As can be observed, being a victim of discrimination significantly and strongly reduces 
one’s level of interpersonal trust, even after taking into account competing explanatory factors 
and country effects (not shown in model to simplify presentation). Indeed, Figure II.7 shows that 
the effect of discrimination on interpersonal trust is stronger than the effect of other negative 
experiences in life such as crime and corruption victimization.  
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Country fixed effects
included but not shown
Age squared
Age
Years of Schooling
Urban
Civic Participation
Corruption Victimization
Crime Victimization
Victim of Discrimination
Male
Quintiles of Wealth
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
95% C.I. (Design-Effects Based)
F=55.688
N =27,120
Dependent Variable: Interpersonal Trust (Ordered Logit Model)
 
Figure II-7. Effect of Discrimination on Interpersonal Trust  
 
The next issue to examine is whether the poor are more likely to be victims of 
discrimination than the rich. The data also show strong evidence of discrimination against the 
poor. As shown in Figure II.8, in Latin America the poor, specifically those belonging to the 
poorest two quintiles of wealth are more likely to be victims of discrimination, regardless of their 
level of education, ethnicity, age, sex, area of residence, and country effects.30 This suggests that 
even in ethnically homogenous countries discrimination can be high, especially in poor and 
highly unequal countries, as the case of Haiti suggests.  
                                                 
30 Economic status is here measured based on “wealth” rather than income, using first principal component analysis 
and household assets and access to basic services as explained in the appendix of this chapter. Wealth levels were 
used instead of income in order to minimize the proportion of missing values in the sample. However, similar results 
were obtained if income was used instead. 
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*Reference Country: Bolivia
Mexico
Guatemala
El Salvador
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
Colombia
Peru
Chile
Uruguay
Brazil
Venezuela
Dominican Rep.
Jamaica
Haiti
Age squared
Age
Black
Indigenous
Years of Schooling
Quintile of Wealth 1
Quintile of Wealth 2
Quintile of Wealth 3
Quintile of Wealth 4
White
Other Ethnicity
Male
Urban
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
95% C.I. (Design-Effects Based)
F=27.782
N =25,993
Dependent Variable: Discrimination Index (Logit Model)
 
Figure II-8. Predictors of Discrimination  
 
The results show that both ethnic diversity and economic heterogeneity work to elevate 
discrimination levels. Individuals self-identified as black, indigenous, or another ethnic group are 
more likely to be victims of discrimination than those self-identified as mestizo, the reference 
category in the regression analysis. On the other hand, individuals self-identified as whites show 
a lower probability of being victims of discrimination than mestizos. It is also notable that males 
and individuals in urban areas are more likely to be victims of discrimination, presumably 
because of their higher likelihood to interact with others outside their family and community 
circle. 
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Finally, Figure II.9 graphically presents the results of an ordered logit model that test the 
hypothesis that the effect of discrimination on interpersonal trust is conditional on one’s 
economic position in society (i.e. the model  interacts the discrimination index with the quintiles 
of wealth variable). Specifically, Figure II.9 indicates the probability of falling in each of the 
categories of the interpersonal trust variable depending whether or not an individual has been 
victim of discrimination by level of wealth.31 As expected, the poor who have being victims of 
discrimination show much lower levels of interpersonal trust in comparison to better off 
individuals who have also being victims, explaining in part why on average at the individual 
level, regardless of country characteristics, the poor show lower levels of interpersonal trust. 
  
                                                 
31 The full output of the regression results can be found in appendix 4 at the end of this chapter. The statistical 
significance of the interaction term is p<0.005. For a detailed explanation about how to estimate and interpret 
models that include interaction terms see Kam and Franzese (2007). 
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Figure II-9. Impact of Discrimination on Interpersonal Trust by Quintiles of Wealth  
 
Figure II.9 shows that for someone who has been a victim of discrimination, the 
probability of finding the people in their community “very untrustworthy” drops as individual 
wealth increases. Conversely, the probability of finding people in the community “very 
trustworthy” among those who have been victims of discrimination increases as individual socio-
economic status improves. This implies that the burden of discrimination on interpersonal trust is 
deeper among lower socio-economic status individuals, which is likely to be explained by greater 
likelihood of their being treated unfairly.32 This analysis demonstrates that discrimination 
obviously represents a threat to equality-one of the most important pillars of democracy. And 
                                                 
32 Moreover, the extent of the gap in Figure 9 between the line representing those who stated to have been victims of 
discrimination and those who did not reveal the significant negative impact of discrimination on interpersonal trust. 
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one of the channels in which discrimination particularly puts at risk democratic stability in Latin 
American countries is through the erosion of interpersonal trust among the poor.  
 
Fear of being a Victim of Crime? 
The second question explored in this section is why the relatively rich show lower levels 
of interpersonal trust in low socio-economic environments. As this chapter has demonstrated in 
economically heterogeneous countries, in addition to the lower overall level of interpersonal 
trust, the rich are also likely to show lower levels of interpersonal trust when underdevelopment 
is high, to the point of having levels of interpersonal trust similar to that of the poor or even 
lower as the case of Haiti illustrates. A plausible hypothesis for explaining this phenomenon is 
that the rich in these contexts feel more exposed, more insecure, and in turn this erodes their 
social capital.  
This hypothesis is indeed plausible. First, the incidence of violent crime in Latin America 
is unparalleled, positioning the region as having the highest rates of social violence and crime in 
the world outside of Sub-Saharan Africa (WHO 2002; Moser and McIlwaine 2006). 
Consequently, fear of crime among the population is to be expected, especially as violent crime 
has increased sharply during the democratization period in the region (Moser and McIlwaine 
2006). Secondly, fear of crime has also been found to have pernicious effects on the 
consolidation of a democratic political culture in the region (Cruz 2008), regardless of whether 
one has been a victim of crime or not. Third, generally speaking, crime and violence in Latin 
America are not randomly distributed across neighborhoods but rather are mainly a characteristic 
of low-income neighborhoods, especially in urban areas (Moser,Winton and Moser 2003; 
McKilwaine and Moser 2007); therefore, contextual characteristics are important for 
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understanding crime and violence patterns and in turn for explaining the intensity of fear of 
crime. Lastly, as Moser, Winton and Moser (2003) point out “[high] poverty and inequality 
levels signify that the poor are frequently held responsible for much of the crime and violence 
perpetrated throughout cities,” which as theorized might explain the low levels of interpersonal 
trust among the rich in highly unequal and poor contexts. This hypothesis is explored using the 
LAPOP data. Fear of crime is measured using the following item in the LAPOP survey:33 
 
Speaking of the neighborhood where you live, and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted 
or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?  
 
(1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe 
 
As shown in Figure II.10, fear of crime is strikingly high in Latin American countries in 
comparison to the United States and Canada. While the average score for the Latin American 
region is 46.14 points, taken together the average for Canada and the United States is only 16.40 
points. Figure II.10 also shows that there are sharp contrasts in the average fear of crime across 
Latin American countries. Fear of crime is more generalized in countries such as Peru, 
Argentina, Bolivia, and Haiti, and much lower in Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. 
 
                                                 
33 The original scale of this item was recoded into a 0-100 scale, with zero representing the lowest level of fear of 
crime (“very safe”), and 100 the highest level (“very unsafe”). 
74 
 
15.3
17.5
37.4
38.4
40.4
40.6
40.8
41.3
42.0
42.6
44.9
45.2
47.2
47.5
47.5
47.9
48.1
50.7
51.3
51.7
57.3
60.0
Honduras
Jamaica
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Colombia
Guatemala
Uruguay
Chile
Ecuador
Costa Rica
Venezuela
El Salvador
Bolivia
Argentina
Canada
United States
Brazil
Panama
Mexico
Dominican Republic
Haiti
Peru
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Fear of being a victim of crime
95% C.I. (Design-Based Corrected Error)
 
Figure II-10. Average Fear of Crime by Country 
 
Taking into account the high levels of fear in the region, three points are explored in 
order to test the above mentioned hypothesis. First, I explore the effect of fear of crime on 
interpersonal trust vis-à-vis crime victimization. Second, taking into account a country’s level of 
socio-economic development, I explore whether fear of crime is randomly distributed across 
individuals or if it is mainly a characteristic of specific economic groups. Third, if higher levels 
of insecurity among the rich is an important characteristic of less developed countries, the next 
step is to examine whether a similar pattern is observed within countries, that is, whether the 
relatively rich living in poorer or less developed areas (i.e. rural areas) feel more insecure in spite 
of the fact that crime and violence rates are, generally speaking, higher in the cities.  
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Figure II.11 shows the standardized regression coefficient of the fear of crime variable in 
comparison to crime victimization as predictors of interpersonal trust, holding constant other 
variables and taking into account country effects. The results of the regression analysis 
demonstrate that fear of crime is a powerful depressant of interpersonal trust; in fact, it has by far 
a much larger negative impact on interpersonal trust than experience with crime per se. 
 
Country fixed effects included
 but not shown
Age squared
Age
Years of Schooling
Urban
Civic Participation
Corruption Victimization
Crime Victimization
Fear of being a victim of crime
Male
Quintiles of Wealth
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2
95% C.I. (Design-Effects Based)
F=96.920
N =31,741
Dependent Variable: Interpersonal Trust (Ordered Logit model)
 
Figure II-11. Impact of Fear of Crime on Interpersonal Trust  
 
Moreover, an initial approximation to the question of whether the rich living in low 
socio-economic environments are more likely to manifest fear reveals that this seems to be the 
case. Table II.3 presents the results of a bivariate analysis that compares the mean difference in 
fear of crime between economic groups by country, ordered from high to low socio-economic 
development. Specifically, Table II.3 shows the difference in means in fear of crime between the 
richest and poorest 20 per cent of the population in each country ranked according to their level 
of socio-economic development based on the respective levels of HDI. 
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Table II-3. Difference in Mean Fear of Crime between the Richest 20% and Poorest 20% 
HDI Ranking Country 
Country 
Average Mean 
(Richest 20%) 
Mean 
(Poorest 20%) 
Difference 
[Mean Richest 20% 
- Mean Poorest 20%] 95% C.I. 
1 CAN 15.323 11.314 19.439 -8.125 -15.815 -0.435 
2 USA 17.462 12.302 20.104 -7.802 -15.352 -0.252 
3 ARG 57.30 54.958 60.369 -5.411 -12.497 1.674 
4 CHIL 47.199 42.763 45.979 -3.216 -8.440 2.009 
5 URU 45.240 48.414 43.278 5.136 -1.043 11.316 
6 CR 47.506 46.329 46.882 -0.553 -6.116 5.010 
7 MEX 44.865 42.650 39.880 2.771 -2.269 7.810 
8 PAN 41.970 37.772 40.187 -2.414 -6.922 2.094 
9 BRA 41.25 46.286 36.975 9.310 4.256 14.365 
10 VEN 47.886 46.174 51.074 -4.900 -10.205 0.404 
11 COL 40.824 39.959 39.034 0.925 -4.388 6.239 
12 DOM 50.695 55.503 49.202 6.301 1.150 11.453 
13 PER 60.031 57.344 60.870 -3.526 -8.149 1.097 
14 ECU 44.901 47.122 43.955 3.167 -0.344 6.679 
15 PAR 40.610 35.300 36.731 -1.431 -7.016 4.155 
16 JAM 38.415 39.377 36.612 2.765 -1.657 7.187 
17 ELS 48.069 47.673 44.284 3.389 -1.809 8.587 
18 NIC 40.433 39.412 38.569 0.843 -3.492 5.177 
19 HON 37.435 42.640 30.740 11.900 7.022 16.778 
20 BOL 50.698 51.526 45.584 5.942 2.499 9.386 
21 GUA 42.639 46.481 37.462 9.020 4.317 13.722 
22 HAI 51.284 59.856 44.438 15.418 10.582 20.254 
 
Table II.3 shows that in the four least developed countries in the Americas the richest 20 
per cent of the population show statistically significant higher average levels of fear of crime 
than the poorest 20 per cent. Indeed, in Haiti, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Honduras the rich appear 
to be more fearful of being victims of crime, precisely the countries where the well known 
positive relationship between individual wealth and interpersonal trust is weaker, or as in the 
case of Haiti, negative. Quite the opposite is the case in Canada and the United States, the two 
most developed countries in the Americas, the poor and not the rich show the highest levels of 
fear of crime, explaining in part why in these two countries the relationship between individual 
wealth and interpersonal trust is positive and much stronger. 
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 Further analysis indicates that the wealthy in the poorest countries in the Americas do 
show higher levels of insecurity. Figure II.12 presents graphically the regression coefficient of 
the richest 40 per cent relative to the poorest 40 per cent predicting fear of crime by country, 
while holding constant individuals’ level of education, age, and sex. The results of the 
multivariate analysis reveal that the richest forty per cent of the population feel consistently more 
insecure than the poorest 40 percent in the four poorest countries in the Americas, although 
Brazil shows a similar trend. 
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Figure II-12. Standardized Regression Coefficient of the Richest 40% relative to Poorest 40% as Predictor of 
Fear of Crime by Country 
  
However, it is worth mentioning that the relationship between individual wealth and fear 
of crime becomes weaker when the area of residence (i.e., the level of urbanization) is taken into 
account (results not shown). This raises the question of whether a similar pattern observed at the 
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country level is reproduced within countries. In other words, in a given country, fear of crime 
among the rich might be greater among those who live in lower socio-economic environments, 
specifically rural areas, explaining the lower levels of interpersonal trust among the rich in those 
areas. If this is the case, it will further confirm the country level finding that the composition of 
the place of residence and individual characteristics matter for the formation of interpersonal 
trust and also that in Latin America the rich show lower levels of interpersonal trust in low socio-
economic status environments because under these circumstances they are more fearful of being 
victims of crime. Moreover, given the larger size of rural areas in poor countries, this would 
imply that the results of multilevel analysis (at the country and individual levels) presented in 
this research are a reflection of within country dynamics. 
 With the purpose of testing the impact of place of residence on fear of crime, I ran an 
ordered logit regression with an interaction term between the quintiles of wealth variable (at the 
individual level) and a dummy variable indicating whether a person lives in urban or rural areas, 
taking into account relevant individual level variables and country effects. Figure II.13 shows the 
regression results based on the pooled dataset containing individual level variables.34 
                                                 
34 The full regression output can be found in appendix 5 at the end of this chapter. The interaction term is 
statistically significant at p<0.001. 
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Figure II-13. Impact of Area of Residence on Fear of Crime by Quintiles of Wealth  
 
Figure II.13 presents the mean predicted probability of feeling very safe, somewhat safe, 
somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe in one’s community taking into account the area of residence. 
There are two important points to notice in Figure II.13. First, fear of crime is much lower in 
rural areas regardless of individuals’ wealth, which is consistent with the fact that crime rates are 
much higher in urban areas. Second, Figure II.13 also shows that in urban areas the rich have a 
higher probability of feeling secure relative to the poor, while conversely the rich who live in  
rural areas show a greater probability of feeling insecure. This begs the question of whether this 
result translates into lower levels of interpersonal trust among the rich living in rural areas. As 
expected, Figure II.14 suggests that this is exactly the case.35 
                                                 
35 Appendix 6 shows full regression output. Individual level variables and country effects are also taken into 
account. The interaction term is statistically significant at p<0.001. 
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Figure II-14. Impact of Area of Residence on Interpersonal Trust by Quintiles of Wealth  
 
The probability of finding people in the community “very trustworthy” is conditioned on 
individual wealth and place of residence. Although the average level of interpersonal trust is 
lower in urban areas, the rich in urban areas are more likely to find those around them 
trustworthy. In contrast, in rural areas those at the top of the distribution of wealth are less likely 
to find people in their community trustworthy in comparison to those at the bottom. Taken 
together the findings suggest that the rich show lower levels of interpersonal trust in low-
socioeconomic environments because they are more fearful of being victims of crime. This result 
seems to hold at the country level and areas within countries. 
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Conclusion 
The democratization literature has identified interpersonal trust as a key component for 
the stability of democracy. An important question, then, is to explore how interpersonal trust can 
be promoted. The answer to this question is particularly relevant for Latin American democracies 
as the region’s underdevelopment and political instability have in part been attributed to its 
enduring low levels of interpersonal trust. This chapter demonstrates that persistent and high 
levels of economic inequality and socio-economic underdevelopment are at the core of Latin 
America’s social distrust. Thus, by improving the overall levels of absolute and relative 
economic wellbeing, cooperation among unlike individuals is likely to increase.  
By employing multilevel modeling, this research has uncovered the mechanisms through 
which economic inequality and underdevelopment erode interpersonal trust, challenging the 
conventional wisdom in the social capital and democratization literature. Studies that rely on 
aggregate data predict lower levels of socio-economic development to be associated with lower 
average levels of interpersonal trust, regardless of relative economic wellbeing. Similarly, higher 
inequality is expected to be inversely related to average interpersonal trust, irrespective of socio-
economic development. Additionally, the literature suggests that these relationships at the macro 
level are explained by the much lower levels of interpersonal trust among the poor in contexts of 
high poverty or inequality. As a result, the poor have typically been blamed to a large  degree for 
the misfortunes of democracy.  
My findings in this paper differ sharply from the conventional wisdom. By bridging 
levels of analysis, this research demonstrates that the relationship between economic contextual 
factors, interpersonal trust, and individual socio-economic status is not as straightforward as the 
literature suggests. The multilevel results indicate that in the Americas economic inequality and 
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underdevelopment have a uniquely negative reinforcing effect on interpersonal trust. While 
economic inequality lowers the average level of interpersonal trust across all economic groups, 
socio-economic underdevelopment lowers interpersonal trust only among the wealthy. 
Consequently, when underdevelopment and inequality are high, as is the case in most Latin 
American countries, the overall level of interpersonal trust is lower and the rich show little trust 
in others in comparison to places where development and equality are relatively high. Contrary 
to what the literature predicts, the evidence suggests that the rich can have about the same or 
even lower interpersonal trust than the poor in context of high poverty and inequality. Latin 
American countries’ higher economic inequality and lower socio-economic development explain 
why lower levels of interpersonal trust and a weaker relationship between individual wealth and 
individual interpersonal trust are observed relative to Canada and the United States. 
In Latin America, economic disparity creates a “perfect storm,” the clash between 
economic classes, which in turn erodes mutual trust. The results of this chapter indicate that 
prejudice against the poor is eroding the poor’s trust toward dissimilar others. On the other hand, 
economic diversity infuses a fear of being a victim of crime among well-off individuals. Indeed, 
higher levels of fear of crime among the relatively rich in environments of low-socio-economic 
development seem to explain their lower levels of interpersonal trust in these contexts. 
Interestingly, the empirical evidence indicates that some of the same patterns observed at the 
country level are reproduced at the sub-national level. In Latin America, higher fear of crime in 
underdeveloped areas (i.e. rural areas) among the well-off also translates into lower interpersonal 
trust. In sum, discrimination, fear of crime, and distrust are some of the manifestations of Latin 
America’s unequal economic development. Thus, Latin American democracies rest on very 
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shaky social foundations as cooperation among economically dissimilar individuals is highly 
unlikely.  
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Appendix 
Appendix. II-1. Wording of the Items from the LAPOP Survey Included as Independent Variables in the 
Multilevel Models 
Variable Question/Description 
Civic Participation  A Civic Participation indicator variable was computed based on 
the following items in the LAPOP survey: 
 
I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell 
me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or 
twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.  
 
Meetings of a parents’ association at school? 
Meetings of a committee or association for community 
improvement? 
 Meetings of an association of professionals, traders or farmers? 
Meetings of a political party or political movement? 
 
This variable takes the value of one if a respondent stated to have 
participated in at least one secular civic organization, or zero 
otherwise. 
 
Corruption Victimization The corruption victimization indicator variable corresponds to a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if a person stated to 
have been victimized by at least one act of corruption in the last 
twelve months. This variable was generated based on the 
following items in the LAPOP surveys: 
 
Has a police officer ask you for a bribe during the past? 
During the past year did any government employee ask you for a 
bribe? 
During the past year did you have any official dealings in the 
municipality/local government?  
Are you currently employed? At your workplace, have you been 
bribed within the past year? 
 During the past year, have you had any dealings with the courts? 
Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts within the past year? 
Have you use any public health services during the past year?  
In order to receive attention in a hospital or a clinic during the 
past year, did you have to pay a bribe? 
Have you had a child in school during the past year? 
Have you had to pay a bribe at school during the past year? 
Crime Victimization Now changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of 
crime in the past 12 months? (yes=1; 0=No)                                     
Years of Schooling What was the last year of education you completed? 
Income Variable Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly 
income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad 
and the income of all the working adults and children?   
[10 deciles based on the currency and distribution of the country] 
Sex Male=1; Female=0 
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Appendix II-2 Multilevel Model: Intercept as an outcome model  
(Ordered logit; standardized coefficients) 
 
Fixed Effects: Coef. Coef. Coef.  Coef. Coef. 
Contextual Variables   
 (Random Intercept)       
       
Economic Inequality [GINI], γ01 -0.354 
(0.003^; 
0.001*) 
    
-0.249 
(0.06^; 
0.011*) 
-0.284 
(0.022^; 
0.004*) 
Economic Development, γ02 
 
0.324 
(0.007^; 
0.004*) 
 
  
0.176 
(0.176; 
0.053*) 
 
Level of Democracy,  γ03 
  
0.281 
(0.017^; 
0.023*) 
 
  
0.150 
(0.202^; 
0.060*) 
^P-values based on model based standard errors; *P-values based on robust standard errors 
Controls for individual level variables included but not shown 
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Appendix II-3. Methodological Note: Estimating Wealth Effects using Household Assets 
 
A central question for this study was how to compute a wealth index that resulted in a lower proportion of 
missing data in comparison to the income variable, and at the same time that effectively discriminated between 
economically well-off and worse-off individuals. A relative wealth index was computed using the methodology 
described below based on the following items from the LAPOP survey: 
 
To end, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: (read out all items) 
 Television  (0) No (1) Yes 
 Refrigerator  (0) No (1) Yes 
Conventional telephone (not 
cellular) 
(0) No (1) Yes 
Cellular telephone (0) No (1) Yes 
 Vehicle (0) No (1) One    (2) Two  (3) Three 
Washing machine (0) No (1) Yes 
Microwave oven (0) No (1) Yes 
Indoor plumbing (0) No (1) Yes 
Indoor bathroom  (0) No (1) Yes 
Computer (0) No (1) Yes 
 
One choice was to create a wealth index based on a “count” of household characteristics and assets. 
However, using this methodology can be misleading since two individuals with very different economic resources 
and therefore standards of living can obtain the same wealth score. For example, an individual owning a television 
would be assigned the same score as one owning a car. Obviously, using this methodology could result in large 
measurement error. A more appropriate methodology was instead implemented: one that weights more heavily the 
most uncommon household services and assets and assigns a lower weight to basic household characteristics.  
 
This study develops a weighting system for constructing a wealth index relying on Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA). Filmer and Pritchett (2001) popularized the use of PCA for estimating wealth levels using 
household asset indicators in the absence of income or consumption data. Based on their analysis of household 
assets for India and the validation of their results using both household assets and consumption data for Indonesia, 
Pakistan, and Nepal, they concluded that PCA “provides plausible and defensible weights for an index of assets to 
serve as a proxy for wealth”(Filmer and Pritchett 2001 128).  
 
After Filmer and Pritchett’s analysis, many other studies, especially in the fields of economics and public 
policy, have implemented and recommend the use of PCA for estimating wealth effects (Minujin and Joon Hee 
2002; McKenzie 2005 ; Seema and Kumaranayake 2006 ; Labonne, Biller and Chase 2007). In fact, estimates of 
wealth based on asset data using PCA has also been used for developing inequality measures at the state or 
municipality level when income or expenditures data is not available (McKenzie 2005). As it will be explain in 
chapter III, this study uses McKenzie’s (2005) inequality index for estimating the degree of economic inequality in 
municipalities or cantones in Costa Rica. 
 
The estimation of relative wealth using PCA is based on the first principal component of the observations. 
Formally, the wealth index for household i  is the linear combination:  
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Where, kx and ks  are the mean and standard deviation of asset kx , and α represents the weight for each 
variable kx  for the first principal component.  
By definition the first principal component variable across households or individuals has mean zero and 
variance λ , which corresponds to the largest eigenvalue of the correlation matrix of x . The first principal 
component y yields a wealth index that assigns a larger weight to assets that vary the most across households so 
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that an asset found in all households is given a weight of zero (McKenzie 2005). The first principal component or 
wealth index can take positive as well as negative values. 
 
The wealth index here estimated using the ten items in the LAPOP survey listed above. All variables are 
dichotomized to indicate the ownership of each household asset (1=Yes, 0=No), except “number of vehicles.” The 
first principal component was first computed for each country separately and then these results were used to 
generate a single pooled wealth variable. This means that the wealth index here computed takes into account the 
asset distribution for each country.  In this sense, the wealth index used is context specific. Each asset receives a 
different weight across countries in order to reflect each country’s socio-economic conditions. Moreover, the 
distribution of wealth for each country was portioned in quintiles and then the results were also used to generate a 
single pooled variable. Table 1 list the ten items included in the wealth index and shows the average asset ownership 
across quintiles using the pooled results. 
 
Table 1. Internal Validity of the Wealth Index: Results based on the First Principal Component  
(Quintiles of Wealth) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Housing Characteristics      
Indoor plumbing (drinkable water) 41.77% 71.44% 84.37% 91.28% 97.12% 
Indoor bathroom  28.51% 62.05% 75.48% 91.15% 97.30% 
Durable Assets      
Television  56.35% 88.32% 93.10% 94.94% 98.96% 
Refrigerator  30.85% 58.62% 79.65% 91.56% 98.73% 
Conventional telephone  5.52% 23.59% 46.80% 71.66% 92.95% 
Cellular telephone 25.47% 49.94% 63.73% 76.58% 93.02% 
Vehicle 4.58% 7.69% 15.82% 31.34% 63.64% 
Washing machine 10.75% 25.92% 35.17% 51.05% 74.45% 
Microwave oven 2.76% 10.21% 21.23% 45.16% 74.48% 
Computer 3.83% 6.34% 13.35% 35.24% 76.16% 
Average Wealth (Mean First 
Principal Component by 
Quintiles) 
-2.42 -0.96 -0.02 1.05 2.79 
N. of Obs 6,483 6,438 5,917 6,123 5,588 
Data Source: AmericasBarometer 2006 by LAPOP 
 
As it can be observed, the wealth index used in this study discriminates well between the relatively rich and 
poor. For all assets, the percentage of ownership increases for higher quintiles. For example, while only about 42 per 
cent of individuals belonging to the first quintile have indoor plumbing or a source of drinkable water in their 
residences, about 97 per cent of them in the fifth quintile do. Moreover, the table also shows the mean value of the 
first principal component (mean wealth) by quintiles. Those at the bottom of the economic ladder have an average 
relative wealth of only -2.42 points, while those at the top an average wealth of 2.79 points. These figures clearly 
show the high degree of inequality in the region. 
 
How much inequality is there within and across countries? In order to explore this point, the following 
figure shows the distribution of a single item, drinkable water, by country and quintiles of wealth. As expected, the 
figure shows that there are huge differences in access to water within and across countries. The degree of inequality 
in access to clean water within countries can be seen by steepness of the slope in each line graph. For example, the 
graph for Haiti shows huge inequalities in access to water in this country. While almost none of those in the first 
quintile have indoor plumbing, about 85 per cent of those at the very top do. On the contrary, the figure below also 
shows that in countries with higher development levels, like Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina, not only a 
much higher proportion of the population has access to clean water (as it can be seen in the y axis of the graphs), but 
also this asset is more evenly distributed between the rich and poor (as it can be seen by the flatter line).   
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Appendix II-4 Impact of Discrimination on Interpersonal Trust by Quintiles 
(Ordered logit regression) 
 Coef. 
Linearized 
Std. Err.          t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Victim of Discrimination -0.605 0.086 -7.010 0.000 -0.774 -0.436 
Quintiles of Wealth x 
Discrimination 0.074 0.026 2.860 0.004 0.023 0.126 
Quintiles of Wealth 0.042 0.012 3.440 0.001 0.018 0.065 
Age 0.005 0.004 1.240 0.214 -0.003 0.013 
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 1.61 0.108 -0.000 0.000 
Education 0.023 0.004 6.210 0.000 0.015 0.030 
Urban -0.419 0.042 -10.080 0.000 -0.500 -0.337 
Sex (1=Male; 0= Female) 0.196 0.025 7.950 0.000 0.148 0.245 
Civic participation 0.100 0.026 3.790 0.000 0.048 0.151 
Victim of Corruption -0.002 0.000 -4.770 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
Victim of Crime -0.003 0.000 -9.250 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 
Mexico 0.288 0.090 3.190 0.001 0.111 0.465 
Guatemala 0.179 0.095 1.890 0.059 -0.007 0.365 
El Salvador 0.429 0.096 4.490 0.000 0.242 0.617 
Honduras 0.682 0.097 7.060 0.000 0.492 0.871 
Nicaragua 0.303 0.084 3.600 0.000 0.138 0.467 
Costa Rica 0.720 0.102 7.080 0.000 0.520 0.919 
Panama -0.489 0.086 -5.700 0.000 -0.657 -0.321 
Colombia 0.436 0.099 4.410 0.000 0.242 0.629 
Bolivia -0.499 0.097 -5.140 0.000 -0.689 -0.309 
Peru -0.739 0.078 -9.540 0.000 -0.892 -0.587 
Paraguay 0.616 0.086 7.120 0.000 0.446 0.785 
Chile 0.208 0.110 1.890 0.059 -0.008 0.424 
Uruguay 0.440 0.097 4.520 0.000 0.249 0.631 
Brazil -0.084 0.095 -0.880 0.377 -0.269 0.102 
Venezuela 0.013 0.104 0.120 0.903 -0.191 0.217 
Dominican Republic 0.314 0.086 3.640 0.000 0.145 0.483 
Excludes Haiti; N. Obs.=25827   F=55.13; Standard Errors take into account design effect 
Reference Country: Jamaica 
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Appendix II-5 Impact of Area of Residence on Fear of Crime by Quintiles 
(Ordered logit regression) 
 Coef. 
Linearized 
Std. Err. t P>t [95%  Conf. Interval] 
Quintiles of Wealth 0.053 0.020 2.710 0.007 0.015 0.092 
Quintiles of Wealth x Urban -0.114 0.024 -4.780 0.000 -0.161 -0.067 
Urban (0=Rural) 0.797 0.074 10.710 0.000 0.651 0.943 
Crime Victimization 0.007 0.000 23.490 0.000 0.007 0.008 
Corruption Victimization 0.002 0.000 7.460 0.000 0.002 0.003 
Civic Participation 0.039 0.026 1.490 0.136 -0.012 0.090 
Education -0.008 0.003 -2.190 0.029 -0.014 -0.001 
Sex 
 (1= Male; 0=Female) -0.197 0.022 -8.770 0.000 -0.241 -0.153 
Age 0.014 0.004 3.730 0.000 0.006 0.021 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 -4.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mexico 0.128 0.102 1.250 0.213 -0.073 0.328 
Guatemala 0.229 0.097 2.360 0.019 0.038 0.419 
El Salvador 0.509 0.102 4.980 0.000 0.308 0.709 
Honduras -0.112 0.124 -0.900 0.368 -0.355 0.131 
Nicaragua 0.085 0.092 0.920 0.355 -0.095 0.264 
Costa Rica 0.456 0.122 3.720 0.000 0.216 0.696 
Panama 0.174 0.089 1.940 0.052 -0.002 0.349 
Colombia 0.031 0.115 0.270 0.789 -0.194 0.256 
Ecuador 0.346 0.099 3.490 0.001 0.151 0.541 
Bolivia 0.644 0.104 6.210 0.000 0.441 0.847 
Peru 1.031 0.088 11.680 0.000 0.858 1.204 
Paraguay 0.033 0.092 0.360 0.718 -0.147 0.214 
Chile 0.293 0.111 2.640 0.008 0.076 0.511 
Uruguay 0.173 0.124 1.400 0.163 -0.070 0.416 
Brazil -0.041 0.117 -0.350 0.725 -0.270 0.188 
Venezuela 0.240 0.122 1.970 0.049 0.001 0.479 
Argentina 0.771 0.085 9.050 0.000 0.604 0.939 
Dominican Republic 0.574 0.097 5.890 0.000 0.383 0.765 
Excludes Haiti; N. Obs.=30830  F=54.83; Standard Errors take into account design effect 
Reference Country: Jamaica 
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Appendix II-6 Impact of Area of Residence on Interpersonal Trust by Quintiles 
(Ordered logit regression) 
 Coef. 
Linearized 
Std. Err. T P>t [95%  Conf. Interval] 
Quintiles -0.055 0.019 -2.930 0.003 -0.092 -0.018 
Quintiles x Urban 0.160 0.023 7.000 0.000 0.115 0.205 
Urban -0.853 0.074 -11.590 0.000 -0.997 -0.708 
Crime Victimization -0.003 0.000 -10.540 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 
Corruption Victimization -0.002 0.000 -5.430 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
Civic Participation 0.089 0.025 3.590 0.000 0.040 0.137 
Education 0.022 0.003 6.330 0.000 0.015 0.028 
Education 0.188 0.024 7.890 0.000 0.141 0.235 
Sex (1= Male; 0=Female) 0.005 0.004 1.210 0.227 -0.003 0.012 
Age 0.000 0.000 1.820 0.068 0.000 0.000 
Mexico 0.250 0.093 2.690 0.007 0.068 0.433 
Guatemala 0.149 0.099 1.510 0.131 -0.045 0.343 
El Salvador 0.370 0.099 3.730 0.000 0.176 0.565 
Honduras 0.673 0.098 6.850 0.000 0.480 0.866 
Nicaragua 0.265 0.087 3.050 0.002 0.095 0.436 
Costa Rica 0.689 0.103 6.700 0.000 0.488 0.891 
Panama -0.415 0.088 -4.730 0.000 -0.587 -0.243 
Colombia 0.403 0.102 3.960 0.000 0.204 0.603 
Ecuador -0.147 0.082 -1.800 0.072 -0.308 0.013 
Bolivia -0.612 0.098 -6.260 0.000 -0.804 -0.420 
Peru -0.797 0.080 -9.990 0.000 -0.953 -0.640 
Paraguay 0.599 0.088 6.790 0.000 0.426 0.771 
Chile 0.179 0.111 1.610 0.108 -0.039 0.397 
Uruguay 0.425 0.100 4.260 0.000 0.229 0.621 
Brazil -0.121 0.096 -1.260 0.208 -0.309 0.067 
Venezuela 0.008 0.107 0.070 0.941 -0.202 0.218 
Argentina 0.033 0.091 0.360 0.719 -0.146 0.212 
Dominican Republic 0.300 0.089 3.350 0.001 0.124 0.475 
Excludes Haiti; N. Obs.=30451  F=52.52; Standard Errors take into account design effect 
Reference Country: Jamaica 
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CHAPTER III  
 
 
CULTURE OR ECONOMIC STRUCTURE? A SUB-NATIONAL MULTILEVEL 
ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF INTERPERSONAL TRUST IN COSTA 
RICA 
 
 
Introduction 
Cost Rica, “the Switzerland of Central America,” as popularly called for its long-standing 
democracy and admirable social equality and economic development in comparison to its 
neighboring countries is, however, a nation full of surprises and contradictions. Although Costa 
Rica’s democracy is the oldest and one of the strongest in Latin America, and as a whole has far 
better socioeconomic indicators than most countries in the region, glimpses of a more 
complicated society come to light once one looks behind this façade. Inside Costa Rica, one 
finds that a number of places have more in common with Central American and other poor Latin 
American nations than is often thought (Booth 1998 262, 63). Costa Rica’s virtues are not 
distributed evenly across the full breadth of its national territory. This small country, about the 
size of the state of West Virginia in the U.S. with an estimated population of 4.4 millions 
inhabitants, has been historically marked by profound economic regional disparities, with most 
of its economic activity and production, concentrated in the central valley region (known as the 
“meseta central”) while much of the rest of the country has lagged behind and been marked by 
poverty. 
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Regional disparities are a relatively natural phenomenon in any country, because initial 
conditions such as natural resources and population density favor investment in certain regions 
more than in others. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that in Costa Rica, as happens in the majority 
of Latin American countries, regional inequalities in well-being have been much more 
pronounced than in the developed world (Hall 1984). Certainly, anyone who has visited Latin 
America has witnessed that, across regions within a single nation, citizens live in worlds apart, 
and Costa Rica is no exception. 
Costa Rica’s unequal regional economic development has been well documented since at 
least the end of the nineteen century when European travelers to the country began recording 
such disparities. As one German visitor observed in 1899, “given that most travelers and even 
the majority of Costa Ricans only know the central valley, Costa Rica has the fame of being the 
most civilized among Central American countries; however, in its isolated areas is equally 
underdeveloped as the great majority of other Latin American countries” (Zeledón Cartín 1997 
63). Since then, despite the nation’s spectacular political transformations and socio-economic 
progress in the twentieth century, particularly between the 1950s and 1970s, deep-seated spatial 
economic inequalities are still present in Costa Rica today. Heightened social investment during 
this period and the country’s relatively steady economic growth in the last fifty years have not 
been able to close the gap between regions.36 
As well as having profound spatial disparities in socio-economic well-being, for 
analytical purposes, Costa Rica has the virtue of having a homogenous culture, devoid of any but 
the most minimal subcultural differences. Indeed, Costa Rica is one of the most culturally 
homogenous countries in the Americas, defined in terms of its ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
                                                 
36 The average annual economic growth in Costa Rica in the 1950’s was 6 per cent. During the period 1965-70, the 
economy grew at 6.99 per cent; and, between 1970-75, 1975-80, and 1983-2005 at 6.04, 5.34, and 5 per cent, 
respectively (Céspedes, et al. 1983 ; Vargas 2007). 
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composition (Alesina, et al. 2003). These factors make this country a perfect laboratory to test 
two of the most contentious theoretical approaches in comparative politics—cultural and 
economic institutional accounts-to explain the formation of individuals’ democratic attitudes, 
specifically interpersonal trust.  
Data for the region offer solid evidence of Costa Rica’s relatively uniform culture. In 
Costa Rica, approximately 87 per cent of the population is white, 98 per cent speak Spanish, and 
about 86 per cent is Roman Catholic (Alesina, et al. 2003). Costa Rica’s ethnic composition, in 
particular, contrasts starkly with those of other former Spanish colonies in Latin America. For 
instance, according to the same data source, in Bolivia, approximately 11 per cent of the 
population is white, 31 per cent is Aymara, 31 per cent is Quechua, and 25 per cent is Mestizo. 
Cultural homogeneity in contrast predominates in Costa Rica, a fact that has been pointed out by 
many authors who have written about its culture and social life (Biesanz and Biensanz 1944; 
Biesanz, Biesanz and Biesanz 1982; Harrison 1985).  
Given its national profile, Costa Rica is also an ideal place to examine the origin of 
citizens’ attitudes, since the causes of its “exceptionality” relative to other Latin American 
countries have been widely debated in the literature. Costa Rica’s high level of  political and 
socio-economic development and their correlates, namely, citizens’ democratic attitudes and 
behaviors, have generally been attributed to the “superior” culture of this country (i.e.Harrison 
1985) or to the “egalitarian” economic institutions established in the country during  the colonial 
era (Acemoglu and Robinson 2002). In terms of citizens’ political attitudes and behaviors, 
compared to other Central Americans, Costa Ricans have been depicted as exceptionally 
peaceful (Seligson 2007), committed to democratic rule (Seligson 2001), and more trusting of 
others (Harrison 1985), characteristics considered products of culture or economic structure. Yet, 
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we still know little about the empirical validity of either explanation, largely because of data 
limitations.  
However, the cultural and institutional accounts of Costa Rican exceptionalism have one 
point in common. In general, both accounts have overlooked the internal disparities in 
development that exist within and across sub-national units. As this chapter will demonstrate, 
this shortcoming in the literature can lead to overestimation or underestimation of the 
exceptionality of a nation’s political culture. By exploring the origins of interpersonal trust 
formation at the sub-national level, this chapter offers a first empirical assessment of the role that 
culture vis-à-vis economic institutions play in shaping democratic attitudes in the Costa Rican 
context. Thus, the aim of this study is to shed light on to the origins of Costa Rica’s sub-national 
disparities in one fundamental factor that has been found key for economic development and 
democratic stability, namely interpersonal trust.  
The direction of the causal relationship between interpersonal trust, economic 
development, and democratic stability is, however, far from clear and has been subject of intense 
research. In this dissertation, and in this chapter in particular, rather than deal with the chicken 
and egg question, the focus is to explore the soundness of cultural and economic institutional 
arguments. In addition, by using a multilevel strategy, the importance of economic contextual 
factors will be assessed vis-à-vis individual experiences and characteristics for interpersonal trust 
creation at the local level, while holding constant a nation’s cultural background and level of and 
years of experience with democracy. 
In order to test the validity of these two theoretical arguments, I proceed as follows.  
First, by exploring the extent of variation in interpersonal trust across sub-national units in a 
relatively homogenous country, I test the explanatory power of the cultural approach. 
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Specifically, if marked differences in interpersonal trust are found at the local level in Costa 
Rica, this would obviously weaken the explanatory power of cultural explanations, especially, if 
it is found that, in some regions in Costa Rica, interpersonal trust levels are similar to those 
found in Latin American countries with a long history of political violence and instability, such 
as Costa Rica’s Central American neighbors.  
Likewise, if it is found that in some places in Costa Rica interpersonal trust levels are 
similar to that of the most politically developed countries in the Americas, namely Canada and 
the United States, this would also constitute evidence against the cultural explanation, since as in 
the case of the rest of Latin American countries, Costa Rica and these two nations have markedly 
different cultural backgrounds. The former has its cultural history deeply rooted in the Hispanic 
Catholic tradition while the latter in the so called Protestant ethic (Weber and Parsons 1930). 
The second step is to assess the explanatory power of economic structural accounts. The 
following questions need to be answered in turn, “are there statistically significant differences in 
interpersonal trust across sub-national units in Costa Rica?” And if so, “Do economic structural 
factors explain in part such variations?” Do individuals exposed to the same economic 
environment show similar levels of interpersonal trust, or is the effect of economic contextual 
factors conditioned on individual socio-economic status, as the country and individual level 
results in this study suggest?  
Besides assessing the validity of these two major theoretical approaches in comparative 
politics, by using local governments’ geographical delimiting units, which in Costa Rica are 
called “cantones” equivalent to a U.S. county or  “municipio” in most other Latin American 
countries, this chapter also hopes to contribute to the debate regarding the factors facilitating or 
constraining the success of decentralization programs in the region, which include, among 
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others, the construction of social capital at the local level (Seligson 2005). The decentralization 
of political power and functions from the national to local governments involves an active role of 
citizens at the local level as well as high levels of social integration. At the heart of 
decentralization programs in Latin America is the notion that democracy must be built from the 
bottom up, beginning at the grassroots level. This enterprise undoubtedly requires high levels of 
social cohesion and therefore interpersonal trust in communities.  
A key question that remains unanswered is whether decentralization programs can 
successfully build a strong civil society and therefore stable democracy in contexts of economic 
marginalization. Specifically, do poverty and economic inequality at the local level constrain the 
building of interpersonal trust in municipalities? If local economic structural factors such as 
poverty and inequality are impeding the consolidation of a robust civil society at the local level, 
then obviously the impact that decentralization programs can have on deepening democracy will 
vary from one municipality to another, with already well off municipalities being more likely to 
succeed in their decentralization efforts, thus widening the gap between municipality haves and 
have nots in the future.  
Despite the increasing importance of local politics in the region (Daughters and Harper 
2007), and certainly in Costa Rica (Córdova Macías,Rojas Bolaños and Valverde Castro 1996 ; 
Programa Estado de la Nación 2008), this is one of the least investigated areas in Latin American 
studies. Moreover, because of the complete absence of multilevel research at the municipal level 
in the Latin American context, we simply do not know whether and how the characteristics of 
municipalities influence citizens’ attitudes and behaviors. For example, it may be that country 
level characteristics are what matter the most for shaping individuals’ political culture, regardless 
of the local context. To my knowledge, no published study has empirically explored, in the 
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context of decentralization, the role played by economic structural factors at the local level in the 
achievement of a strong civil society in Latin American countries.  
This chapter is organized in the following manner. In the first section, the cultural and 
institutional arguments are briefly described. The second section explores the origins as well as 
the present state of sub-national economic disparities in Costa Rica. The third section examines 
empirically the strength of cultural arguments, contrasting the levels of interpersonal trust in 
Costa Rican municipalities included in the sample to those found in other countries in the 
Americas. The following section presents the levels of poverty and wealth inequality in the 
municipalities included in the sample. Then, taking into account the theoretical discussion of the 
previous chapter and the particularities of the Costa Rican case, a sub-national multilevel model 
of the economic determinants of interpersonal trust is estimated. The last section presents 
conclusions. 
 
Culture and Economic Structure as Contextual Determinants of Interpersonal Trust: A 
Review of the Literature 
 
Why does interpersonal trust flourish more in some environments than in others? The 
comparative politics literature on the contextual determinants of interpersonal trust, and citizens’ 
political attitudes in general, can be divided into two camps, those who argue that cultural factors 
better explain differences in interpersonal trust across contexts and those who claim that 
institutional explanations, mainly economic institutions or structural factors, better account for 
observed patterns. “Institutions” are generally defined as “humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction” (North 1990). Likewise, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) point out, 
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institutional factors are the products of policy making and therefore contrast with aspects outside 
of human control, such as one’s cultural background.  
In turn, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008 v) define “economic” institutions as “collective 
choices that are the outcome of a political process,” and add, “economic institutions of a society 
depend on the nature of political institutions and the distribution of political power in society.” 
This section lays out the main arguments of cultural and institutional explanations for the 
formation of democratic attitudes, and discusses the limitations of the existing empirical 
literature. 
Proponents of cultural explanations argue that interpersonal trust originated in the historical 
legacy of nations, especially in their religious backgrounds, and therefore in values transmitted 
from generation to generation. According to the culturalist view, following Max Weber’s 
seminal ideas, Western Protestant values are considered more compatible with democratic 
attitudes, and with democracy per se, than other value systems. Hence, Latin America’s 
relatively low levels of interpersonal trust as well as its political and economic 
underdevelopment are ultimately attributed to this region’s Catholic tradition.  
While Protestantism in the United States, for example, is said to have brought “religious and 
political pluralism,” the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America is said to have infused 
“absolutism and authoritarianism”(Wiarda and Kline 2007), value systems that are reflected in 
citizens’ political attitudes. Ebel and Taras (2003 60), for example, report that “the dominant 
value system of Latin America has been, and continues to be, what has been called political 
monism…resistance to political competition, differences of opinion, and thus to change.” 
Similarly, Harrison (1985) evaluates the causes of Latin America’s relative 
underdevelopment and concludes that Catholic values and traditions imbedded in Hispanic 
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culture impede prosperity and the emergence of stable democracy in Latin American countries. 
He states that “human development is frustrated in most Hispanic-American countries and most 
Third World countries by a way of seeing the world that impedes the achievement of political 
pluralism, social equity, and dynamic economic progress” (Harrison 1985 168).  
On the other hand, Harrison also observes that within Latin America, some countries have 
made more progress than others and attributes these differences to variation in the degree of 
exposure to orthodox Catholic traditions during colonial times. For example, he explains Costa 
Rica’s exceptionality relative to other Latin American countries, including likely higher levels of 
interpersonal trust, to the fact that the Spanish conquistadors who settled in this country held 
more liberal values. As a consequence, Harrison (1985) argues, Costa Rica had a lower degree of 
exposure to the authoritarian Hispanic culture.  
In terms of interpersonal trust, in his comparative analysis of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 
Harrison (1985 55) points out that “one factor that distinguishes Costa Ricans from Nicaraguans 
(and indeed from most other Hispanic Americans) is the Costa Rican’s identification with other 
Costa Ricans…the sense of family is doubtlessly reinforced by Costa Rica’s relative racial 
homogeneity.” However, only a handful of studies have attempted to test the validity of cultural 
arguments in the Latin America context. Most empirical works use cross-country data from 
around the world with only few Latin American countries included in the sample.  
Inglehart’s multiple cross-country statistical analyses using data from the World Values 
Surveys offer the most comprehensive empirical examination of the validity of the cultural 
argument; however, it only takes into account a few Latin American countries. Based on this 
data, Inglehart has concluded that cultural heritage rooted in religious traditions offer the most 
powerful explanation for observed differences in political attitudes and economic and political 
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development across nations around the world (Inglehart 1988; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart 1999; 
Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  
Yet, Inglehart’s empirical analysis has relied almost entirely on aggregated figures at the 
country level, causing authors to wonder whether patterns at the country level are also observed 
at the individual level (Seligson 2002b), and, in the case of this research, whether within a single 
culturally homogenous country marked regional differences in political attitudes exist. As 
Jackman and Miller (1998 52) strongly argue, one key limitation of the empirical literature that 
claims that culture plays a powerful role in shaping political attitudes is that it has generally 
looked at “aggregate properties of societies,” neglecting possible variations in political attitudes 
across individuals and regions within relatively culturally homogenous countries. 
Inglehart suggests that even if there are differences in interpersonal trust across individuals 
and regions in a given country, on average these varying levels of interpersonal trust would 
continue to reflect the nation’s cultural tradition. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005 69) put it, in a 
society, “the persistence of distinctive value systems seems to reflect the fact that culture is path 
dependent” and, in old democracies in particular, “Protestant religious institutions helped shape 
the Protestant ethic, relatively high levels of interpersonal trust, and a high degree of social 
pluralism.” Inglehart and Welzel claim that societies “in a given cultural zone,” regardless of 
individual characteristics, show distinct values. 
In terms of possible individual effects across different socio-economic groups within 
societies, based on data at the country level for five countries,37 Inglehart and Welzel (2005) 
argue that, on average, even individuals at the top of the income distribution (who according to 
advocates of the modernization theory are more likely to hold democratic attitudes), show very 
                                                 
37 They analyzed three high income countries, Switzerland, Germany, and the United States, and two low income 
countries, India and Nigeria.  
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different sets of “self-expression values” or political attitudes across nations. For instance, they 
argue that, the rich in the United States show political attitudes more suitable for democracy than 
the rich in India and Nigeria, and in fact that in these two countries, the poor and not the rich 
demonstrate slightly more democratic values. They end the discussion with the general 
conclusion that these observations confirm that a country’s cultural background is ultimately 
what determines its political culture. Specifically, Inglehart and Welzel (2005 69) conclude that, 
a nation’s culture binds “even the exceptionally rich and poor in this nation’s cultural orbit,” 
explaining why in countries with cultures supposedly less suitable for democracy even the rich 
show a lower quality set of political values.  
As this example suggests, reliance on aggregated data at the country level is problematic. 
First, Inglehart and Welzel have not tested whether this “cultural orbit” also holds at the regional 
level within countries. Second, they are unable to empirically test whether the characteristics of 
context, other than culture, shape the political attitudes of the rich and poor differently, in other 
words, the possibility of an interaction between levels of analysis. Thus, notwithstanding 
Inglehart and Welzel’s advantage of having a large-N to work with, and not having to deal with 
the small-N problem that characterizes multilevel regional studies, they fail to employ a 
multilevel strategy.  
As the results of the previous chapter in this study suggest, the characteristics of both the 
context and individuals matter for the formation of democratic attitudes. In the case of the 
Americas, the results of this research suggest that differences in interpersonal trust across 
countries as well as across rich and poor individuals seem to be largely explained by the 
economic performance of nations in two important areas: the overall level of socio-economic 
well-being and the distribution of economic gains. Inglehart and Welzel’s aggregate strategy 
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makes it impossible to test whether cultural or economic structural factors better explain the 
observed political attitudes across the poor and rich in the countries they analyzed.  
By employing a multilevel sub-national empirical analysis in a culturally homogenous 
country, this research overcomes the two aforementioned constraints in the empirical literature 
and should demonstrate that neither individual nor aggregate country level approaches alone can 
fully answer fundamental questions in the field of comparative politics, such as why some 
environments are more prone to cultivate interpersonal trust than others and the role that culture 
and economic structures play.  This last point is particularly important as Inglehart and Welzel 
have forcefully claimed that the most productive research strategy for explaining political 
attitudes is the one that relies on aggregated figures at the country level, since the ultimate 
dependent variable to be explained, the institution of democracy, is to be found at this level of 
analysis.38  
Thus, just as in international relations, the field of comparative politics is caught up in the 
level of analysis question. However, recent multilevel empirical works have suggested that the 
most important question in comparative politics is not whether analyses at the country or 
individual level are the most appropriate for understanding democratization, but whether levels 
of analysis interact (Seligson,Cordova and Moreno 2007; Andersen and Fetner 2008; Anderson 
and Singer 2008; Solt 2008). 
As this chapter will show, a multilevel approach proves to be a more productive research 
strategy. Such an approach empirically tests, for example, why two rich persons who live in 
dissimilar environments, show a different set of attitudes, all other individual characteristics 
                                                 
38 See chapter 10, “Individual-Level Values and System-Level Democracy: The Problem of Cross-Level Analysis,” 
in Inglehart and Welzel (2005). 
108 
 
being equal, rather than assume, as Inglehart and Welzel do, that such differences can be 
automatically attributed to their religious or cultural backgrounds.  
Besides these methodological shortcomings, culturalist arguments can also be criticized on 
the grounds of lack of face validity. Culturalists argue that although over time changes in 
political attitudes and interpersonal trust levels can occur (Inglehart and Baker 2000), they take 
place at a slow pace, since by their very nature cultural traits are enduring. However, in the last 
few decades the United States has experienced drastic declines in both interpersonal trust and 
civic participation (Putnam 1995; Putnam 2000), challenging one of the major implications of 
the cultural explanation. Putnam argues that the decline in interpersonal trust and civic activism 
in the United States is explained, in part, by the increased number of hours people spend 
watching television, which has also made people less trusting because television programs tend 
to overstate negative aspects and portray the world as a “mean” place (Putnam 1996) and at the 
same time deter individuals from interacting with others.  
The Putnam thesis, however, has not gone unchallenged either.  While many agree that there 
has been a decline in interpersonal trust in the United States, the explanation is not to be found in 
television viewing. Structural economic factors are said to have played a role. Uslaner, for 
example,  rejects Putnam’s explanations for the decline in social capital (Uslaner 1998; Uslaner 
and Brown 2005). Instead, he argues that the recent rise in economic inequality in the United 
States better explains the waning of interpersonal trust and adds that the decline in civic 
participation is the effect of the decline in interpersonal trust. 
Other authors have also suggested that democratic attitudes, among them interpersonal trust, 
are not entirely cultural, but primarily the result of institutional or structural factors, including 
economic ones. Indeed, institutionalists suggest that the relationship between cultural heritage 
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and interpersonal trust might be a spurious one, since the institutions established during colonial 
times might, rather than religious background, better explain the extent to which people trust 
others. Contrary to the culturalist implication that people belonging to the same cultural group 
would show similar levels of interpersonal trust even if exposed to different institutional or 
structural constraints, Jackman and Miller, for example, contend that “the structure of the 
situation…creates incentives for individuals to be trustworthy” (Jackman and Miller 1998 53).  
Indeed, the social capital literature in general and Putnam’s (1993) well known cultural 
account of the different development patterns of Northern and Southern Italy, in particular, have 
been criticized for paying insufficient attention to the characteristics of the “structure” in which 
individuals interact with others as a way of explaining interpersonal trust, one of them being the 
extent of economic inequality. Boix and Posner (1998 689), for example, note that the role that 
inequality and polarization play in defining the degree of trust and cooperation is “almost 
invisible not only in Putnam’s account of Italian history but in most theoretical accounts of the 
evolution of social co-operation.”  
In sum, according to structural accounts, democratic attitudes are more malleable than 
what some proponents of the culturalist view suggest. Structuralists argue that economic factors 
are important, and consequently interpersonal trust can be shaped by the products of public 
policies. This is the theoretical framework that has inspired this study. This research argues that 
the quality of social capital in Latin America can be improved if  the appropriate set of public 
policies is implemented. Economic development and equality have been found to be important 
structural factors that affect the level of interpersonal trust in democratic nations, and their role in 
shaping social capital vis-à-vis culture and individual factors is investigated in this chapter at the 
sub-national level in the Costa Rican context.  
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Does Culture Matter for the Formation of Interpersonal Trust? Evidence for Costa Rica 
The sample design of the LAPOP surveys for Costa Rica allows carrying out a multilevel 
analysis at the municipal level. Costa Rica has a total of 81 municipalities; 29 were selected 
using the Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) procedure and included in the LAPOP surveys.  
Unlike the sample design for most LAPOP surveys, each Costa Rican municipality included in 
the sample has a sizable fixed number of observations or interviews. In each municipality, in a 
given year, 50 interviews are carried out, except in the municipality of San José, the capital city, 
where 100 individual cases are collected due the larger population this municipality. Cantones or 
municipalities are the primary sampling units (PSU), and census tracts or “segmentos censales” 
within municipalities were chosen using PPS within both urban and rural areas, with about 6 and 
12 interviews in each rural and urban census tract, respectively.  
Moreover, given that the sample design for Costa Rica has remained the same and the 
same municipalities have been used in each round of surveys, the pooled dataset for 2004, 2006, 
and 2008 is used with the objective of increasing the number of observations available in each 
municipality.39  
In sum, the dataset used here consists of a total of 29 municipalities and 4,500 individual 
cases. For the capital city the sample size is 300 cases; for the remaining of municipalities, it is a 
total of 150 cases in each. With this sample size in each municipality, it is possible to observe 
general patterns within and across municipalities and to perform regression and difference in 
means analyses, as the descriptive statistics for the variable of interest, interpersonal trust, show 
relatively small standard errors at the municipal level in comparison to other variables included 
in the LAPOP surveys, such as corruption and crime victimization.  
                                                 
39 The LAPOP data for Costa Rica show that there are no statistically significant differences in the average of 
interpersonal trust from year to year, indicating that the datasets for 2004, 2006, and 2008 can be pooled. 
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To assess the validity of cultural arguments, the first step is to explore the levels of 
interpersonal trust at the municipal level in this relatively culturally homogenous country. Figure 
III.1 depicts the average level of interpersonal trust in Costa Rica by municipality. The vertical 
lines show the mean interpersonal trust value for Costa Rica and other selected countries. Figure 
III.1 demonstrates that despite Costa Rica’s long democratic tradition and cultural homogeneity, 
at the local level, there are substantial differences in interpersonal trust. These differences are so 
marked that Costa Rica can actually be characterized as a country of multiple political sub-
cultures, rather than having a unified political culture as predicted by culturalist scholars.  This is 
the first major finding of this chapter, and it is hard to overstate it. Although in terms of average 
interpersonal trust, Costa Rica ranks high in comparison to most Latin American countries, 
Figure III.1 makes clear the need to go beyond national averages as these can mask important 
variations within countries. 
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Figure III-1. Mean Interpersonal Trust by Municipality  
Compared to the United States and Selected Latin American Countries 
 
Looking solely at national averages can clearly under or overestimate the quality of 
democracy in some places in Costa Rica when measured by social capital levels. Within Costa 
Rica, cantones can be found with average interpersonal trust similar to the average for the United 
States, a country that has supposedly embraced the “right” culture for the formation of 
democratic attitudes. Moreover, interpersonal trust levels within Costa Rica are similar to those 
of some of the least politically developed countries in Central America, including Nicaragua and 
some of the most politically unstable countries in South America, such as Ecuador, some of the 
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very countries that have been said to hold cultural traditions not apt for the creation of 
interpersonal trust.  
Specifically, Figure III.1 indicates that on one hand, at the very top one finds 
municipalities, such as Turrialba and San Carlos, with average interpersonal trust similar to the 
United States, while on the other hand, at the very bottom municipalities like Desamparados and 
San José, with average interpersonal trust similar to the levels of weaker Latin American 
democracies. Moreover, these differences are statistically significant, as the confidence intervals 
for municipalities with high and low interpersonal trust levels do not overlap.40 This first analysis 
shows that once sub-national variations are explored, cultural explanations are found wanting. 
Despite their geographical proximity (keep in mind that Costa Rica is no larger than West 
Virginia) and shared experience with democracy and Catholic tradition, striking variations in 
interpersonal trust levels across municipalities in Costa Rica are observable, suggesting that 
factors other than national cultural heritage better account for these differences.  
The next step is to examine what actually explains such marked differences in 
interpersonal trust across municipalities in Costa Rica. Following the theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence from Chapter II, this chapter hypothesizes that structural economic factors, 
specifically poverty and economic inequality, at the local level are detrimental for the formation 
of interpersonal trust despite this country’s overall lower economic inequality rates and higher 
socio-economic development relative to most countries in the region. The next section discusses 
the historical origins of Costa Rica’s regional inequalities, and assesses the extent of inequality 
across Costa Rica’s regions at the present time. 
                                                 
40 Table I in the appendix of this chapter shows the mean values of interpersonal trust by municipality and their 
respective standard errors and confidence intervals.  
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Explaining Costa Rica’s Sub-National Economic Disparities: their Origin and Current 
State 
 
Two major approaches to the study of Costa Rica’s economic history can be found in the 
literature. One that focuses on the country as a “whole,” and other that also accounts for its 
“parts” or sub-regions. Authors who focus on the nation as a whole, and therefore pay little 
attention to the subtleties and economic histories of its parts, tend to overestimate Costa Rica’s 
exceptionality.  
Those who look at Costa Rica as a compact unit, often explain its relatively high level of 
economic development as the result of the more favorable institutional or structural 
configurations that were established in this country as consequence of its unique colonial 
origins.41 In that sense, these authors use an approach that economists Acemeglou and Robinson 
(2002), sociologists such as James Mahoney(2001) and political scientist Howard Wiarda (2007) 
have popularized in recent years, in which contemporary conditions are seen as having their 
origins hundreds of years in the past. In a nutshell, the story goes as follows: At the beginning of 
the colonial period, after realizing that “Costa Rica,” a name that translates into English as “rich 
cost,” was actually not rich in precious metals, Spanish conquerors lost interest in the country. 
For more than two hundred years, Costa Rica remained largely unexplored and a poorer relative 
to its neighboring countries.  Key to the explanation of these colonial origins is that Costa Rica 
was characterized by a very low density indigenous population, denying an adequate labor force 
to the Spaniards for their colonization efforts (Stone 1975).  
Costa Rica’s initial scarce natural resources and short labor supply are said to have 
required the small settler group to have to resort to farming rather than to use indigenous labor to 
                                                 
41 For an overview of Costa Rica’s economic and political development see (Booth 1998 ; Wiarda and Kline 2007 ; 
Booth 2008) 
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exploit mineral resources, a process that gave birth to a more egalitarian society, which in turn 
built the very institutional foundations of the country’s subsequent economic development and 
democratization. Equality has been considered the engine of both economic and political 
development in Costa Rica; in contrast, inequality is viewed as a primary cause of most Latin 
American countries’ economic and political decay. Thus, paradoxically, Costa Rica’s initial state 
of poverty and despair promoted equality, which translated into future prosperity (Seligson 
1980). 
During the colonial period, relations between the labor force and land owners in Costa 
Rica were less exploitative because of the lack of labor supply and scarce resources. The 
colonizers themselves had to look after their land and crops, and a kind of “rural democracy” 
(Monge 1980) is said to have emerged as small landholdings predominated the system of land 
tenure. Labor was scarce, but land was abundant and for the most part peasants were the owners 
of the land they worked. Consequently, unlike most other Latin American countries, a high 
concentration of land in the hands of a few was not prevalent in Costa Rica, a factor which 
avoided the major political conflicts over economic gains and resources that marred the political 
landscape in neighboring countries, like El Salvador (Durham 1979). Costa Rica’s lower 
propensity to social conflict is suggested to have contributed to the earlier emergence of 
democracy as a system of government (Booth 2008), undergirded by a more democratic political 
culture, including a far less conflict between the relatively rich and poor, thus facilitating the 
early emergence of a welfare state in the years to come. 
While these accounts of Costa Rica’s political and economic development are generally 
accepted as true, this abbreviated story corresponds primarily to the economic history of one 
region in the country, the Central Valley, until the mid nineteenth century. A closer look at Costa 
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Rica’s history reveals that some of the very same economic institutions, greatly responsible for 
high poverty and economic inequality in many Latin American countries were also established 
across Costa Rica’s territory.  
Because of the favorable characteristics of its soil and the difficulty of accessing regions 
in the interior of the country, most of Costa Rica’s population and economic activity was 
concentrated in the Central Valley, specifically in the towns of San José, Cartago, and Heredia, 
until the 1850’s (Seligson 2007). By 1840, only five per cent of Costa Rica’s territory had been 
settled, concentrated overwhelmingly in the Central Valley (Augelli 1987). This accident of 
nature and history gave the Central Valley an initial economic advantage. In the Valley, small 
landholdings called “chacras” predominated, the economic institution that promoted Costa 
Rica’s more egalitarian economic system, and therefore indisputably avoided the high levels of 
political and social violence observed in neighboring countries. Thus, the Central Valley’s initial 
advantage and earlier development explains in part the marked spatial inequalities we observe 
today in Costa Rica. But, the other side of the coin is that the rest of the country has not been 
able to catch up. 
In addition to the historically more favorable economic environment in the Central 
Valley, Costa Rica’s uneven spatial socioeconomic development can also be attributed to the 
various economic institutions established across its small territory during and after the colonial 
period, a fact that has been largely overlooked in institutional historical accounts and social 
science literature. 
Although institutionalists have attributed Costa Rica’s political stability and high socio-
economic development relative to other countries in the region to this country’s patterns of 
colonization. In some areas of Costa Rica the very same patterns of colonization and therefore 
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the economic institutions that characterized other Central American and poor Latin American 
countries can also be found. This fact seems to continue having important implications for the 
standards of living of the populations residing in those areas.  
A clear example of this pattern is the predominance of “haciendas” or large landholdings 
owned by a single family as a mode of land tenure in the northestern part of the country, 
specifically in the province of Guanacaste, during and after the colonization period. In his 
comprehensive study of the evolution and contemporary state of the hacienda in this region, 
Edelman (1992 27)  states that “this province of 10,000 square kilometers appears almost another 
country, with a land tenure pattern resembling that of the rest of Central America’s Pacific 
lowlands,” and adds that as in other Latin American countries workers in the haciendas in 
Guanacaste were treated in an unfair and exploitative manner, especially in the 1930s, as 
consequence of the drop in international prices during the Great Depression, which contributed 
to the decline of wages and curtailment of labor benefits.  
Indeed, as Guillen (1988, 27) points out, “the many times told account that small property 
predominated during the colony across all the Costa Rican territory seems unfounded, since in 
reality it coexisted with other forms of land tenure such as the plantación and the hacienda.” 
Although haciendas were established mainly in Guanacaste during the colonial period, this mode 
of land tenure spread throughout Costa Rica’s territories in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century as well as into the twentieth century, as a result of Costa Rica’s profitable production and 
export of coffee and bananas to international markets, which increased the value of land and 
initiated a concentration of land process. The following makes this point clear: 
“Among the myths that currently cloud the outsider’s impressions of this “Switzerland of 
Central America,” none is as misleading as the belief that the country is a land of small farmers, 
unaffected by the evils of large landholdings. It may be true that the formative years of Costa 
Rican history were characterized by small holding land tenure, especially in the Central Valley, 
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but the size of landholdings, devoted to export crops, increased with the coming of coffee and 
banana production”(Augelli 1987 12). 
 
Seligson (1980, 23) estimates that as a consequence of the coffee boom, “By 1864, nearly 
half the peasants were no longer yeomen,” and about twenty years later, “71 percent of the 
agricultural population were landless laborers.” What is more, evidence shows that even after 
governmental efforts to achieve a better distribution of land were implemented in the mid-
twentieth century, land inequality continued to grow in Costa Rica, in part as a result of an 
abrupt increase in the number of haciendas across cantones. According to Seligson (1980), 
seventy nine per cent of the cantones experienced an increase in the concentration of land 
between 1963 and 1973.  Seligson (1980 149) concludes that, during this period, “hardly any 
area of the country escaped increasing [land] concentration.” Additionally, given their lack of 
technical assistance, many of the peasants who benefited from the land reform, during and after 
this period, have not been able to work the land efficiently, and as consequence are living today 
in extreme poverty (Baquero 1999).   
Land concentration and its varying degrees across territories in Costa Rica, a core issue in 
this country even today, has most likely also contributed to varying levels of income and wealth 
inequality within and across cantones. Land for most of the poor in developing countries, 
concentrated mainly in rural areas, has been found to be the “main vehicle for investing, 
accumulating wealth, and transferring it between generations” (Deininger 2003). In sum, deep 
seated regional inequalities in Costa Rica are likely to explain in part the sharp differences 
observed in interpersonal trust across municipalities today. 
In the 21st century, how deep is the economic gap between municipalities in Costa Rica? 
The answer to this question depends on how the gap is measured. Spatial inequalities are less 
pronounced if measured by standard of living indicators, such as life expectancy and education. 
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Yet, the gap is much sharper if assessed based on poverty rates (UNDP 2007). During the 
democratization period, and especially in the 1970s, Costa Rica constituted itself as a true 
welfare state (Segura-Ubiergo 2007), significantly improving the life of all Costa Ricans, which 
in turn positioned the country as one of the most developed in Latin America; nonetheless, high 
social investment did not translate automatically into better economic opportunities across 
populations and territories.  
Thus, although the democratic era brought to Costa Rica an exceptional improvement in 
the standards of living of its population even in remote areas, through government expending in 
human capital, it neither guaranteed the dynamization of local economies nor a fairer distribution 
of economic gains. Indeed, in Costa Rica the distribution of economic gains significantly 
worsened over the last two decades (Jiménez and Céspedes 2007). Despite Costa Rica’s overall 
relatively high socio-economic development, poverty in many of its municipalities is today 
similar to that of other less economically developed and recently democratized Latin American 
countries.   
According to the most recent data available, the proportion of households living in 
poverty in Costa Rica is approximately 21.7 per cent. However, important disparities are found 
across municipalities.42  The following map illustrates the contrasting standards of living across 
Costa Rica’s eighty-one municipalities. The shading demonstrates the uneven nature of Costa 
Rica’s development, with lighter shades indicating a lower proportion of households living in 
poverty. As can be observed, poverty rates in the Central Valley contrast with those in the rest of 
                                                 
42 Given the lack of income or consumption data reported at the municipal level in Costa Rica, poverty at this level 
of analysis is measured using a combination of two methods, the poverty line, which comes from annual household 
surveys representative at the province and national levels, and the Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) approach, which 
uses data from the 2000 census, the most recent census conducted in the country. The poverty data presented in this 
chapter corresponds to estimates for 2004. The data were downloaded from the Centro Centroamericano de 
Población (CCP)’s website (http://ccp.ucr.ac.cr/ ). For a full description of the methodology used for estimating 
poverty rates at the municipal level in Costa Rica, see (Baquero and Bonilla 2007). The full article describing the 
methodology can be downloaded at http://ccp.ucr.ac.cr/bvp/pdf/pobreza/barquero2.pdf 
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the country. Only in this region are poverty rates lower than 14 per cent, while in the northern an 
and southwestern and southeastern regions, poverty is widespread. The proportion of households 
living in poverty, for example, La Cruz in the Guanacaste province and Coto Brus in the 
Puntarenas is approximately 41.9 and 60.8 per cent respectively. In contrast, in cantones located 
in the central region, like Montes de Oca, the proportion of households living in poverty is less 
than ten per cent.  
 
 
Figure III-2.  Poverty Rates across Municipalities in Costa Rica 
 
Given that about two thirds of the total population resides in the Central Valley, in 
absolute terms, the number of poor individuals is far greater in this region than in the rest of the 
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country; the central region is home to about half of the poor in Costa Rica (World Bank 2007). 
Yet, the socio-economic composition of municipalities (i.e., the extent of poverty relative to its 
population) is likely to matter most for the creation of social capital at the local level and 
therefore for the functioning of local governments. Another related feature of Costa Rica’s 
spatial inequality is that outside of the Central Valley, cantones are overwhelmingly rural. This 
might work to counterbalance the negative impact of poverty on interpersonal trust, as the 
literature consistently finds that urban settings are less suitable for building social capital.43  
In sum, poverty rates across cantones clearly show that Costa Rica’s fifty plus years old 
democracy has not been able to close the gap between regions and municipalities. The uneven 
performance of Costa Rica’s democracy is likely to have translated into unequal opportunities 
for enjoying and exercising citizens’ political rights, and therefore in what O’Donnell (1993) has 
called areas of “low intensity citizenship.” As O’Donnell notes, “empirically, various forms of 
discrimination and extensive poverty and their correlate, extreme disparity in the distribution of 
(not only economic) resources, go hand in hand with low intensity citizenship.”  
In areas of low intensity citizenship even when the overall country’s democracy score is 
relatively high, citizens live in a polity of a different kind, one in which the relationship between 
citizens and national and local governments as well as between citizens themselves is likely to be 
more tense and therefore conflict-prone. In municipalities of low intensity citizenship, as 
indicated by their lower standards of living, discord and consequently lower levels of 
interpersonal trust between the rich and poor are not unexpected. 
 
 
                                                 
43 Evidence for eight Latin American countries, including Costa Rica, using the LAPOP data shows that, at the 
individual level the size of the place matters for the formation of social capital. Individuals living in urban areas are 
found to have lower levels of  interpersonal trust (Rosero Bixby 2006). 
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Poverty and Inequality in the Municipalities Included in the Sample 
Poverty rates at the cantón level were obtained from the Centro Centroamericano de 
Población at the Universidad de Costa Rica. The data correspond to estimates for 2004, the most 
recent year available and corresponds precisely to the first year of the survey data included in 
this study. Figure III.3 shows the proportion of households living in poverty in each municipality 
included in the LAPOP sample. As can be observed, poverty rates vary substantially across 
municipalities, from 8.9 to 41.9 per cent. The poorest municipality, La Cruz, in the province of 
Guanacaste, shows almost five times the poverty rate of the better off municipality, Montes de 
Oca, a cantón in the Central Valley and home to the main academic institutions of the country, 
including the Universidad de Costa Rica, and is characterized by elevated economic activity. 
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Figure III-3. Poverty Rates across Municipalities Included in the Sample 
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One of the main challenges of this study was to obtain reliable economic inequality 
measurements at the canton level. Given the lack of representative income or consumption data 
at the canton level, economic inequality figures at this level of analysis are not available. This 
challenge was overcome implementing the methodology developed by Mckenzie (2005). With 
this methodology, based on Principal Component Analysis, measures of wealth inequality are 
obtained using household assets and access to basic services indicators.44  
Thus, McKenzie’s methodology is useful for computing economic inequality measures at 
the subnational level in the absence of income or consumption data. Moreover, this methodology 
has the advantage that economic inequality can be computed over negative and zero values. 
Since the first principal component or wealth level, , has a zero mean and can take negative 
values, it is not possible to compute conventional inequality measures such as the Gini 
coefficient, which requires dividing by the mean and only allows for positive values.  
McKenzie’s economic inequality index overcomes this problem; the index makes it possible to 
estimate wealth inequality at the town level based on principal component analysis, while at the 
same time satisfying the basic axioms of inequality measures.45 Wealth inequality is computed 
using the following formula: 
                                                 
44 For an explanation of the First Principal Component methodology and the computation of individual wealth based 
on household assets and services, see chapter II. 
45 For a review of the main axioms of economic inequality measures see Sen and Foster (1998) and Ray (1998). 
Mckenzie’s (2005) inequality measure satisfies the four main axioms: anonymity, scale independence, population 
independence, and Pigou-Dalton transfer property. 
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Where, 
 is the sample standard deviation of the first principal component score, , across 
households in town t. 
 is the variance of  over the whole sample or the largest eigenvalue corresponding to 
the first principal component. 
As McKenzie (2005) notes,  is a measure of “relative” wealth inequality, since it 
compares the standard deviation of the first principal component in town t to the standard 
deviation of the first principal component over the whole sample. Consequently, if  is greater or 
lower than or equal to one, this indicates that town t shows greater, lower, or the same wealth 
inequality than the country as a whole, accordingly. 
Although the most recent 2000 census in Costa Rica contains information on the 
possession of household assets and access to basic services, it was not possible to use this data 
source for the estimation of wealth inequality at the municipal level because in order to protect 
the identities of respondents, raw census data by law cannot be distributed by the statistics 
bureau in Costa Rica.46 Alternatively, the LAPOP series on household assets and access to basic 
services is employed. Therefore, the relative wealth at the individual level is estimated via the 
First Principal Component analysis using household assets and basic services indicators based on 
                                                 
46 The Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) makes available to the public random samples of census 
data for many countries around the world, including a sample of the last census (2000) in Costa Rica. However, the 
IPUMS’ census data for Costa Rica does not include observations for four municipalities surveyed by LAPOP: 
Belén, Sarapiqui, La Cruz, and Garabito. The use of the IPUMS data would have signified a loss of about 600 
observations and four municipalities in my sample, which would reduce the variance in key variables across 
municipalities. For this reason, LAPOP’s information on household assets and access to basic services was used 
instead. 
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the LAPOP data (described in chapter I). Then, the level of wealth inequality at the municipal 
level is estimated applying McKenzie’s (2005) formula.47  
Figure III.4 shows the computed economic inequality figures for each municipality using 
McKenzie’s (2005) methodology. The municipality with the highest level of economic inequality 
in the sample is La Cruz. Wealth inequality for this municipality is equal to 1.56, meaning that 
La Cruz shows 56 per cent greater inequality than the country as a whole. As shown before, La 
Cruz is also the municipality with the highest poverty rate in the sample. In contrast, Tibás, 
located in the province of San José, shows the lowest level of inequality, with a score of 0.50, 
meaning that this municipality shows 50 per cent less inequality relative to the national average.  
                                                 
47 McKenzie (2005)’s methodology for the estimation of wealth inequality in the absence of income or consumption 
data has been widely implemented. For example, see Labonne, Biller and Chase (2007) . Labonne, Biller, and 
Chase’s study, sponsored by the World Bank, looks at the effect of economic inequality on interpersonal trust in 
poor towns in the Philippines. 
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Figure III-4. Wealth Inequality across Municipalities Included in the Sample 
 
In conclusion, taken together, Figures III.3 and III.4 show that there are sharp disparities 
across and within the municipalities included in the sample. These variations in standards of 
living and inequality allow for testing the hypotheses presented in Chapter II and exploring how 
interpersonal trust levels change across individuals and municipalities, depending on the 
characteristics of the context where individuals reside. Specifically, variation among 
interpersonal trust levels across individuals and municipalities, depending on whether one lives 
in a municipality characterized by low poverty and low inequality, low poverty and high 
inequality, high poverty and low inequality, or high poverty and high inequality. Thus, as 
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hypothesized in Chapter II, the possibility of a reinforcing effect between poverty and inequality 
on interpersonal trust is examined. Figure III.5 shows the municipalities that fall in each of these 
four possible cases.  
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Figure III-5. Levels of Poverty and Inequality across Municipalities Included in the Sample 
 
The vertical and horizontal lines correspond to the average national poverty rate and 
inequality, respectively. Municipalities above (below) the horizontal line present relatively high 
(low) levels of inequality, and those to the right (left) of the vertical line, relatively high (low) 
poverty rates. Thus, for example, La Cruz clearly shows high poverty and high inequality. Perez 
Zeledón, on the other hand, shows high poverty but low inequality. Limón falls in the category 
of relative low poverty and high inequality while Montes de Oca represents the best case 
scenario, a situation of low poverty and low inequality.  
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Is the Effect of Context Conditioned on Individual Wealth? A First Look at the Data 
Relying on averaged figures, even at the sub-national level, makes it difficult to 
understand the underpinnings of interpersonal trust formation. In Costa Rica, the unique features 
of each cantón are likely to lead to a different process of interpersonal trust formation across 
individuals. In other words, interaction between levels of analysis might occur at the cantón 
level. Consequently, even if two cantones show a similar level of interpersonal trust, the 
mechanisms that generated it might be very different. Figure III.6 illustrates this point. It depicts 
the average level of interpersonal trust across quintiles of wealth in each municipality. 
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Figure III-6.  Relationship between Interpersonal Trust and Individual Wealth by Municipality 
 
For example, Turrialba and San Carlos show a similar average levels of interpersonal 
trust. However, Figure III.6 suggests that the average level of interpersonal trust in San Carlos 
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(see the third row of Figure III-6) seems to be similar across individuals belonging to different 
economic groups, while the poor show slightly higher levels of interpersonal trust in Turrialba 
(also on the third row). Interestingly, although these two municipalities show a relatively similar 
level of wealth inequality, the percentage of households living in poverty is higher in Turrialba.  
Similarly, although Montes de Oca (see the second row of Figure III-6) and Puriscal (on 
the first row) show similar averaged levels of interpersonal trust, the rich in Montes de Oca show 
a higher level of interpersonal trust relative to the poor, while in Puriscal the opposite 
relationship between individual wealth and interpersonal trust is depicted. In this case, although 
both Montes de Oca and Puriscal show an inequality rate lower than the national average, in 
Puriscal a higher proportion of households live in poverty. 
These observed differences in the average level of interpersonal trust and the strength and 
direction of the relationship between interpersonal trust and individual wealth across 
municipalities raise the following questions: can these patterns also be explained by economic 
contextual characteristics, and if so, can the results obtained at the country level in the previous 
chapter be extrapolated from the local environment? If this is the case, it would suggest that the 
features of the economic structure at the local level are powerful enough to shape citizens’ 
democratic attitudes regardless of country level economic characteristics. This means that 
country and individual level patterns of interpersonal trust are likely to be a reflection of sub-
national processes.  
Because statistically significant differences in the average level of interpersonal trust and 
in the strength of the relationship between individual wealth and interpersonal trust across 
municipalities have been observed, Costa Rica offers the perfect setting for exploring the effect 
of economic contextual factors on interpersonal trust across municipalities and individuals. As 
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determined in the previous chapter, there are statistically significant random effects in both the 
intercepts and slopes (P<0.001).48 This finding allows for the use of the multilevel sub-national 
method and thus to expand the analysis of chapter 2 at the country and individual levels.  
 
Modeling Interpersonal Trust: Building a Sub-National Multilevel Model 
In order to test the hypotheses laid out in the previous chapter, Costa Rica’s unique 
characteristics must be taken into account. Although the comparative sub-national method allows 
for the efficient control of a country’s cultural background, the level of democracy, and years of 
democratic rule, other factors are likely to be related to both the main independent variables, 
poverty and inequality, and the dependent variable, interpersonal trust, across municipalities. The 
following municipal characteristics are also taken into account: population density, ethnic 
composition, percentage of foreign born inhabitants, and level of crime and violence. 
The literature suggests that the size of place matters for the formation of interpersonal 
trust.  Places with high population density have been found to show lower levels of interpersonal 
trust. Since poverty and inequality are correlated with population density at the cantón level in 
Costa Rica, the latter must be considered in the multilevel model. In Costa Rica, poverty is 
concentrated mainly in rural areas (World Bank 2007 xv), although a similar extent of economic 
inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, is observed in rural and urban areas at the national 
level (World Bank 2007 31). Wealth inequality appears to be higher in cantones with lower 
population density. 
                                                 
48 As expected, the total variance decomposition indicated that most of the variation in interpersonal trust is due to 
differences across individuals. Only five per cent of the total variance in interpersonal trust is due to differences 
across cantones. Nonetheless, the statistical significance of the random components for the intercept and slope 
indicates that it is appropriate to estimate the proposed multilevel model. 
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The other two factors likely to be correlated with both contextual economic variables and 
interpersonal trust are the cantón’s ethnic composition and the percentage of foreign born 
population. Since individuals are more likely to trust those who are similar to themselves, 
ethnically mixed communities and those areas with a higher proportion of foreign born 
individuals are likely to show lower overall levels of interpersonal trust. In terms of ethnicity, 
according to the 2000 census, 94 per cent of the Costa Rican population self-identified as white 
or mestizo, and 5 per cent self-identified as part of one of the three main ethnic groups in the 
country: black (3%), Amerindian (1%), and Chinese (1%). One per cent stated that they belong 
to “other” ethnic groups.  
The black population of Costa Rica is concentrated primarily in the North Atlantic region 
of the country. Black immigrants from Jamaica settled in the province of Limón at the end of the 
nineteenth century to work on the construction of the railroad. The flow of immigrants continued 
to rise in this region at the beginning of the twentieth century as the demand for labor in banana 
plantations grew (Mitchell and Pentzer 2008). The indigenous population is divided into eight 
indigenous groups distributed throughout 22 territories in the country (Putnam 2004). In contrast, 
the Chinese population is more spread out across the country, with important concentrations in 
the municipalities of Limón, Puntarenas, Nicoya, and San José.  
Statistical analyses based on data from the 2000 census indicate important differences in 
standards of living between minority ethnic groups, particularly Afro-Costa Ricans and 
indigenous populations, and the rest of the population. Afro-Costa Ricans in the province of 
Limón constitute 74 per cent of the population and exhibit  better socio-economic conditions 
than the rest of the population living in that province (Putnam 2004). In contrast, indigenous 
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populations show, in general, lower standards of living than the rest of the population (Solano 
Salazar 2004). 
The marked socio-economic disparities between blacks and the rest of the population in 
the province of Limón might explain in part why the three municipalities belonging to this 
province included in the sample (Limón, Guacimo, and Pococí) show relatively high levels of 
wealth inequality.  In Limón, Guacimo, and Pococí, ethnic minorities represent approximately 
43, 7, and 3 per cent of the total population in these municipalities, respectively.  
Moreover, prejudice and discrimination against Afro-Caribbeans and indigenous 
populations are still present in Costa Rica, a source of erosion of interpersonal trust in ethnically 
heterogeneous municipalities. According to one account,  
“The stereotype of “white” Costa Rica is still apparent in advertising…and some of these 
same kinds of prejudices have also affected indigenous Costa Ricans. Black Costa Ricans did not 
become citizens until 1949. Indigenous peoples were not full citizens until 1991, when they were 
finally recognized as Costa Ricans by right of birth and received the identity cards (cédulas) that 
allowed them to vote and take advantage of state services” (Mitchell and Pentzer 2008 255).  
 
The co-existence of foreigners and nationals can also decrease the level of interpersonal 
trust across municipalities. International immigration has increased considerably during the last 
three decades in Costa Rica. According to the latest census, foreign born individuals constitute 
7.7 per cent of the population in Costa Rica; Nicaraguans represent 5.9 per cent. Important 
residential segregation of foreign born individuals, especially Nicaraguans, across cantones has 
been observed. According to one study, the highest levels of Nicaraguan residential segregation 
can be found in four cantones in the Central Region: San José, Alajuelita, Tibás, and Curridabat 
(Brenes Camacho 2003). The first three are included in the sample of this study.  
The incidence of poverty has been found to be higher among foreign born individuals 
relative to nationals. Estimates based on census data for 2000 indicate that, while 10.2 per cent of 
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nationals have two or more Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI), this figure corresponds to 22.9 per 
cent among foreigners (Gutiérrez Saxe 2004).  
Nicaraguans, the largest foreign born group in Costa Rica, are also victims of prejudice 
and discrimination. Mitchell an Pentzer (2008 262,63) note that, 
 “Nicaragua’s tumultuous history has contributed to a popular perception that individual 
Nicaraguans are more prone to violence, and the generally darker tone of their skin has led them 
to be stereotyped as more “Indian.” Costa Ricans call the immigrants “nicas,” which also 
something Nicaraguans call themselves. Yet in this situation, it has taken a pejorative meaning 
and generally signifies to Costa Ricans not all people from Nicaragua, but only poor immigrants 
who came to Costa Rica looking for work.”  
 
This is a telling example of the intertwined relationship between nationality, ethnicity, 
and poverty in Costa Rica and their likely effects on Costa Ricans’ political attitudes and 
interpersonal trust in heterogeneous communities.  
Another factor associated with both economic contextual factors and interpersonal trust is 
the level of crime and violence in the place of residence. Previous cross-country empirical works 
have found that environments characterized by high economic inequality are more violent and 
crime prone (Fajnzylber,Lederman and Loayza 1998 ; Fajnzylber,Lederman and Loayza 2002 ; 
Moser, et al. 2003), and also that crime and violence are associated with lower levels of 
interpersonal trust (Lederman, et al. 2002).  
In Costa Rica, as in other Central American countries (especially El Salvador, Honduras, 
and Guatemala), crime and violence has become the main problem of the country in the eyes of 
Costa Ricans in recent years.  
The LAPOP data for 2008 show that 45.5 per cent of Costa Ricans consider issues related 
to lack of security as the main problems in the country, followed by the economy with 28.42 per 
cent. Moreover, 75.24 per cent of the Costa Rican population affirms that the level of crime in 
the country “very much” represents a threat to the country’s future well-being. A recent report by 
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the UNDP shows that Costa Ricans live in constant fear of being victims of crime (UNDP 2006). 
Furthermore, although the level of crime and violence still remains well below the rates observed 
in other Central American and Latin American countries,  that this fear is not unfounded as crime 
victimization has virtually doubled since the 1980’s (UNDP 2006 92).  
An important point considered in this research is that crime and violence rates in Costa 
Rica are not randomly distributed across municipalities. The UNDP has developed an index of 
public safety at the municipal level (Indice de Seguridad Cantonal, 2003), allowing the ranking 
of cantones according to levels of crime and violence based on three objective indicators: 
domestic violence, robbery, and homicide. Based on this index, the sample considered here 
includes six of nine cantones in the country with the lowest public safety scores: Tibás, La Cruz, 
Montes de Oca, Limón, Garabito, and San José (ordered from high to low). The sample also 
includes cantones with some of the highest public safety scores, such as Poás, Puriscal, Grecia, 
San Ramón, and Turrialba, and cantones with a “medium” level of public safety, such as Santa 
Ana, Guácimo, Desamparados, Alajuela, Escazú, and Heredia. 
Table 1 shows the correlation matrix of the variables at the cantón level to be included in 
the multilevel model. Descriptive statistics and data sources are presented in table III.2 in the 
appendix to this chapter.  
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The correlation matrix indicates that the mean value of interpersonal trust is not 
associated with poverty at the cantón level. In contrast, wealth inequality, as expected, is 
negatively correlated with the average level of interpersonal trust (-0.33). Additionally, 
population density, the percentage of foreign born residents, and the extent of ethnic diversity 
(measured as the percentage of blacks, indigenous, and Chinese residents) show a relatively 
strong correlation with both interpersonal trust and inequality in the expected direction. This 
suggests the existence of factors that might confound the relationship between economic 
inequality and interpersonal trust. On the other hand, the UNDP’s public safety indicator, 
although strongly correlated with interpersonal trust (0.47), is only weakly associated with 
poverty and wealth inequality at the cantón level. It is also noteworthy that wealth inequality 
maintains a relatively strong and positive relationship with poverty rates (0.39) at the municipal 
level, which increases confidence in the inequality measure here used.  
 
Table III-1. Correlation Matrix: Contextual Factors at the Municipal Level, Costa Rica 
(Based on 29 municipalities) 
 
Interpersonal 
Trust 
Population 
Density 
Public 
Safety 
Poverty 
Rate 
Wealth 
Inequality 
Ethnical 
Diversity 
Foreign 
Born 
Rate 
        
Interpersonal 
Trust 1       
Population 
Density -0.2708 1      
Public 
Safety 0.4726 -0.5248 1     
Poverty Rate -0.0009 -0.1952 0.1038 1    
Wealth 
Inequality -0.3314 -0.3877 -0.1138 0.3902 1   
Ethnical 
Diversity -0.2508 -0.1003 -0.3146 0.0694 0.3925 1  
Foreign 
Born Rate -0.3679 0.2653 -0.644 -0.0523 0.3129 0.0282 1 
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Sub-National Multilevel Results 
The multilevel sub-national analysis presented in this study builds upon the multilevel 
model of interpersonal trust at the country and individual levels presented in the previous 
chapter. The multilevel sub-national analysis carried out here expands the country level analysis 
in three important ways. First, it seeks to further assess the empirical validity of the scarcity, 
relative deprivation, and alternative hypotheses outlined in chapter II, and therefore checks the 
robustness of the findings. Secondly, the larger number of cases at level-2 allows for the 
inclusion of additional contextual variables in the model. This, in turn, makes it possible to 
examine the impact of other contextual factors on the formation of interpersonal trust, and parcel 
out the effect of intertwined variables such as communities’ ethnic composition and the extent of 
international immigration, crime and violence, poverty, and economic inequality at the local 
level. Lastly, a multilevel sub-national strategy in this case also permits the evaluation of the 
importance of structural economic factors while holding constant major competing explanations 
that are likely to confound the relationship between the economic context and interpersonal trust, 
specifically the country’s cultural heritage and level of and experience with democracy. The 
results of the multilevel sub-national analysis are shown below. 
 
 What explains the varying levels of interpersonal trust in Costa Rica? Individual and 
Municipal Level Factors 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the effect of individual level variables and each contextual 
variable included in the analysis. All multilevel models were estimated based on a non-linear 
function, specifically an ordered logit model. The first point to note is that given the larger 
sample size at level-2, 29 municipalities, appropriate robust standard errors were obtained. Thus, 
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the statistical significance of all the results reported here are based on robust standard errors, 
increasing confidence that the estimated parameters and their effects resemble that of the true 
population values. In addition, Table 2 shows that the reliability estimates for the intercepts are 
high (λ>0.7), which also increases confidence in the robustness of the results. 
 The individual level variables included in the models are the following: quintiles of 
wealth, corruption and crime victimization, participation in civic groups, life satisfaction, 
religion, size of place, number of children, education, age, age squared, and sex. The results 
indicate that, as expected, individuals with a higher socio-economic status, as measured by the 
level of household wealth, are more likely to show higher levels of trust in the people in their 
communities. On the other hand, corruption and crime victimization are detrimental to 
interpersonal trust. Civic participation is not statistically significant linked to interpersonal trust, 
confirming the disconnection or weak link between civic participation and interpersonal trust in 
the Latin American context. Life satisfaction is statistically significant and strongly linked with 
interpersonal trust so that individuals who have higher levels of life satisfaction are also more 
likely to trust others, a result that supports the contention that life satisfaction and interpersonal 
trust go together (Inglehart and Baker 2000). Interestingly, the results show that in terms of 
religious denomination, Costa Rican Catholics have higher levels of interpersonal trust than 
Protestants and that there is no difference in interpersonal trust between Protestants and 
individuals of “other” denominations or individuals self-identified as nonreligious.  
 At the individual level, the size of place of residence, as expected, is an important 
determinant of interpersonal trust. All other things being equal, individuals living in high density 
population areas (i.e., urban areas), which typically are the most developed areas in any country, 
show lower levels of interpersonal trust. On the other hand, having children does not seem to 
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affect one’s level of interpersonal trust. Individual education also does not have a statistically 
significant effect on interpersonal trust.  
In contrast to the country-level results, in Costa Rica age affects are observed. Age 
maintains a curvilinear relationship with interpersonal trust, with younger and older individuals 
showing lower levels of interpersonal trust and middle aged persons, higher levels. Males are 
also more likely than females to trust others. 
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Table III-2. Results Multilevel Model: Intercept as outcomes model  
(Standardized Coefficients with Robust Standard Errors) 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 4 
Fixed Effects Coef. Odds Ratio 
P-
Value Coef. 
Odds 
Ratio 
P-
Value Coef. 
Odds 
Ratio 
P-
Value Coef. 
Odds 
Ratio P-Value
 Coef. Odds Ratio 
P-
Value 
Fixed Effects:  
Contextual Variables (Random 
Intercept, β0) 
               
Intercept, γ00 -0.469 0.625 0.000 -0.469 0.626 0.000 -0.469 0.626 0.000 -0.469 0.626 0.000 -0.469 0.625 0.000 
Population Density,  γ01 -0.060 0.942 0.270 -0.015 0.985 0.728 0.021 1.022 0.616 -0.114 0.893 0.022 -0.056 0.946 0.309 
Poverty, γ02             -0.019 0.981 0.779 
Wealth Inequality, γ03          -0.174 0.841 0.002    
Public Safety, γ04       0.142 1.152 0.023       
Ethnical Diversity,  γ05 -0.067 0.935 0.004             
Foreign Born,  γ06    -0.135 0.874 0.012          
Individual Level Variables                
Quintiles of Wealth, β1 0.082 1.085 0.023 0.083 1.086 0.021 0.082 1.085 0.023 0.085 1.088 0.019 0.082 1.086 0.023 
Corruption victim,  β2 -0.065 0.937 0.024 -0.065 0.937 0.025 -0.064 0.938 0.027 -0.065 0.937 0.024 -0.065 0.937 0.025 
Crime victim,  β3 -0.051 0.950 0.150 -0.052 0.950 0.149 -0.051 0.950 0.151 -0.052 0.950 0.145 -0.051 0.950 0.150 
Civic participation, β4 -0.039 0.961 0.154 -0.040 0.960 0.145 -0.040 0.961 0.150 -0.039 0.962 0.161 -0.040 0.961 0.154 
Life Satisfaction,  β5 0.313 1.367 0.000 0.312 1.367 0.000 0.313 1.367 0.000 0.311 1.365 0.000 0.313 1.368 0.000 
Education,  β6 0.006 1.006 0.866 0.005 1.005 0.891 0.006 1.006 0.871 0.001 1.001 0.971 0.006 1.006 0.882 
Age,  β7 0.829 2.291 0.000 0.832 2.297 0.000 0.829 2.290 0.000 0.828 2.289 0.000 0.831 2.296 0.000 
Age squared,  β8 -0.545 0.580 0.000 0.549 0.577 0.000 -0.546 0.579 0.000 -0.548 0.578 0.000 -0.548 0.578 0.000 
Sex (Male=1; Female=0),  β9 0.069 1.071 0.006 0.068 1.070 0.006 0.069 1.071 0.006 0.069 1.072 0.006 0.068 1.070 0.006 
Area ( Urban=1;Rural=0),  β10 -0.133 0.875 0.005 -0.138 0.871 0.003 -0.132 0.876 0.005 -0.143 0.866 0.002 -0.135 0.874 0.004 
Number of Children,  β11 -0.007 0.992 0.854 -0.007 0.993 0.860 -0.007 0.993 0.857 -0.006 0.994 0.876 -0.008 0.992 0.849 
Catholic (=1; 0=Protestant),  β12 0.078 1.081 0.028 0.079 1.082 0.029 0.079 1.082 0.027 0.077 1.080 0.033 0.079 1.082 0.028 
No Religious (=1; 0=Protestant),  β13 -0.013 0.987 0.686 -0.013 0.987 0.718 -0.013 0.987 0.709 -0.012 0.988 0.723 -0.013 0.987 0.706 
Other Religion (=1; 0=Protestant),  β14 -0.019 0.981 0.520 -0.018 0.982 0.521 -0.019 0.981 0.513 -0.019 0.981 0.512 -0.019 0.981 0.516 
Threshold 2,  1.678 5.353 0.000 1.678 5.354 0.000 1.678 5.354 0.000 1.678 5.353 0.000 1.678 5.353 0.000 
Threshold 3 3.198 24.495 0.000 3.198 24.484 0.000 3.198 24.491 0.000 3.198 24.490 0.000 3.198 24.492 0.000 
Random Effects:                
Intercept, u0 0.11034  0.000 0.09690  0.000 0.099  0.000 0.08679  0.000 0.11454  0.000 
Percent Explained, Intercept, u0 25.91% 34.57% 33.15% 41.39% 22.66%   
Reliability Intercept 0.821   0.801   0.805   0.783   0.826   
N. Obs Municipal Level  29 29 29 29 29   
N. Obs Individual Level 2471 2471 2471 2471 2471   
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 Contextual factors at the cantonal (i.e., municipal) level also matter for the building of 
interpersonal trust. Given that the population size of the municipality is an important determinant 
of interpersonal trust, it was left as a control variable in all models in Table 2. Each model 
assesses the effect of a contextual variable while taking into account the population size in each 
municipality. As can be observed, ethnically heterogeneous municipalities are less likely to build 
interpersonal trust; specifically, the greater the percentage of blacks, indigenous, and Chinese 
populations, the lower the likelihood of an individual finding the people in their community 
trustworthy. Similarly, the greater the percentage of foreign born individuals, the lower the 
likelihood of trusting one’s neighbors. Thus, it can be inferred that international migration, 
particularly of Nicaraguans, tends to decrease the overall level of interpersonal trust in high 
migration municipalities.  
Additionally, municipalities with high violence and crime rates also show lower levels of 
interpersonal trust, as suggested by the statistically significant and positive sign of the “public 
safety” coefficient. Moreover, municipalities divided by disparities in wealth are also less likely 
to build interpersonal trust. In fact, the model that includes the wealth inequality variable shows 
a better goodness of fit, as indicated by the largest percentage of the total variance in the 
intercepts explained by this model. Specifically, wealth inequality jointly with population density 
explains 41.39 per cent of the total variance in interpersonal trust across cantones. 
Municipalities’ overall absolute economic well-being (i.e., poverty), however, does not 
significantly explain the varying levels of interpersonal trust across municipalities.  
The next section explores whether the effect of inequality remains strong even after 
taking into account simultaneously, in a single model, the effect of other contextual 
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characteristics at the municipal. Moreover, it explores whether contextual factors explain the 
observed differences in interpersonal trust across individuals from different economic groups.  
What are the main determinants of interpersonal trust at the municipal level? Do economic 
structural factors at the municipal level explain observed differences in interpersonal trust 
across economic groups? 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the combined multilevel models. In contrast to the statistical 
analysis shown in Table 2, the multilevel models in Table 3 examine the municipal level 
determinants of the variations observed in both the intercept and slopes of the quintile of wealth 
variable across municipalities. Moreover, by including additional contextual variables at the 
municipal level in a single model, Table 3 test the robustness of the results presented in Table 2. 
As can be observed, when contextual variables are considered simultaneously, the negative effect 
of wealth inequality predominates. In other words, the inequality of wealth coefficient remains 
statistically significant at standard levels even after taking into account the effect of population 
density, ethnic diversity, international immigration rates, public safety, and poverty. Thus, 
although all these factors seem to explain in part why interpersonal trust is more likely to flourish 
in some municipalities rather than in others (except for the extent of poverty),  inequality of 
wealth  stands out as the most important determinant of interpersonal trust levels across 
municipalities in Costa Rica. In fact, most other factors, except wealth inequality, lose their 
statistical significance once they are considered simultaneously in a single model.49 This finding 
is consistent with the results of the cross-country multilevel analysis presented in the previous 
chapter. 
                                                 
49 Because of evidence of multicolinearity, in Table 3, equation 4 considers simultaneously only the effects of five 
out of the six level-2 variables here taken into account. However, as shown, both ethnical diversity and the 
percentage of foreign born variables, in equations 3 and 4 accordingly, lose their statistical significance once they 
are entered in the model in combination with wealth inequality, indicating that the effect of inequality predominates 
over these two variables.  
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Table III-3. Results Multilevel Model: Intercept and Slope as Outcomes Model  
(Standardized Coefficients with Robust Standard Errors) 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 
Fixed Effects Coef. Odds Ratio 
P-
Value Coef. 
Odds 
Ratio 
P-
Value Coef. 
Odds 
Ratio 
P-
Value Coef. 
Odds 
Ratio 
P-
Value 
Fixed Effects:  
Contextual Variables (Random Intercept, β0)    
      
   
Intercept, γ00 -0.473 0.623 0.000 -0.473 0.623 0.000 -0.473 0.623 0.000 -0.473 0.623 0.000 
Population Density,  γ01 -0.140 0.870 0.010 -0.087 0.917 0.174 -0.084 0.919 0.201 -0.084 0.920 0.199 
Poverty, γ02 0.051 1.052 0.393 0.040 1.041 0.510 0.041 1.041 0.504 0.036 1.037 0.556 
Wealth Inequality, γ03 -0.200 0.819 0.002 -0.166 0.847 0.029 -0.170 0.844 0.031 -0.152 0.859 0.072 
Public Safety, γ04    0.080 1.084 0.258 0.086 1.090 0.260 0.057 1.059 0.480 
Ethnical Diversity,  γ05       0.014 1.014 0.679    
Foreign Born,  γ06          -0.042 0.959 0.617 
Contextual Variables (Quintiles of wealth, β1)             
Intercept,  γ10 0.074 1.077 0.028 0.074 1.077 0.025 0.074 1.077 0.025 0.075 1.077 0.018 
Population Density, γ11 0.097 1.102 0.001 0.075 1.078 0.079 0.077 1.080 0.078 0.072 1.074 0.088 
Poverty,  γ12 -0.076 0.927 0.009 -0.072 0.930 0.014 -0.072 0.931 0.014 -0.067 0.935 0.028 
Wealth Inequality,  γ13 0.044 1.045 0.234 0.031 1.031 0.491 0.030 1.030 0.519 0.015 1.015 0.709 
Public Safety,  γ14    -0.032 0.968 0.391 -0.031 0.970 0.450 -0.003 0.997 0.934 
Ethnical Diversity,  γ15       0.004 1.004 0.846    
Foreign Born,  γ16          0.052 1.053 0.117 
Individual Level Variables             
Corruption victim,  β2 -0.069 0.933 0.017 -0.068 0.934 0.019 -0.068 0.934 0.019 -0.069 0.933 0.018 
Crime victim,  β3 -0.049 0.952 0.174 -0.049 0.952 0.175 -0.049 0.953 0.176 -0.049 0.952 0.173 
Civic participation, β4 -0.040 0.961 0.163 -0.040 0.961 0.162 -0.040 0.961 0.163 -0.040 0.960 0.156 
Life Satisfaction,  β5 0.310 1.363 0.000 0.310 1.363 0.000 0.310 1.363 0.000 0.309 1.363 0.000 
Education,  β6 0.001 1.001 0.976 0.001 1.001 0.972 0.001 1.001 0.975 0.002 1.002 0.950 
Age,  β7 0.840 2.315 0.000 0.837 2.310 0.000 0.838 2.313 0.000 0.836 2.308 0.000 
Age squared,  β8 -0.552 0.576 0.000 -0.551 0.577 0.000 -0.552 0.576 0.000 -0.549 0.578 0.000 
Sex (Male=1; Female=0),  β9 0.071 1.073 0.007 0.071 1.074 0.006 0.071 1.074 0.006 0.072 1.074 0.006 
Area ( Urban=1;Rural=0),  β10 -0.116 0.891 0.007 -0.114 0.892 0.009 -0.114 0.892 0.011 -0.114 0.892 0.012 
Number of Children,  β11 -0.011 0.990 0.792 -0.010 0.990 0.795 -0.010 0.990 0.794 -0.011 0.989 0.782 
Catholic (=1; 0=Protestant),  β12 0.061 1.063 0.087 0.061 1.063 0.088 0.061 1.063 0.089 0.060 1.062 0.096 
No Religious (=1; 0=Protestant),  β13 -0.021 0.980 0.558 -0.021 0.980 0.555 -0.021 0.980 0.555 -0.021 0.979 0.545 
Other Religion (=1; 0=Protestant),  β14 -0.022 0.978 0.444 -0.022 0.978 0.441 -0.022 0.978 0.443 -0.022 0.978 0.448 
Threshold 2,  1.690 5.418 0.000 1.691 5.422 0.000 1.691 5.426 0.000 1.691 5.426 0.000 
Threshold 3 3.220 25.032 0.000 3.221 25.056 0.000 3.222 25.080 0.000 3.222 25.080 0.000 
Random Effects:             
Intercept, u0  (Variance Component) 0.097 25 0.000 0.104 24 0.000 0.109 23 0.000 0.108 23 0.000 
Quintiles, slope u1 (Variance Component) 0.012 25 0.000 0.012 24 0.008 0.014 23 0.005 0.012 23 0.011 
Percent Explained, Intercept, u0 34.46% 29.73% 26.35% 27.03% 
Percent Explained, Quintiles, slope u1 47.83% 47.83% 39.13% 47.83% 
Reliability Intercept             
Reliability Slope             
N. Obs Municipal Level  29 29 29 29 
N. Obs Individual Level 4263 4263 4263 4263 
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On the other hand, the slope as an outcome portion of the model shows that the extent of 
poverty at the municipal level has a role to play in explaining interpersonal trust. The statistically 
significant and negative coefficient of the interaction between individual wealth (i.e., quintiles of 
wealth variable) and poverty rates at the municipal level indicates that the relatively rich show 
lower levels of interpersonal trust in low socio-economic environments. This result holds even 
after controlling for the other contextual variables considered in this chapter, including wealth 
inequality at the municipal level. This finding is also consistent with the results of the cross-
country multilevel analysis. Thus, while wealth inequality lowers the average level of 
interpersonal trust across municipalities, local environments characterized by high poverty 
inspire mistrust among better-off individuals.  
In terms of goodness of fit, the model in Equation I in Table 3, the simplest model, 
performs best. This model explains 34.46 per cent of the variance in interpersonal trust across 
cantones and 47.83 per cent of the variance in the strength of the relationship between individual 
wealth and interpersonal trust across cantones. 
In addition, the results of this chapter also suggest that better off individuals are more 
trusting of their neighbors in large or high population density municipalities; namely in more 
urban settings, as also found in the previous chapter. Hence, this finding suggests that even if 
poverty is relatively low, the rich are more trusting of others if they live in relatively modern 
environments, where the overall standard of living is higher and therefore, in terms of socio-
economic status, those with whom they are likely to interact are more like them. The following 
passage, from a book that describes Costa Ricans’ social life and culture, illustrates how the 
characteristics of the place of residence, particularly its overall level of development, shapes the 
views of better off individuals toward unlike others, 
144 
 
“Villagers refer to people in outlying hamlets as gente de campo, or country folk. (They 
in turn are lumped in that category by residents of larger towns). As rural communities have 
become less isolated and as land has become scarcer, class distinctions there have approached 
the urban pattern. Landowners may send their children to high school and even to a university or 
to work for a time in the United States, thus enhancing their own prestige in the community 
while weakening their identification with it. They are now also more likely to seek out friends or 
commercial amusements in a large town and less likely to share their wealth with poorer kin…a 
sixty-five-year-old small farmer in a nearby hamlet comments, “Both rich and poor greet each 
other when they pass. But each has his own friends.” This comment encapsulates an old truth 
about social class in Costa Rica: Although one’s class position has profound effects on lifestyle 
and opportunities, it is downplayed in most face-to-face interaction, where the desire to quedar 
bien is paramount.”(Biesanz,Biesanz and Biesanz 1999 109) 
 
These social patterns are in fact observed not only in Costa Rica but also more generally 
throughout the Latin American context.  
As Biesanz, Biesanz, and Biesanz suggest, better off individuals’ lower identification 
with the poor in their communities is likely to have important political implications as the 
relatively rich are probably less likely to support policies that seek to close the gap between rich 
and poor. This possibility is explored in the next chapter of this dissertation. 
Taken together, the results of the sub-national multilevel analysis performed here give 
strong support to the alternative hypothesis laid out in chapter II, and consequently to the results 
of the cross country multilevel analysis. Economic inequality and socio-economic 
underdevelopment reinforce each other, contributing to an overall state of mistrust. Based on the 
results of the sub-national multilevel analysis, Figure III.7 exemplifies the dynamics of 
interpersonal trust formation in the Costa Rican context, and the role that these two structural 
economic factors play in the building of interpersonal trust across the relatively rich and poor.  
Specifically, Figure III.7 shows the predicted average interpersonal trust across 
individuals from different economic classes in four municipalities with varying degrees of wealth 
inequality and poverty: La Cruz (a relatively high poverty and high inequality town), Pérez 
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Zeledón (a relatively high poverty and low inequality town), Limón (a relatively low poverty and 
high inequality town), and Montes de Oca (a relatively low poverty and low inequality town).50  
 
 
Figure III-7. Dynamics of Interpersonal Trust Formation at the Local Level, an Illustration 
 
Figure III.7 clearly shows that, in the two municipalities with high poverty rates, La Cruz 
and Pérez Zeledón, the relationship between individual wealth and interpersonal trust is negative, 
with a steep slope. Hence, the poor show much higher levels of interpersonal trust than the 
relatively rich. In addition, as predicted, given La Cruz’s higher wealth inequality, the overall 
level of interpersonal trust is lower than in Pérez Zeledón, as depicted by the lower solid parallel 
line. In places with high wealth inequality both the poor and rich are more likely to be 
mistrusting, but mistrust is reinforced among the rich when inequality is accompanied by high 
levels of poverty; intolerance to difference rises among the rich in highly underdeveloped towns. 
In contrast, in Montes de Oca, a town with low poverty, the relationship between 
individual wealth and interpersonal trust is positive, suggesting that better off individuals show 
                                                 
50 As shown in Figure III.5, towns included in the sample are classified in one of these four categories, taking as a 
reference point the average level of inequality and poverty in the country as a whole.  
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higher levels of interpersonal trust. In Limón, a town with a lower poverty rate than the national 
average, but greater than in Montes de Oca, this relationship is negative. Moreover, the lower 
intercept of the line that represents Limón indicates the higher level of wealth inequality in this 
town relative to Montes de Oca. It is also noteworthy that because of Limón’s lower poverty rate, 
the relationship between individual wealth and interpersonal trust, although negative, is weaker 
than in La Cruz and Pérez Zeledón.  
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Conclusion 
The findings of this chapter have important implications for the comparative politics 
literature in general, and Costa Rica’s democratization in particular.  
This research suggests that cultural arguments explaining political attitudes across nations 
have been overestimated. The sub-national analysis here performed rejects the notion that a 
country’s cultural background prescribes its citizens’ political attitudes. Within a culturally 
homogeneous country, with a culture rooted in the Roman Catholic tradition, extremely different 
sets of political attitudes are found. In Costa Rica, some municipalities present levels of 
interpersonal trust similar to the United States, a country with a Protestant cultural background, 
while other municipalities show levels of interpersonal trust similar to the ones found in Catholic 
Latin American countries characterized by political turmoil. The analysis presented in this 
chapter exemplifies the importance of engaging in sub-national research in comparative politics, 
and therefore going beyond the aggregate cross-country approach that has predominated in the 
field. Although at the country level, certain patterns are observed, these may be discredited once 
sub-national disparities are taken into account. 
When compared to culture, economic structure matters most for the creation of 
interpersonal trust. Thus, this research finds institutional accounts, rather than culturalist 
arguments, more compelling. To be clear, it is not argued here that values do not matter; quite 
the contrary. But it does argue that institutional context has an important impact on values, and 
that variation in context produces sharply different values even when national context and 
cultural patterns and histories are identical, as they are in the case of this single-country (Costa 
Rica) analysis. 
148 
 
Congruent with the analysis presented in the previous chapter, in Costa Rica sub-national 
variations in interpersonal trust across municipalities are in great part explained by economic 
inequality within municipalities. The wider the gap between haves and have nots at the local 
level, the lower the average level of interpersonal trust. Similarly, the effect of municipalities’ 
economic composition on interpersonal trust is conditioned on citizens’ economic status such 
that wealthy individuals living in municipalities characterized by underdevelopment and high 
poverty show lower levels of interpersonal trust. In sum, when underdevelopment and inequality 
are high at the local level, interpersonal trust is lower, especially among the wealthy, in 
comparison to relatively rich and egalitarian local environments. This gives support to the 
hypothesis that socio-economic underdevelopment and economic inequality have a reinforcing 
negative effect on the creation of interpersonal trust. Of course, this is exactly the situation found 
in many Latin American countries. 
Consequently, the analysis presented here, in addition to highlighting the importance of 
carrying out sub-national research to allow testing important theories in comparative politics, this 
research also demonstrates the relevance of further assessment of the likely effects of local 
contextual factors across individuals with distinctive traits. Indeed, a sub-national multilevel 
analysis allows disentangling the mechanisms through which democratic attitudes are formed.  
Taken together, the results of this and the previous chapter suggest that cross-country 
patterns can be extrapolated from the intermixing of local contextual characteristics and 
individual traits, supporting the assertion that “all politics is local politics.”51 In the Latin 
American context, local politics have experienced unprecedented salience in the past two 
decades. Most countries are in the process of state reform, which includes the decentralization of 
resources and responsibilities from national to local governments (Lora and World Bank. 2007). 
                                                 
51 Cited in Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995). 
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One of the aims of decentralization is the empowerment of citizens through the installation of 
participatory democracies at the local level. However, for decentralized regimes to contribute to 
the deepening of democracy “from below,” high levels of interpersonal trust in communities are 
required. In the case of Costa Rica, because of eroding interpersonal trust, deep seated economic 
inequalities within and across municipalities are threatening the potential of decentralization 
policies to fortify democracy at the grassroots level. This implies that decentralization may have 
a “regressive” effect on democracy, with citizens living in economically better off municipalities 
disproportionately benefiting from decentralization policies. 
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Appendix 
Appendix III-1. Descriptive Statistics: Mean Interpersonal Trust by Municipality from High to Low 
Municipality Mean Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Turrialba 79.626 2.451 74.820 84.431 
San Carlos 79.577 1.917 75.818 83.336 
Poás 79.349 1.940 75.545 83.153 
Oreamuno 79.215 2.399 74.512 83.918 
Grecia 78.493 2.112 74.353 82.633 
Perez Zeledon 77.662 2.171 73.405 81.919 
Belén 73.731 2.374 69.077 78.385 
Cartago 73.074 2.278 68.608 77.540 
Montes de Oca 71.171 2.456 66.357 75.986 
Puriscal 71.166 2.339 66.580 75.751 
San Ramon 70.878 2.278 66.411 75.344 
Goicoechea 70.538 2.636 65.371 75.705 
Guácimo 69.311 2.602 64.210 74.412 
Escazú 69.293 2.415 64.558 74.027 
Garabito 69.293 2.436 64.517 74.068 
Sarapiquí 67.714 2.497 62.818 72.611 
Tibás 66.178 2.874 60.543 71.814 
Heredia 66.163 2.726 60.818 71.509 
Santa Ana 66.056 2.340 61.468 70.643 
Pococí 65.456 2.621 60.318 70.595 
Alajuela 65.419 2.333 60.844 69.994 
Aserrí 63.000 2.636 57.832 68.168 
Carrillo 62.712 2.736 57.349 68.076 
Puntarenas 62.196 2.885 56.540 67.851 
La Cruz 61.838 2.412 57.109 66.567 
Limón 60.373 2.788 54.907 65.839 
Alajuelita 60.138 2.692 54.860 65.416 
San Jose 59.497 1.953 55.668 63.326 
Desamparados 56.403 2.845 50.824 61.981 
Data Source: Americas Barometer  2004, 2006, 2008 by LAPOP 
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Appendix III-2. Descriptive Statistics and Data Sources of the Municipal Data Employed in this Study 
Variable Number of Obs. 
(Municipalities) 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Description Data Source 
Wealth 
Inequality 29 0.883 0.244 0.503 1.560 
Computed based on 
Mackenzie’s (2005) 
methodology 
LAPOP’s 
household assets 
and access to basic 
services series 
Population 
Density 29 4.069 1.689 1 7 
Level of population 
concentration 
UNDP’s 2006 
Report for Costa 
Rica, “Estado de la 
Nación” 
Public 
Safety 29 0.674 0.186 0.287 0.959 
Based on official figures for 
the following three crimes: 
homicide, robbery, and 
domestic violence. The index 
rages from 0 to 1, where 0 
represents high levels of crime 
UNDP’s 2006 
Report for Costa 
Rica: Informe 
nacional de 
desarrollo Humano, 
2005 
Poverty 29 20.424 8.475 8.9 41.9 
Rates computed based on the 
combination of the Unsatisfied 
Basic Needs (NBI) and 
Poverty Line methodologies; 
figures based on Costa Rica’s 
2000 national census and 
household surveys 
Centro 
Centroamericano de 
Población (CCP) 
Foreign 
Born 29 8.8 5.089 0.8 21.1 
Figures based on Costa Rica’s 
2000 national census 
Centro 
Centroamericano de 
Población (CCP) 
Ethnicity 29 3.274 7.826 0.35 43.09 Figures based on  Costa Rica’s 2000 national census 
Centro 
Centroamericano de 
Población (CCP) 
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CHAPTER IV   
 
 
OVERCOMING GRIDLOCK POLITICS BETWEEN HAVES AND HAVE NOTS: THE 
ROLE OF INTERPERSONAL TRUST IN CITIZENS’ SUPPORT FOR 
REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
 
Introduction 
Does interpersonal trust lead to well-off citizens having higher support for redistributive 
policies? Faith in others is said to be the “chicken soup of social life” (Uslaner 2000 492) 
because it has been seen as a wellspring of a wide variety of positive social, political, and 
economic outcomes (Almond and Verba 1963 ; Coleman 1990 ; Putnam 1993 ; Fukuyama 1995 ; 
Inglehart 1999). In the political arena, trusting individuals have been found to be more likely to 
interact and sympathize with others who do not share their political interests, facilitating the 
generation of mutual respect among the citizenry for the political rights of minorities and 
underprivileged groups. Thus, the literature suggests that where interpersonal trust reigns, 
solidarity rather than conflict is more likely to prevail, fostering political stability and, in turn, 
democracy.  
Surprisingly, despite the strong empirical link between interpersonal trust and a myriad of 
democratic attitudes, one of the least researched topics in the social capital and public opinion 
literature is the effect of generalized interpersonal trust on support for public policies, especially 
among citizens who are less likely to benefit directly from them. If interpersonal trust foments a 
wide array of desirable political attitudes, a fundamental component of this amalgam is citizens’ 
willingness to support policies that benefit unlike others. If this were not the case, then the link 
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between interpersonal trust and democratic attitudes would be more rhetorical and not likely to 
have an impact on the lives of unprivileged groups or, as Uslaner (2004) puts it, interpersonal 
trust would be more of a “mixed blessing.”  
In terms of the focus of this research, for interpersonal trust to be truly an “elixir” for 
alleviating social illnesses and consequently for increasing the chances that democracy will 
survive, not only would it have to encourage citizens’ sympathy towards the poor but also 
encourage citizens to support and demand government action in favor of economically 
disadvantaged populations, regardless of citizens’ economic standing in society, ideological 
orientation, views about the political system, and other confounding factors. Moreover, 
interpersonal trust would have to promote support for policies to reduce inequality even among 
those who are less likely to support such policies, namely the wealthy. Thus, by exploring the 
impact of interpersonal trust vis-à-vis other relevant variables on citizens’ support for 
redistributive policies, the social capital literature is here being put to a demanding test. 
Rational choice theories for explaining the formation of individual preferences predict that 
high support from the rich for wealth redistribution is highly unlikely as “self-interest” is a 
critical determinant of citizens’ support for public policies (Meltzer and Richard 1981 ; Persson 
and Tabellini 2000). For example, Meltzer and Richard’s (1981 921) well known utility 
maximizing model on preferences for social protection, in the form of government spending, 
predicts that, “the higher one’s income, the lower the preferred tax rate.” Correspondingly, the 
higher one’s income or wealth, the lower his or her support for government redistribution. 
Conversely, as Rehm (2007) points out,  “disadvantaged individuals, that is, poor people, are in 
favor of income redistribution because they hope to gain from it.” Generally speaking, the 
empirical literature gives support to the rational choice hypothesis (Iversen 2005 ; Edlund 2007 ; 
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Rehm 2007); individualistic interests largely guide one’s preferences for government policies; 
deep pocket individuals are less likely to support redistribution.  
However, recent empirical evidence for West European countries has challenged rational 
choice accounts, indicating that the degree of support for redistributive policies varies across 
individuals with similar income levels, even after holding constant other intervening variables 
(Kumlin and Svallfors 2007). Therefore, it would appear that the relationship between support 
for redistribution and individual socio-economic status is conditioned on factors overlooked by 
utility maximizing models. For example, Kumlin and Svallfors (2007) interpret variations in 
support for redistribution among the rich as likely “policy feedback” effects. They theorize that 
in countries with strong welfare states, the rich are likely to have been socialized by welfare state 
institutions, resulting in a higher likelihood of appreciating the value of equality. In turn, 
according to Kumlin and Svallfors (2007), smaller differences in the extent of support for 
redistribution across economic groups are observed in welfare states.52  
The literature also points out that another explanatory factor overlooked by the rational 
choice approach is the role that individuals’ views about the main beneficiaries of redistributive 
policies may play in determining their level of support for such policies. In general, the few 
works that have examined this issue find that individuals are more likely to support redistributive 
policies when they believe that the beneficiaries are similar to themselves (Mau and Veghte 
2007). For instance, Luttmer (2001 500) finds that in the United States, “individuals’ preferences 
for income redistribution are not only determined by financial self-interest but also affected by 
the characteristics of others around them.” He concludes that “interpersonal preferences” 
                                                 
52Following a similar argument, Edlund (1999 360) explains the higher level of support for government 
redistribution in Norway relative to the United States as a result of the former’s long-standing welfare state tradition, 
concluding that “the results endorse arguments emphasizing that the design and scope of welfare policies shapes and 
determines its own legitimacy.”  
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(preferences that depend on the characteristics of others) are an important determinant of 
citizens’ support for redistribution. Surprisingly, despite the clear association between concepts 
such as interpersonal preferences and interpersonal trust, the impact of the latter on support for 
redistribution remains largely unexplored. 
Moreover, largely absent in the theoretical and empirical literature is the likely mediating 
effect of interpersonal trust on the link between individual socio-economic status and support for 
redistribution. If generalized interpersonal trust, by definition, rests on equality and solidarity 
principles, as Seligman (1997) and Uslaner (2001) strongly argue, then, contrary to the rational 
choice theory, we would expect trusting well-off individuals to show higher support for 
government redistribution, even if this requires a sacrifice in the form of a higher tax rate.   
The objectives of this chapter are threefold. First, it seeks to answer the question of how 
important are conflicts over redistributive policies between poor and well-off citizens in the 
Latin American context. Secondly, it assesses the effect of interpersonal trust vis-à-vis other 
competing factors, including individual socio-economic status, civic participation, political trust, 
and ideology, on support for redistribution. Finally, I explore the possibility that the relationship 
between individual socio-economic status and support for redistribution is conditional on 
interpersonal trust so that well-off individuals with high levels of interpersonal trust are more 
likely to support an active role of the government in improving the distribution of economic 
resources.  
The research agenda outlined here seeks to complement the previous chapters by 
demonstrating the policy relevance of those results. Given Latin America’s high poverty and 
inequality, I expect the results to translate into significant polarization between haves and have 
nots regarding their opinions about the role of the state in reducing economic inequality. As the 
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literature suggests, conflict over redistribution is expected to be deeper in poor and unequal 
democracies (Boix 2003 ; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), putting at risk the stability of the 
political system. The problem is that prior work has not shown how this conflict emerges and 
why. In addition, this chapter is aimed at demonstrating the empirical validity of one of the 
fundamental premises of this research: interpersonal trust matters and therefore it is important to 
cultivate it. Above all, it is aimed at demonstrating that the gridlock politics that characterize 
poor and unequal democracies could be ameliorated by fostering interpersonal trust. How to do 
that is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but failing to do so, the findings here suggest, will 
leave unresolved one of the most basic flaws in Latin American society, politics and economics. 
As reported in previous chapters, poverty and inequality are deterring the formation of 
interpersonal trust in Latin American countries, especially among the rich. Thus, taken together, 
the results of previous chapters and the hypotheses here laid out suggest that Latin America’s 
low levels of interpersonal trust in comparison to the developed world, especially among the 
well-off, is preventing widespread citizen support for public policies aimed at shrinking the gap 
between the rich and poor. Lower levels of trust and sympathy toward low socio-economic status 
individuals among the well-off relative to the most developed countries in the Americas (i.e., 
Canada and the United States) are likely to result in little support among the wealthy for the very 
policies that might work to improve the distribution of economic resources and reduce poverty 
and, ultimately, create more conflict-free nations.  
The core argument of this chapter is that I have identified a vicious circle involving Latin 
Americas’ high poverty and economic inequality, low interpersonal trust, and low support for 
redistributive policies within certain segments of the population, especially the wealthy.  This 
chapter argues that this dynamic might be in part responsible for the lack of substantial 
161 
 
improvement in the distribution of economic resources in the region. Latin America’s long-
standing poverty and economic inequality explain in part the relatively low levels of 
interpersonal trust in the region; at the same time interpersonal distrust might account for the 
lower support for redistributive policies among those who do not benefit directly from them. In 
turn, the lack of consensus in Latin American societies about whether or not the state should 
implement firm policies to improve the distribution of economic resources seems to be at the 
core of Latin Americas’ enduring poverty and inequality.  
As the evidence for the United States suggests, citizens’ preferences for public policy are 
taken into account by the government, but at the same time not all citizens’ preferences are 
weighted equally, sometimes working to the advantage of the rich (Gilens 2005). Thus, it is not 
unexpected that in the United States regressive public policies, rather than market forces, are said 
to better explain the rising economic inequality in this country (Bartels 2008). In Latin America, 
a similar process might be at work. Despite the overwhelming levels of poverty and economic 
inequality, and therefore the predictably high support for redistributive policies by an important 
proportion of the population, the relatively unchanged distribution of economic resources in 
Latin America suggests that the well off might be influencing government policies the most. This 
suggests that despite the likely high support for redistributive policies by the majority of citizens, 
the lack of a significant progressive fiscal reform in Latin America might be explained, to a 
considerable extend by the lower support or even opposition by a relatively powerful economic 
minority.  
As a recent World Bank report states, in Latin America “inequalities in influence lie behind 
many of the mechanisms that reproduce inequality…with disproportionate influence over the 
state by wealthy individuals” (De Ferranti 2004 5). The same report also concludes that given the 
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overall negative effects of economic inequality, “decisive action to tackle the range of 
mechanisms that reproduce inequality” is necessary (De Ferranti 2004 1). Nevertheless, 
“decisive action” is likely to take place only if solidarity and cooperation rather than egoism 
prevails, as suggested by the coexistence in Scandinavian countries of welfare states, relatively 
high levels of interpersonal trust, and low economic inequality (Rothstein and Stolle 2003 ; 
Kumlin and Rothstein 2005 ; Rothstein 2005).  
Ironically, despite the increased emphasis of late by economists and political scientists alike 
concerning the negative effects of poverty and economic inequality on democratic stability in 
Latin America (e.g.De Ferranti 2004 ; Smith 2005 ; Carlin 2006 ; Birdsall 2007), and 
consequently on the urgent need to level the economic playing field, citizens’ opinions on 
redistributive policies and their determinants are for the most part unknown. This paper aims to 
break new ground in the Latin American democratization literature by examining the three 
aforementioned points empirically.  
This chapter is organized into four sections. In the first, the hypotheses of this chapter are 
presented. The second presents the data and assess the level of support for redistributive policies 
in Latin America in comparison to Canada and the United States. In addition, the relationship 
between individual socio-economic status and support for redistribution are explored. The third 
section presents the results of the multivariate statistical analysis that tests the hypotheses of this 
research. The last section presents conclusions.  
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Hypotheses  
Taking into account the discussion above, the following three main hypotheses are tested 
in this chapter:  
 
 
H1: More prosperous individuals are more likely to express lower levels of support for 
redistributive policies than less prosperous individuals 
 
H2: Individuals with high levels of interpersonal trust are more likely to exhibit high support for 
redistributive policies, regardless of their personal economic situation 
 
H3: Economically better off individuals with high levels of interpersonal trust are more likely to 
show high support for government redistribution 
 
Each of these hypotheses is tested while controlling for other relevant characteristics at 
the individual level, including three major factors that have been cited in the public opinion 
literature as important determinants of citizens’ support for redistributive policies: participation 
in voluntary organizations, ideology, and political trust.  
 Uslaner (2002, 2004) has overturned classical thinking in the social capital literature, 
demonstrating that the cornerstone of social capital is interpersonal trust rather than participation 
in civic organizations. Regarding citizens’ support for redistributive policies, Uslaner (2004) also 
shows that, in the United States, what matters most is interpersonal trust, not civic participation. 
Specifically, Uslaner (2004) demonstrates that Hero (2003) mistakenly concludes that social 
capital is not important when it comes to support for public policies. Uslaner explains that Hero’s 
conclusion is the result of insufficient consideration of the role of generalized interpersonal trust. 
In this chapter, the impact of interpersonal trust vis-à-vis participation in civic organizations on 
citizens’ support for redistributive policies is tested within the Latin American context. 
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 Besides interpersonal trust and civic participation, ideology is also likely to play a role in 
the extent of citizens’ support for policies aimed at reducing the gap between rich and poor. By 
definition, individuals on the right of the ideology continuum are expected to be less likely to 
support government intervention while those on the left will be more likely to support an active 
role of the government in the economy.  However, evidence for the United States suggests that 
“political trust” or trust in government, not ideology, is the main determinant of citizens’ support 
for redistributive public policies (Hetherington 1998 ; Hetherington 2005). Hetherington argues 
that if citizens do not trust the government, they are less likely to support the implementation of 
public policies, especially when such policies do not benefit them directly. Thus, ideology and 
political trust are both also major competitors of interpersonal trust for citizens’ support for 
government redistribution.  
In sum, in this chapter I assess the role of interpersonal trust and individuals’ objective 
economic well-being vis-à-vis civic participation, ideology, and political trust in citizens’ 
support for redistributive public policies in the Latin American context, while also taking into 
account individuals’ interest in politics, perception of the national and personal economic 
situation, years of schooling, and demographic characteristics. The exact wording of all the 
variables included in the regression models of this chapter can be found in the appendix. 
 
The Data and Descriptive Statistics 
For testing the hypotheses of this chapter, I make use of the 2008 round of the 
AmericasBarometer’s surveys carried out by LAPOP at Vanderbilt University. In the 2008 round 
of surveys, for the first time, a series of items about the role of the state was included in the core 
questionnaire, including an item that asks respondents about the extent of their support for 
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income redistribution by the state. The sample consists of twenty Latin American countries plus 
Canada and the United States. The dataset includes over 36,000 individual interviews. The data 
for Canada and the United States are used to assess the level of citizens’ support for 
redistribution in these two countries in comparison to the Latin American region. The hypotheses 
of this chapter are tested at the individual level taking into account the Latin American countries 
included in the sample.  
 
The Level of Support for Income Redistribution in the Americas  
Citizens’ support for redistributive policies was measured using the following item in the 
2008 round of the AmericasBarometer surveys by LAPOP: 
 
Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent 
you agree or disagree with the following statement. 
 
The (nationality) government should implement firm policies to reduce inequality in income between the 
rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                     Strongly agree  
 
Figure IV.1 shows the average level of support for income redistribution. The original 
variable was recoded into a 0-100 scale in order to ease the interpretation of the results.  The data 
indicate that citizens’ support for the implementation of public policies to reduce the gap 
between rich and poor is high in most Latin American countries. A clear exception is Venezuela 
where support for income redistribution by the government is relatively low, 54.1 points, perhaps 
reflecting the political polarization between those who support Hugo Chavez’s policies and those 
who oppose them. 
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In the remaining of Latin American countries, although support for redistribution is 
relatively high, an important variation in the average level of support is also observed. The 
average level of support for the implementation of income redistribution ranges from 65 points, 
in Haiti, to 90.7 points, in Paraguay. Interestingly, compared to most Latin American countries, 
in Canada and the United States support for government redistribution is low, at 68.7 and 47 
points, respectively. In fact, support for redistribution in the United States is by far the lowest in 
the Americas. 
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Figure IV-1. Average Support for Government Redistribution by Country 
 
Figure IV.2 shows the percentage of the population in the pooled dataset, excluding 
Canada and the United States, that falls in each category of the original scale of the support for 
redistribution variable. As can be observed, in Latin America there is a clear divide between 
those who “strongly agree” with the implementation of redistributive policies and those who 
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show lower support. Figure IV.2 indicates that 48 per cent of the population in Latin America 
“strongly agree” with government intervention for the purpose of improving the distribution of 
income, while 9.7, 13.0, and 17.6 per cent of the population gave a score of 4, 5, and 6, 
respectively; only a small portion of the population at the lower end of the scale, 3.8 per cent, 
strongly disagree with the implementation of redistributive policies. 
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Figure IV-2. Percentage of the Population in Latin America Showing low or high support for Income 
Redistribution 
 
This chapter examines the factors that explain this divide in opinions in Latin America 
about the proper role of the state in income redistribution; that is, why a sizable percentage of the 
population “strongly agrees” with the implementation of redistributive policies while others 
show lower support or even opposition. A simple cross tabulation suggests that an important 
determinant of individuals’ level of support in Latin America is individual wealth (see Figure 
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IV.3).53 As expected, the poor show a higher level of support in comparison to the relatively rich. 
It is worth mentioning that the level of support for those in the fifth quintile is likely to be much 
higher than what we would observe if data for the entire population were available, since non-
response rates among the very rich are much higher than among the poor in household surveys. 
Nevertheless, as it will be shown, the analysis presented in this chapter makes clear that when it 
comes to support for redistribution, citizens’ opinions are divided along class lines. 
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Figure IV-3. Average Support for Redistribution by Quintiles of Wealth 
 
It has been posited here that interpersonal trust encourages solidarity and therefore 
support for public policies that benefit the poor, regardless of individuals’ economic situation. 
                                                 
53 Individual wealth is here estimated taking into account the distribution of household assets and access to basic 
services in each country using the Principal Component Analysis’ methodology, as explained in Chapter II. Each 
quintile of wealth groups individuals that fall in the same level of wealth given their country’s wealth distribution. 
This implies, for instance, that although the standard of living across countries among individuals who fall in the 
first quintile may vary, in relative terms they represent the poorest population in their respective country. 
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Thus, the normative question that this study asks is how the linear relationship shown in Figure 
IV.3 can be made to look more like a flat line at a high value of support for redistribution. I 
hypothesize that interpersonal trust is an essential ingredient for achieving that goal.  
 
Multivariate Analysis 
Gridlock Politics between the Rich and Poor 
In order to test the first hypothesis of this chapter and explore the extent of class conflict 
over government redistributive policies, an ordered logit model was estimated. The model 
compares the likelihood of having a high support for redistribution across quintiles, holding 
constant individuals’ age, size of place of residence, years of schooling, sex, and country fixed 
effects.54 The results are presented in Table IV.1.55  
As can be observed in equation 1, where the baseline category is the fifth quintile, the 
odds of having a strong support for government redistribution is significantly higher for the first 
four quintiles relative to the fifth. This suggests that individuals at the very top of the wealth 
distribution are unambiguously the ones with the lowest levels of support for redistributive 
policies in Latin America. In addition, the results indicate that, as individual wealth increases, the 
odds ratio of showing high support for redistributive policies decreases, giving support to the 
first hypothesis of this chapter. Specifically, equation 1 shows that for individuals in the first 
                                                 
54 Haiti was excluded from the multivariate analysis because, given its extreme levels of poverty, it was not possible 
to split the distribution of wealth in quintiles. Forty per cent of the population falls in the first quintile. Therefore, no 
observations for the second quintile were available. Including Haiti, however, the results obtained are similar to the 
one reported in the regression models in this section.  
55 In all regression models in this section, standard errors were estimated taking into account the complex sample 
design of the LAPOP surveys; that is, the multivariate statistical analysis take into account the design effect on the 
precision of the regression results due to clustering and stratification. Standard errors were computed employing the 
command “svy” in STATA v.10 using the Taylor series’ linearization procedure. 
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quintile, the odds of showing the highest level of support for government redistribution (a score 
of 7) versus a lower score is about 1.34 times greater than for individuals in the fifth quintile. 
Table IV-1. Ordered Logit Model: Impact of Individual Wealth on Support for Redistributive Policies 
 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
 Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio 
Quintile 1 1.336***  1.089* 
Quintile 2 1.226*** .918*  
Quintile 3 1.206*** .903* .983 
Quintile 4 1.161*** .869** .947 
Quintile 5  
Age     
 
1.001 
.749*** 
1.001 
.815*** 
1.001 
 Large City (Capital city ; 
large cities =1; otherwise= 
0)         
1.015 1.015 1.015 
 Years of Schooling      1.006 1.006 1.006 
 Gender (1=Male ; 
0=Female)      
1.041+ 1.041+ 1.041+ 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Standard Errors take into account design effect 
N. of cases= 29,804 
N of countries=21 
F(26,1605)=32.26  
Country fixed effects included but not shown 
 
Equations 2 and 3 compare the probabilities of high support, leaving as reference 
categories the first and second quintile groups, accordingly. Taken together, equations 2 and 3 
suggest that, all other things being equal, the opinions of individuals in quintiles 2, 3, and 4 are 
closer to that of the poor; this is suggested by the smaller difference in the size of the odd ratios 
between the first four quintiles. The results also suggest that across quintiles 2, 3, and 4 
individuals show similar levels of opinions on what the role of the state in improving the 
distribution of income should be. Consequently, the highest levels of polarization about whether 
the government should implement firm policies to reduce income inequality is found between the 
very poor and rich.  As the bulk of the literature predicts, the middle class seems to have more 
moderate views on political issues, balancing out political conflict between haves and have nots 
(Lipset 1961 ; Moore 1966). 
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Testing the Impact of Social Capital on Support for Redistributive Policies 
Table IV.2 shows the results of the ordered logit model for testing the second hypothesis 
of this chapter. The regression results provide support to the hypothesis that trusting individuals 
are more likely to show higher support for redistributive policies, independently of individuals’ 
economic status and other confounding factors. In fact, as the standardized coefficient related to 
this variable indicates, interpersonal trust exerts one of the strongest effects on support for 
redistribution among the independent variables included in the models. 
 
Table IV-2. Ordered Logit Model: Impact of Interpersonal Trust on Support for Redistributive Policies 
(Standardized Coefficients) 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Interpersonal Trust 0.124*** 0.120*** 0.126*** 
Quintiles of Wealth -0.071*** -0.065*** -0.058** 
Political Trust  0.110*** 0.123*** 
Ideology   -0.102*** 
Participation in Religious Organizations -0.017 -0.014 -0.015 
Participation in Parents’ Organizations 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.059*** 
Participation in Community Organizations 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.059*** 
Participation in Work Related Organizations -0.028* -0.025+ -0.029+ 
Participation in Political Parties -0.011 -0.014 -0.009 
Interest in Politics 0.051*** 0.043** 0.051** 
Perception of  Personal Economic 
Wellbeing 
-0.067*** -0.076*** -0.076*** 
Perception of  National Economy -0.063*** -0.085*** -0.085*** 
 Number of Children      0.073*** 0.071*** 0.076*** 
 Age     -0.044** -0.046** -0.036* 
 Large City (Capital city ; large cities=1; 
otherwise= 0)          
0.018 0.020 0.015 
 Years of Schooling      0.038* 0.046* 0.069*** 
 Gender (1=Male ; Female=0)      0.036** 0.038** 0.047*** 
F 30.61 30.34 32.94 
 Number of Obs. 27814 27374 22446 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Standard Errors take into account design effect 
Country fixed effects included but not shown 
 
Additionally, Table IV.2 indicates that this result holds even after taking into account 
individuals’ level of trust in the government and ideological inclinations. Individuals who trust 
others are more likely to sympathize with the causes of economically disadvantaged groups, 
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regardless of their personal economic situation, degree of political trust, and ideology. Moreover, 
as the literature suggests, individuals who show a higher level of trust in the government are also 
more willing to support the implementation of public policies that benefit the poor. On the other 
hand, as expected, individuals who place themselves on the right of the ideological continuum 
show lower levels of support for direct government involvement in the distribution of income.  
The results in Table IV.2 also make clear that interpersonal trust rather than civic 
participation is unambiguously the most important source of solidarity in Latin American 
countries, a finding similar to Uslaner’s conclusion for the United States. Interestingly, 
participation in religious organizations, the most common type of civic participation in Latin 
America, does not have any impact on citizens’ support for policies that benefit the poor. The 
only two types of civic participation that seem to foster support for redistributive policies are 
participation in community groups and parents associations. This result confirms the finding of 
previous studies that suggest that in the Latin American context, contrary to Putnam’s 
contention, the type of civic participation matters for the formation of democratic attitudes 
(Seligson 1999). 
The three attitudinal items included in the model as control variables are statistically 
significant and have the expected signs. Citizens expressing more interest in politics show higher 
levels of support for redistributive policies. In addition, individuals who have more positive 
perceptions of their personal economic situation and of the state of the national economy are less 
likely to support redistributive policies. However, as the size of the standardized coefficients for 
these variables suggests, the effect of subjective measures on support for redistribution is smaller 
than the impact of objective individual wealth.  
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In terms of the demographic variables, the results indicate that despite the usual positive 
correlation between individual wealth and education, the latter is statistically significant but 
shows a positive sign. Therefore, while higher levels of individual wealth work to decrease the 
likelihood of strong support, education has the opposite impact, suggesting that education is not a 
good proxy of individual wealth. In addition, individuals with children also show a higher 
probability to strongly support policies to shrink the gap between the rich and poor, a finding 
congruent with the result that participation in parents’ organizations fosters support for 
redistributive policies. As Rehm (2007) suggests, it is likely that individuals, in this case those 
with children, support the implementation of redistributive policies regardless of their current 
wealth as a means to guarantee the economic safety of their family in the future. Finally, males 
show a higher likelihood of strongly agreeing to the implementation of redistributive policies, 
while older individuals are more likely to show lower support. 
 
Interpersonal Trust as a Source of Support for Redistribution among the Well-Off 
The empirical evidence gives strong support to the third hypothesis of this chapter as 
well. Better off individuals who show high levels of trust in the people in their community were 
found to be more likely to support policies to that benefit the poor. Table IV.3 presents the 
results. In order to test this hypothesis, an interaction term between interpersonal trust and 
quintiles of wealth was included in the ordered logit model. The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of the interaction term indicates that the higher the level of interpersonal 
trust, the higher the likelihood that economically better off individuals strongly support 
government policies to reduce income inequality. As shown in Table IV.3, the coefficient of the 
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interaction term is statistically significant even after controlling for political trust and ideology, 
the other two most important determinants of support for redistribution in the model. 
 
Table IV-3. Ordered Logit Model: Interpersonal Trust as a Mediating Factor between Individual Wealth 
and  Support for Redistributive Policies 
(Standardized Coefficients) 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Interpersonal Trust 0.046 0.035 0.050 
Quintiles of Wealth -0.186*** -0.189*** -0.166** 
Interpersonal Trust * Quintiles of Wealth 0.145** 0.156** 0.137* 
Political Trust  0.110*** 0.123*** 
Ideology   -0.101*** 
Participation in Religious Organizations -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 
Participation in Parents’ Organizations 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.058*** 
Participation in Community Organizations 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.059*** 
Participation in Work Related Organizations -0.029* -0.025+ -0.029* 
Participation in Political Parties -0.011 -0.014 -0.009 
Interest in Politics 0.051*** 0.043** 0.051** 
Perception of Personal Economic Wellbeing -0.068*** -0.077*** -0.077*** 
Perception of National Economy -0.062*** -0.084*** -0.085*** 
 Number of Children      0.074*** 0.072*** 0.077*** 
 Age     -0.045** -0.047** -0.037* 
 Large City (Capital city ; large cities=1; 
otherwise= 0)      
0.017 0.019 0.014 
 Years of Schooling      0.036* 0.044* 0.067*** 
 Gender (1=Male ; Female=0)      0.037** 0.039** 0.048*** 
F 30.18 29.92 32.53 
 Number of Obs. 27814 27374 22446 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Standard Errors take into account design effect 
Country fixed effects included but not shown 
 
Figure IV.4 illustrates the effect of interpersonal trust on the probability to “strongly 
agree” (i.e. to give a score of 7) with government intervention with the objective to reduce 
economic inequality. The predicted probabilities of giving a score of 7 to the redistribution 
question were estimated based on the results of equation 1 in Table IV.3. As shown in Figure 
IV.4, the average predicted probability of a “strongly agree” response to the implementation of 
redistributive policies is above fifty per cent for poor individuals (i.e. those in the first quintile), 
regardless of their level of interpersonal trust. In sharp contrast, the probability of a “strongly 
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agree” response among well-off individuals (i.e. those in the fifth quintile) is conditioned on their 
level of interpersonal trust. 
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Figure IV-4. Predicted Probability to Strongly Support Redistributive Policies  
by Quintiles and Levels of Interpersonal Trust 
 
While the difference of falling in the category of maximum support for government 
redistribution between individuals in the first and fifth quintiles is greater than twelve points 
among those with the lowest level of interpersonal trust, this gap between rich and poor shrinks 
considerably among those who find people in their community “very trustworthy.” Specifically, 
when individuals believe people in their community to be “very trustworthy,” the likelihood that 
they will “strongly agree” with the implementation of firm policies to reduce inequality is above 
fifty per cent for all economic groups. Thus, as interpersonal trust increases, agreement on 
fundamental political issues between the rich and poor is more likely, as depicted by the almost 
flat curve at the highest level of interpersonal trust.  
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Conclusion 
Latin American countries have high rates of political instability, which have been 
associated with the region’s high economic inequality and polarization (Gasparini and Molina 
2006). This chapter demonstrates that an important source of political conflict in Latin America 
is the disagreement among the citizenry on the role of the government in income redistribution, 
particularly between the very rich and poor. While the poor cry for vigorous redistributive public 
policies, the rich show low support or utterly reject them.  
The findings support Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2008) suggestion that the “political 
nature” of the process of reforming economic institutions makes such reform difficult. In 
economically divided societies, profound divergence of interests seems to impede achieving a 
“political equilibrium” that would translate into sound public policies. Thus, an important issue 
to resolve is how political compromise can be encouraged across economic groups with the aim 
to promote economic progress and political stability.  
 The findings of this chapter suggest that interpersonal trust does work as a conciliatory 
force between haves and have nots. Contrary to what rational choice models predict, support for 
redistributive public policies is higher among well-off individuals who show high levels of 
interpersonal trust. Moreover, this chapter demonstrates that interpersonal trust trumps civic 
participation, since the former consistently predicts higher levels of support for redistribution, 
giving firm support to the contention that generalized interpersonal trust is strongly linked to 
equality and solidarity values. In turn, interpersonal trust seems to be a critical part of the 
solution to the political disequilibrium that characterizes the region.  
 The downside of this hopeful finding is that, as previously noted, the formation of 
interpersonal trust in the Americas is conditioned by poverty and economic inequality levels. 
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High poverty and inequality disincentivize the emergence of interpersonal trust, particularly 
among those who are most likely to oppose redistribution, especially the well-off. Thus, Latin 
American countries seem to be trapped in a vicious circle between high poverty and economic 
inequality, low interpersonal trust, and low support among the rich for the implementation of 
public policies that are likely to counterbalance the state of poverty and deep economic disparity 
that characterizes the region.  
A policy implication of this study is that Latin American governments need to weight the 
preferences of the relatively poor more heavily in their political agendas and implement serious 
and effective policies to alleviate poverty and economic inequality while increasing the levels of 
interpersonal trust. Of course, if those elected to office are themselves wealthy, it is unlikely that 
they will follow this advice. Nonethless, to escape from the poverty/inequality/instability trap, 
Latin American leaders need to heed the cross-country empirical evidence that reducing 
economic inequality through redistributive public policies has a positive effect on the generation 
of interpersonal trust (Knack and Zak 2002), suggesting that in Latin America, the 
implementation of progressive fiscal policies are key for turning the vicious circle here described 
into a virtuous circle that might ultimately promote a more just and democratic region. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix IV-1. Exact Wording of the Items from the LAPOP Survey Included in Chapter IV 
Variable Question 
Interpersonal trust  Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that 
people in this community are generally very trustworthy, 
somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy ..?     
Support for Redistributive Policies The (country) government should implement firm policies to 
reduce inequality in income between the rich and the poor. To 
what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? (1-7 
scale) 
Participation in Meetings of Religious 
Organizations 
I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell 
me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or 
twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. 
 Meetings of any religious organization? 
Participation in Meetings of Parents’ 
Organizations 
Meetings of a parents’ association at school? 
Participation in Meetings of Community 
Organizations 
 Meetings of a committee or association for community 
improvement? 
Participation in Meetings of Work related 
Organizations 
Meetings of an association of professionals, traders or farmers? 
Participation in Meetings of Political Parties  Meetings of a political party or political movement? 
Interest in Politics How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or 
none?  
Political Trust To what extent do you trust the national government? (1-7 scale) 
Ideology On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right… 
According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have 
for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where 
would you place yourself on this scale? 
Perception of Personal Economic Situation How would you describe your overall economic situation? 
Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, 
bad or very bad? 
Perception of National Economy How would you describe the country’s economic situation? 
Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, 
bad or very bad?  
Education What was the last year of education you completed? 
Quintiles of Wealth Own estimations based on LAPOP’s household assets and access 
to basic services series and the Principal Component Analysis’s 
methodology 
Number of Children How many children do you have?   
Large Cities (Capital city and large cities=1 ; 
otherwise= 0)  
Based on LAPOP’s size of place variable.  
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FINAL REMARKS 
 
 
Intense conflict over public policy choices has historically turned Latin American 
countries into battle fields. During the democratization period in Latin America, social conflict 
over policies has continued to occur on daily basis, particularly in unconventional types of 
political participation, putting democratic stability at risk. Disputes in Bolivia over the fate of gas 
industry revenues, social polarization in Costa Rica between supporters and opponents of the 
implementation of a free trade agreement with the United States, and the opposition of farmers in 
Argentina to the taxation of exports are just some of the most recent and salient examples of 
political conflict in the region that have resulted in heated street protests. The results of this study 
suggest that at the core of Latin America’s political turmoil are the high levels of economic 
inequality that characterize the region. Heightened economic inequality engenders adverse social 
attitudes among the citizenry that ultimately erodes solidarity and results in polarized public 
policy preferences along economic class lines, especially when such policies are likely to 
produce redistributive effects.  
Specifically, this study finds that Latin America’s high economic inequality is preventing 
the widespread emergence of a core social attitude for the achievement of political stability, 
namely interpersonal trust. Extreme economic heterogeneity creates the perfect setting for the 
growth of discriminatory attitudes against those who have less and also infuses fear of crime 
among well-off individuals, resulting in overall lower levels of interpersonal trust. These 
pervasive social dynamics make the rich and poor uneasy about each other to the point that the 
rich who live in contexts of high economic inequality and underdevelopment might even show 
lower levels of interpersonal trust than the poor. This finding clearly contradicts the conventional 
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wisdom in the democratization and social capital literature that suggests that the poor are the 
ones primarily responsible for low levels of interpersonal trust in developing countries.  
By examining the political culture and preferences of ordinarily citizens in economically 
unequal societies, this study has contributed to our understanding of why economic inequality 
produces fragile democracies. The political implications of the social dynamics that this study 
finds in contexts of high economic inequality are profound. In particular, low levels of 
generalized interpersonal trust among the rich make it more difficult for them to identify with the 
cause of the poor and therefore to compromise and support policies aimed at the redistribution of 
income or wealth. While the majority of the population demands policies to improve their 
standards of living, a minority bitterly opposes them. Thus, individualism trumps solidarity 
under conditions of inequality, perpetuating a state of poverty and political instability. As the 
empirical evidence from Latin America presented in this dissertation suggests, political 
deadlocks over policy preferences among the citizenry is a primary characteristic of 
economically unequal democracies, which are at the same time characterized by feelings of 
mistrust, discriminatory attitudes, and fear.  
Pundits and academics alike face the challenge of determining feasible courses of action 
that will eventually break Latin America’s vicious circle that links economic inequality, mistrust, 
and low support among the rich replacing these with the implementation of policies to tackle 
poverty. An obvious part of the solution is to weight more heavily the voices of the poor in the 
design and implementation of public policies. Although in the last few years many Latin 
American countries have elected, self-denominated, pro-poor governments, proclaiming and 
implementing populist measures and acting at the margin of the law, however, has  been typical 
for many of these new administrations. How to fight poverty and achieve political stability 
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within the confines of the democratic game is the real challenge that Latin American countries 
face.  
 
